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Abstract: Inter-sovereign disputes o(,er environmental regulation in Indian country are
increasingly common. The federal government, individual states, and native nations all
assert interests in controlling pollution on Indian reservations; the question of which sov-
ereign should regulate in this area presents complex issues of federal law, native self-deter-
mination, and state autonomy. In this Article, the authors trace the roots of federal, state,
and tribal authority to control events within reservation boundaries. Applying a three-
tiered analysis to the problem, the authors examine: express federal preemption of state
pollution control laws; federal program delegation to native governments as a bar to state
regulation; and established common law barriers to state authority in Indian country. The
authors conclude that state pollution control regulation, whether aimed at native or non-
native persons and activities, is prohibited in Indian country.
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[W]e beg leave to observe and to remind you that the Cherokee are not
foreigners but original inhabitants of America, and that they now
inhabit and stand on the soil of their own territory and that the limits of
this territory are defined by the treaties which they have made with the
government of the United States, and that the states by which they are
now surrounded have been created out of land which was once theirs,
and that they cannot recognize the sovereignty of any state within the
limits of their territory.'
Tribal and state jurisdictional confrontations abound in Indian
country.2 Control over reservation environmental protection increas-
ingly is a focus of these inter-sovereign disputes. Native nations, long
1. R. COTTERILL, THE SOUTHERN INDIANs 218 (1954) (from a letter of 1823 to President
Monroe from the Cherokee chiefs concerning their suggested removal to Arkansas from their
original homelands claimed by the state of Georgia).
2. The authors generally prefer the term "Native American," or the shortened version,
"native," to the term "Indian." There are, however, some exceptions. First, "Indian country" is
used as a term of art to designate all lands within the territorial boundaries of a reservation, as
well as additional native lands located outside reservation borders. See infra note 207 (statutory
definition of Indian country). Much of the discussion in this Article pertaining to reservation
pollution, however, will differentiate between native and non-native lands within Indian country.
Second, while we recognize that the euphemisms of "Indian law" and "'Indian policy" patently
are incorrect as reflecting derivations of tribal legal and policy preferences, we use those terms in
the popular sense to refer to domestic United States law and policy regarding relations among the
federal government, the states, and the native nations.
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threatened with the loss of their extractable and renewable resources,
now are faced with losing as well the ability to protect those natural
assets remaining to them. Preserving the natural resources of Indian
country for future generations of native peoples ultimately will mean
little if the air is polluted, the waters unfit to drink, and the land
poisoned.
Recent case law and scholarly commentary have served to direct
renewed attention to environmental issues and pollution control
problems within native territories.3 The primary legal issue that has
emerged is who should regulate environmental protection in Indian
country.4
3. Washington Dep't of Ecology v. EPA, 752 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1985); Allen, Who Should
Control Hazardous Waste on Native American Lands?: Looking Beyond Washington Department
of Ecology v. EPA, 14 ECOLOGY L.Q. 69 (1987); Du Bey, Tano & Parker, Protection of the
Reservation Environment: Hazardous Waste Management on Indian Lands, 18 ENVTL. L. 449
(1988); Note, Regulatory Jurisdiction over Non-Indian Hazardous Waste in Indian Country, 72
IOWA L. REV. 1091 (1987) [hereinafter Non-Indian Hazardous Waste Regulation]; Note,
Environmental Law--Federal Indian Law--Recent Developments-State of Washington,
Department of Ecology v. EPA, 27 NAT. RESOURCES J. 739 (1987). For a recent non-scholarly
overview of environmental activities in Indian country, see [Current Developments] Env't Rep.
(BNA) 1920 (Jan. 27, 1989).
Attention to environmental matters in Indian country, however, is hardly a recent
phenomenon. The mid- to late 1970's, for example, saw a surge of legal materials on native
environmental issues. See, eg., COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, INDIAN RIGHTS AND
CLAIMS: ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE STATES (1977); P.
MAXFIELD, M. DIETERICH & F. TRELEASE, NATURAL RESOURCES LAW ON AMERICAN
INDIAN LANDS (1977) [hereinafter P. MAXFIELD]; Anderson, Strip Mining on Reservation
Lands: Protecting the Environment and the Rights of Indian Allotment Owners, 35 MONT. L.
REV. 209 (1974); Schaller, The Applicability of Environmental Statutes to Indian Lands, 2(8) AM.
INDIAN J. 15 (1976); Schnidman, Indians and the Environment: Anl Examination of Jurisdictional
Issues Relative to Environmental Management, 4 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (1977); Will, Indian
Lands Environment-Who Should Protect It, 18 NAT. RESOURCES J. 465 (1978); Comment, The
Applicability of the Federal Pollution Acts to Indian Reservations: A Case for Tribal Self-
Government, 48 U. COLO. L. REV. 63 (1976) [hereinafter Applicability of Federal Pollution Acts].
4. In this Article the authors address solely the issue of precluding state jurisdiction over
environmental matters in Indian country, and not the related issue of which of the remaining
sovereigns-native nations or the federal government-should have primacy over environmental
affairs within native territorial boundaries.
The legitimacy of federal environmental powers over native reservations is much more
problematical. The merits of this issue will not be debated fully here; to facilitate the present
discussion only, the authors have accepted that federal environmental laws of general
applicability to the United States at large apply with equal force to native governments. In the
broader context, the authors reject any unilateral arrogation of federal authority.
Both tribal and federal sovereigns appear to agree that the optimum solution to pollution
control within Indian country is for those tribes that are willing and able, to assume control over
environmental regulation, with the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") serving as an
interim facilitator and a source of funding, assistance, and technical expertise. To an extent,
these practices promote tribal self-government, build tribal expertise in environmental matters,
further the concept that native nations are more than mere geopolitical subdivisions of the states,
and prohibit the imposition of state regulatory authority over native peoples and reservations.
Washington Law Review
Section I of this Article presents an overview of regulatory jurisdic-
tion in Indian country, as a necessary backdrop to the issue of state
assertions of pollution control authority over native territories. Sec-
tion II outlines the types of pollution control laws that the states may
attempt to impose in Indian country. In Section III, the Article sets
forth a three-tiered analysis by which a court may determine whether
these state pollution control laws are applicable in Indian country. At
the first level, the court determines whether federal pollution control
legislation expressly preempts state pollution control laws. If not, the
court next considers whether the statutory interpretation scheme of
the federal Environmental Protection Agency, involving federal pri-
macy and program delegation to native governments, bars state regu-
lation. If this second level of analysis does not preclude state
regulation, the court lastly determines whether the standard Indian
common law barriers to state authority-federal preemption and
infringement on tribal sovereignty-serve to prohibit state jurisdic-
tion. The authors conclude that under this three-tiered analysis, state
pollution control laws and regulations, over both native and non-
native persons and activities, are prohibited in Indian country.
I. REGULATORY JURISDICTION IN INDIAN COUNTRY
Pollution control is primarily a regulatory activity. The govern-
ment attempts to regulate and control the amount and placement of
pollutants before incidents of ecological insult occur. These efforts
aim to maintain pollution at or below an acceptable level and, perhaps,
to reduce overall pollution. Which government can regulate pollution
in Indian country-over which persons and on what lands-is a
source of continuing conflict among the three governments involved in
regulatory activities in native territory.
Jurisdiction in Indian country is apportioned among three govern-
ments-federal, tribal, and state-all of which claim a degree of regu-
latory authority over the territory of native nations. The federal
government claims the right to regulate by virtue of its asserted posi-
tion as the dominant sovereign throughout the entirety of the United
But delegation of program authority under the federal pollution control acts is incompatible with
true tribal self-determination. Federal delegation imposes upon native nations the environmental
values and concerns, and the methods for addressing them, of the federal government.
By definition, a program imposed upon a tribal government is not freely chosen. Regardless of
the beneficence of the federal pollution control schemes, and regardless of whether a tribe freely
would choose those same programs, the mere fact of federal imposition severs the "self" from the
"determination." Tribal primacy should be released, to the extent tribes are willing to shoulder
the political and fiscal encumbrances, from subordination to federal laws and standards. Tribes
should have true primacy, not a primacy dependent upon federal pollution control programs.
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States' internationally-recognized borders. Native governments are
entitled, pursuant to their inherent sovereign powers, to regulate the
persons and lands within the tribes' territorial domains. State govern-
ments assert regulatory authority on the ground that native nations
are not extraterritorial to the states that abut them, and many times
also on the ground that non-natives within reservation domains are
properly the subjects of state rather than tribal regulation and enforce-
ment. This section will survey the basis of each government's asser-
tion of regulatory jurisdiction in Indian country and will describe the
current status of each government's authority to regulate under
domestic law.
A. Federal Regulatory Jurisdiction
The basis for the assertion of federal authority in Indian country
stems irreducibly from the dual fictions of discovery and conquest
incorporated into United States domestic law during the early nine-
teenth century by Chief Justice John Marshall. Marshall outlined
"that great and broad rule" of the colonizing European powers, that
"discovery" gave to the discovering nation the exclusive right against
other European powers to acquire title from the aboriginal inhabi-
tants. In Marshall's hands, however, this agreement of convenience
among the discovering nations was transformed into a doctrine vesting
absolute title in fee in the discoverer; the native nations necessarily
retained only a lesser right of occupancy to the lands they inhabited.6
Marshall then fictionalized discovery even further, into a "conquest"
of the continent, thus transmuting the already fictive native right of
5. Johnson & Graham's Lessee v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 587 (1823). The title
thus derived necessarily was inchoate, for discovery vested in the discoverer only an exclusive or
preemptive entitlement to deal with the natives as against other cisatlantic crowns. The
discovering nation's entitlement could be made complete only by extinguishing the indigenous
peoples' natural title. See, e.g., R. BARSH & J. HENDERSON, THE ROAD: INDIAN TRIBES AND
POLITICAL LIBERTY 46-49 (1980); Henderson, Unravelling the Riddle of Aboriginal Title, 5 AM.
INDIAN L. REv. 75 (1977). For a Native American parody on the discovery doctrine, see
Revard, Report to the Nation, 6 AM. INDIAN Q. 305 (1982) (claiming various parts of Europe in
the name of the Osage Nation).
6. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 574:
While the different nations of Europe respected the rights of natives, as occupants, they
asserted the ultimate dominion to be in themselves; and claimed and exercised, as a
consequence of this ultimate dominion, a power to grant the soil, while yet in possession of
the natives. These grants have been understood by all to convey a title to the grantees,
subject only to the Indian right of occupancy.
With this creative manipulation of the discovery doctrine, Marshall devised a notion of absolute
title from its inchoate title root. The residual right of occunancy in the native nations ironically
is characterized in the legal lexicon as "Indian title." This "Indian title" is not a property right
and carries no legal title. See infra note 20.
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occupancy into a profound legal disability, persistent to this day, that
prevents native tribes from alienating their land to any entity other
than the federal government.7
Within a decade Marshall extended the ramifications of the discov-
ery doctrine beyond the lands issue. In part because the native nations
had only a right of occupancy to the lands they inhabited, Marshall
ruled that they could not be true foreign nations, but merely "domes-
tic dependent nations."8 As such, the tribes and their territories were
a part of, and not apart from, the United States itself.' The exercise of
certain sovereign powers, notably the right freely to alienate land and
the right to engage in foreign relations, could now be accomplished
only through the intermediary of the federal government.'0 Judicial
alchemy in the domestic courts thus transformed the United States
from a discovering nation into a superior sovereign."1
7. M'Intosh. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 591:
However extravagant the pretension of converting the discovery of an inhabited country
into conquest may appear; if the principle has been asserted in the first instance, and
afterwards sustained; if a country has been acquired and held under it: if the property of the
great mass of the community originates in it, it becomes the law of the land, and cannot be
questioned. So, too, with respect to the concomitant principle, that the Indian inhabitants
are to be considered merely as occupants ... [and] to be deemed incapable of transferring
the absolute title to others.
The legal disability articulated by Marshall in 1823 was not the shared vision of all colonists.
For a discussion of early views on "the Indians' rights to dispose of their property as they saw fit
upon their own authority," see Anderson, Samuel Wharton and the Indians' Rights to Sell Their
Land: An Eighteenth Century View, 63 W. PA. HIST. MAG. 121 (1980).
8. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
9. Native nations "are considered as within the jurisdictional limits of the United States.
subject to many of those restraints which are imposed upon our own citizens." Id. The view that
native nations are subsumed within the United States reached its ultimate articulation in United
States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 379 (1886):
But these Indians are within the geographical limits of the United States. The soil and the
people within these limits are under the political control of the Government of the United
States, or of the States of the Union. There exist within the broad domain of sovereignty but
these two.
10. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17-18:
[The Cherokee] and their country are considered by foreign nations, as well as by ourselves,
as being so completely under the sovereignty and dominion of the United States, that any
attempt to acquire their lands, or to form a political connection with them, would be
considered by all as an invasion of our territory, and an act of hostility.
11. See. e.g., Choctaw Nation v. United States, 119 U.S. 1, 28 (1886) ("[t]he recognized
relation between the parties to this controversy, therefore, is that between a superior and an
inferior").
Even domestic law, however, recognizes that this arrogation of superior dominion by the
United States, as a successor to the discovering nations, did not divest native nations of all
sovereignty. Chief Justice Marshall maintained that tribes retained all rights not inconsistent
with the doctrine of discovery:
The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent political
communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil
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The federal government, relying upon its perceived superordinate
sovereignty, asserts the right to regulate within the entirety of its bor-
ders, including reservation territories. This federal regulatory power
stems from two basic sources. Congress' asserted right of plenary
power over native nations allows it to enact legislation specifically
affecting native tribes, lands, and peoples. General federal legislation,
on the other hand, usually is held applicable to natives through a judi-
cially created doctrine that natives ordinarily should not be immune
from federal laws of general applicability.
1. Federal Plenary Power
Federal power-more particularly, congressional power-over
native nations is said to be plenary. 2 Domestic courts have positioned
the legal origins of this congressional power, derived from the doctrine
of discovery, in the Constitution. 3 One of the primary tenets of the
plenary power doctrine is the unilateral power of the federal govern-
ment to legislate specifically regarding native peoples, lands, and gov-
from time immemorial, with the single exception of that imposed by irresistible power,
which excluded them from intercourse with any other European potentate than the first
discoverer ....
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832).
12. National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 851 (1985).
13. McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 n.7 (1973). The constitutional
provisions frequently invoked to buttress the plenary power doctrine include the Indian
Commerce Clause, allocating to Congress the power to regulate commerce "with the Indian
tribes," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; the Treaty Power, under which the young Republic treated
with the native nations as with any foreign nation, U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; the Supremacy
Clause, which lists treaties among the supreme laws of the land, U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2; and the
Property Clause, permitting Congress to "make all needful Rules and Regulations" concerning
property of the United States, U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
Chief Justice Marshall invoked as well the War Power. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6
Pet.) 515, 559 (1832) (The Constitution "confers on Congress the powers of war and peace: of
making treaties, and of regulating commerce . . . with the Indian tribes. These powers
comprehend all that is required for the regulation of our intercourse with the Indians."). Judicial
use of the Constitution to justify exercises of congressional power is, in truth, little more than an
after-the-fact search for legal underpinnings. In its blunter opinions, the Court on occasion has
exposed the bare skeleton of the doctrine: that the federal government has plenary legal power
simply because it has the concomitant raw political power:
The power of the General Government over these remnants of a race once powerful, now
weak and diminished in numbers... must exist in that Government, because it never has
existed anywhere else, because the theater of its exercise is within the geographical limits of
the United States, because it has never been denied, and because it alone can enforce its laws
on all the Tribes.
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384-85 (1886).
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ernments, and to exercise near complete control over significant
aspects of native life."
Plenary power involves more, however, than the ability to impose a
federal overlay of regulations onto tribal life. In stark fact, it means
that congressional whim ultimately can control fully the tribal exercise
of sovereign powers.' 5 Under the ruse of plenary power, Congress can
strip tribes of specific governmental powers,16 force state jurisdiction
onto unconsenting and unwilling native governments,' 7 unilaterally
abrogate native treaties,' 8 or choose even to end the existence of tribes
14. For example, federal legislation governs such areas as trading with the native tribes, 25
U.S.C. §§ 261-266 (1982); and leasing of allotted and unallotted lands for mining and timber
harvesting, id. §§ 391-412.
The exercise of plenary power to legislate over native nations, however, is not confined to the
economic arena. See, e.g., Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1982) (arrogating to the federal
government the authority to try natives for enumerated crimes committed in Indian country).
15. Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 719 (1983) (native sovereignty "'exists only at the
sufferance of Congress and is subject to complete defeasance' " (quoting United States v. Wheeler,
435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) (emphasis in Rice)); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56
(1978) ("Congress has plenary authority to limit, modify or eliminate the powers of local self-
government which the tribes otherwise possess"); see also Newton, Federal Power Over Indians:
Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 195, 284-85 (1984) ("Whatever
Congress wants, Congress gets .... ).
For a view that plenary power is not such a bad thing, see Laurence, Learning to Live with the
Plenary Power of Congress Over the Indian Nations: An Essay in Reaction to Professor Williams'
"Algebra" 30 ARIz. L. REv. 413 (1988). Professor Laurence champions the doctrine, presenting
his belief that "it is to the benefit of the health and stability of Indian law to ... accepto the
plenary power, and to work to control the exercise of it." Id. at 426. He condescendingly
describes as "charming" the native vision of separate, fully equal, full self-determinative
sovereignty for native nations. Id. at 437.
Laurence's argument necessarily is skewed by his failure to address any exercise of plenary
power other than imposition of due process and equal protection guarantees on tribal
governments. For a brief discussion of other congressional depredations on native sovereign
powers under the guise of plenary power, see Newton, supra, at 234-35.
The Laurence thesis triggered a brief but rousing scholarly exchange on the issue of
congressional plenary power. Compare Professor Williams' response, Learning Not to Live with
Eurocentric Myopia: A Reply to Professor Laurence's "Learning to Live with the Plenary Power of
Congress over the Indian Nations, " 30 ARIZ. L. REV. 439 (1988), and Laurence's reply, On
Eurocentric Myopia, the Designated Hitter Rule, and "The Actual State of Things, " 30 ARIz. L.
REV. 459 (1988).
16. See, e.g., Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1439 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (Curtis Act
of 1898, until repealed by the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act of 1936, abolished the tribal courts
of the Creek Nation).
17. See the discussion of Public Law 280, infra Section I.C.3.
18. The classic case of treaty abrogation in Indian law is Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S.
553, 556 (1902), although courts continue to find that congressional action has abrogated rights
guaranteed by treaty. See, e.g., United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 743 (1986) (legislative
history of Bald Eagle Protection Act, and express provision for permits to natives to take eagles
for religious purposes, reflected Congress' belief "that it was abrogating the rights of Indians to
take eagles"); Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 478 n.22 (1979) ("The intent
to abrogate inconsistent treaty rights is clear enough from the express terms of Pub. L. 280.");
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as federally recognized entities.' 9 Congressional exercise of its plenary
power frequently is said to be subject to the restraints of the Constitu-
tion"° and the federal-Indian trust doctrine,2" through the mechanism
Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 594 (1977) ("Congress understood that it was not
bound by the three-fourths consent requirement of the 1868 Treaty with the Sioux Nation.").
19. From 1954 to 1962, the most recent heyday of federal assimilationist policy, Congress
passed fourteen termination acts providing for removal of federal recognition from some 110
bands and tribes. Although in theory termination legislation withdrew only federal recognition,
supervision, and services, in fact the acts dissolved tribal governments and dissipated or
liquidated tribal land bases. Six restoration acts in the 1970's and 1980's returned federal
recognition to most of the terminated communities. Additionally, federal courts have held
unlawful the termination of 21 of 40 California rancherias. See, e.g., Governing Council of
Pinoleville Indian Community v. Mendocino County, 684 F. Supp. 1042 (N.D. Cal. 1988); Smith
v. United States, 515 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Cal. 1978). Several native bands and tribes and over one
million acres of land remain unrestored. See generally Walch, Terminating the Indian
Termination Policy, 25 STAN. L. REv. 1181 (1983).
House Concurrent Resolution 108, establishing in 1953 the congressional policy of terminating
native tribes' "status as wards of the United States," was not repudiated by Congress until 1988.
See H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 67 Stat. B132 (1953); H.R. Res. 427, 100th Cong.,
2d Sess., 134 CONG. REc. H1707, H1792-93 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1988).
20. In particular, the takings clause of the fifth amendment places the federal government
under an obligation to pay just compensation for taking native land where native title has been
recognized by treaty. United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (1980). But see
United States v. Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, 480 U.S. 700 (1987) (no takings where damage
to riverbed interests was caused by government action pursuant to the overriding federal
navigational servitude); Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 288-89 (1955)
("Indian occupancy, not specifically recognized as ownership by action authorized by Congress,
may be extinguished by the Government without compensation"). Oddly enough, in these latter
two cases the Court spoke of its "generosity" to native nations. Cherokee Nation, 480 U.S. at 706
("We think that the decision [determining tribal ownership of the riverbed pursuant to treaty)
was quite generous to respondent, and we refuse to give a still more expansive and novel reading
of respondent's property interests."); Tee-Hit-Ton, 348 U.S. at 281-82 ("[g]enerous provision has
been willingly made to allow tribes to recover for wrongs, as a matter of grace, not because of
legal liability"). Tribes might well dispute the Court's reading of its course of "generous"
dealings with native nations.
21. The trust doctrine, the untoward outgrowth of Chief Justice Marshall's original
characterization of the federal-tribal relationship as that of guardian-ward, Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831), binds the federal government to "the most exacting
fiduciary standards." Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 297 (1942). The Supreme
Court in recent years, however, has limited the utility of the trust doctrine as a restraint on
congressional power. In a pair of cases, the Court appears to hold that a federal statutory and
regulatory scheme establishing a fiduciary obligation regarding a specific activity is necessary
before a native nation successfully can bring suit against the government for breach of trust.
United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 546 (1980) (Mitchell 1); United States v. Mitchell, 463
U.S. 206, 224-26 (1983) (Mitchell I1) (General Allotment Act creates only a "bare trust" that
will not support an action for breach for mismanagement of timber lands, but federal timber
management statutes and regulations comprehensively governing harvest of native timber
"establish a fiduciary relationship and define the contours of the United States' fiduciary
responsibilities" such that the government is liable in damages for breach of those duties).
Several scholars recently have challenged the long presupposed efficacy of the trust doctrine as a
curb on federal power by noting the fact that raising a trust.claim presupposes the legitimacy of
the trust relationship. See, e.g., Ball, Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes, 1987 AM. B. FOUND.
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of judicial review.22 These restraints, however, ultimately are ineffec-
tive defenses to counter the congressional power of "complete defea-
sance. '"23 Moreover, these restraints do not prevent Congress from
acting, but only permit the subsequent remedy of money damages in
selected instances.24
RES. J. 3, 65 (1987); Newton, Enforcing the Federal-Indian Trust Relationship After Mitchell, 31
CATH. U.L. REV. 635, 682 (1982).
22. In United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (1980), the Court referred to
"the idea that relations between this Nation and the Indian tribes are a political matter, not
amenable to judicial review. That view, of course, has long since been discredited in taking cases,
and was expressly laid to rest in Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 84...
(1977)." Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 413 (footnote omitted). Professor Newton notes that the
mere fact of judicial review of congressional actions represents a significant "narrowing" of the
plenary power doctrine. Newton, supra note 15, at 231. Professor Wilkinson asserts in a similar
vein that recent Supreme Court "opinions have reconceptualized aspects of federal power over
Indian property rights, narrowed it, and rendered the term plenary (as a synonym for absolute
and unreviewable) obsolete." C. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW 79
(1987).
Wilkinson's prognostication that the opinions he references "may well become reasonably
imposing edifices in this field," standing as "polite but firm warnings to Congress that care must
be taken in-house," id. at 82, is disconcerting. Even granting the frequently acknowledged check
on congressional taking of treaty-recognized property rights without fifth amendment
compensation, no similar check exists for United States governmental "taking" of most things
"aboriginal"-neither land, Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955); self-
government, Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463 (1979); nor culture, Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988). Judicial checking power of
congressional interests in Indian affairs, other than for fifth amendment takings, is gossamer.
Moreover, contrary to the entirety of Wilkinson's thesis that the judiciary has been "principled,
even courageous" as a modern savior to native interests, C. WILKINSON, supra, at 4, the Supreme
Court itself arguably is the current primary wielder of a plenary authority adverse to native
interests. See Ball, supra note 21, at 57-58; Royster & Fausett, Fresh Pursuit onto Native
American Reservations: State Rights "to Pursue Savage Hostile Indian Marauders Across the
Border'--The Limits of State Intrusion into Tribal Sovereignty, 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 191, 263-
81 (1988). See generally Kramer, The Most Dangerous Branch: An Institutional Approach to
Understanding the Role of the Judiciary in American Indian Jurisdictional Determinations, 1986
Wis. L. REV. 989.
23. See supra note 15.
24. Classic to this point is the celebrated unlawful taking of the Black Hills-the sacred
center of the Dakota (Sioux) Nation. The native pursuit of elusive American justice since the
congressional theft of these sacred lands in 1877 has required four special acts of Congress, the
longest running federal court battle in United States history, nearly $11 million in attorney's fees,
and more than 100 years of waiting. In 1980, the Supreme Court affirmed the largest native land
claims damages judgment ever: $105 million in value and interest for seven million acres,
including the Black Hills, admitting that " '[a] more ripe and rank case of dishonorable dealings
will never, in all probability, be found in our history.' " United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians,
448 U.S. 371, 388 (1980) (quoting United States v. Sioux Nation, 207 Ct. Cl. 234, 241, 518 F.2d
1298, 1302 (1975)).
Five of the eight tribes party to the litigation, including the largest tribe, the Oglala Lakota,
consistently have refused to accept payment for their birthright or to participate with the
Department of the Interior in planning the distribution of the judgment, now worth over $200
million. The award of "just" compensation, while vindicating their legal right, merely
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2. The Tuscarora Rule
At least through the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court
adhered to the rule that general federal laws, like state laws, were not
applicable to natives within Indian country." Despite these early une-
quivocal pronouncements, the Court held in Federal Power Commis-
sion v. Tuscarora Indian Nation16 that, absent a treaty or federal
statute to the contrary, federal laws of general applicability apply also
to natives and native tribes.2 7
The Tuscarora Court drew this rule almost exclusively from three of
its earlier decisions.28 Oddly, all three were tax cases: two of these
opinions concerned the applicability of the federal income tax to
natives, and the third addressed the applicability of state inheritance
taxes to Oklahoma natives. A long-standing rule in tax law, however,
provides that "to be valid, exemptions to tax laws should be clearly
expressed."2 9 Thus, in the tax cases cited by the Court in Tuscarora,
the requirement of express exemptions in tax law had been permitted
to override competing native interests. In Tuscarora itself, the Court
took that tax rule and applied it wholesale to general federal
legislation."0
perpetuated an heinous cultural wrong. Adams, Whose Land Is ItAnyway?, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 3,
1987, at 21.
Senators Bill Bradley and Daniel Inouye have sponsored in each of the last two Congresses the
Sioux Nation Black Hills Act to return 1.3 million acres of federally controlled lands in and
around the Black Hills to the rightful owners. See King, Bradley Offers Measure to Return Sioux
Land, N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1987, at Y17. For recent accounts of the Dakota Nation travail in
this issue, see generally Adams, supra; Carrels, Sioux Demand the Black Hills, High Country
News, Feb. 15, 1988, at 10; Greider, The Heart of Everything That Is, ROLLING STONE MAG.,
May 7, 1987, at 37.
25. "General acts of Congress did not apply to Indians, unless so expressed as to clearly
manifest an intention to include them." Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 100 (1884); see also United
States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1886); Exparte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 570 (1883).
One notable exception arose in the case of The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616
(1871), in which the Court held that a general federal excise tax abrogated a specific provision of
the Cherokee treaty guaranteeing the tribe a tax exemption on all products sold outside the
reservation. A dozen years later, the Court refused to follow The Cherokee Tobacco, and held
that federal laws must be construed to conform to treaty provisions wherever possible. United
States v. Forty-Three Gallons of Whiskey, 108 U.S. 491, 496, 497-98 (1883).
26. 362 U.S. 99 (1960).
27. "However that may have been, it is now well settled by many decisions of this Court that
a general statute in terms applying to all persons includes Indians and their property interests."
Id. at 116; see also Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1, 6 (1956).
28. Superintendent of Five Civilized Tribes v. Commissioner, 295 U.S. 418 (1935); Choteau v.
Burnet, 283 U.S. 691 (1931); Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. United States, 319 U.S. 598 (1943).
29. Squire, 351 U.S. at 6; see also Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U.S. 84, 93
(1934); Great N. Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 216 U.S. 206, 221 (1910).
30. Occasionally, laws of general applicability that otherwise arguably would apply under the
Tuscarora rule, expressly will exempt native tribes from coverage. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of
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Whether particular treaties or federal laws are "to the contrary,"
thus blocking application of the general law, is, of course, a matter of
judicial interpretation. The courts have moderated the harshness of
the Tuscarora rule by employing limiting rules of application: general
statutes must be interpreted in conformity with treaties wherever pos-
sible,3 and treaties will not be abrogated by subsequent legislation
absent a clear intent on the part of Congress to do so.32 Nonetheless, a
federal law of general applicability may operate to abrogate treaties
with the native nations.3 3 Despite a number of agency rulings and
lower court decisions subsequent to Tuscarora that have found natives
and native governments not subject to particular federal laws,3 4 there
is relatively unquestioning acceptance that most general federal laws
apply in Indian country.3 5
1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982), which addresses discrimination in
employment and specifically excludes native nations from the definition of employers covered by
the act. Id. § 2000e(b).
31. United States v. Forty-Three Gallons of Whiskey, 108 U.S. 491, 496 (1883):
The laws of Congress are always to be construed so as to conform to the provisions of a
treaty, if it be possible to do so without violence to their language. This rule operates with
special force where a conflict would lead to the abrogation of a stipulation in a treaty
making a valuable cession to the United States.
32. Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S.
658, 690 (1979); Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 478 n.22 (1979);
Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 412-13 (1968). But see United States v. Dion,
476 U.S. 734, 739 (1986) (congressional intent to abrogate native treaties can be found "from
clear and reliable evidence in the legislative history of a statute")-
The classic survey of the canons of construction applicable to treaty abrogation is Wilkinson &
Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty Abrogation: "As Long as Water Flows, or Grass Grows
Upon the Earth'--How Long a Time Is That?, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 601 (1975).
33. See Dion, 476 U.S. at 745 (holding that the Bald Eagle Protection Act abrogated the
Yankton Sioux treaty-reserved right to hunt within the borders of the reservation).
34. For exemplary agency rulings, see Fort Apache Timber Co., 226 N.L.R.B. 503, 93
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1296 (1976) (Labor Management Relations Act implicitly exempts tribal
timber company from definition of employer); 78 Interior Dec. 18 (1971) (Wholesome Meat Act
does not authorize Secretary of Agriculture to conduct meat inspections on reservations); 78
Interior Dec. 349 (1971) (twenty-sixth amendment guaranteeing 18-year-old vote does not apply
to tribal elections, although it does apply to elections called by Secretary of the Interior); Rev.
Rul. 67-284, 1967-2 C.B. 55, 55, 58 (although individual natives generally are subject to federal
income tax because not specifically exempted, native tribes are not taxable entities under the
federal income tax statutes).
Also compare Donovan v. Navajo Forest Prods. Indus., 692 F.2d 709 (10th Cir. 1982)
(Occupational Safety and Health Act does not apply to tribal business) with Donovan v. Coeur
d'Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113 (9th Cir. 1985) (OSHA is applicable to tribal enterprise).
See also Note, A Proposal for Extension of the Occupational Safety and Health Act to Indian-
Owned Businesses on Reservations, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 473 (1984-85).
35. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 803 F.2d 545
(10th Cir. 1986) (Safe Drinking Water Act applies to native lands); United States v. Farris, 624
F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1980) (Organized Crime Control Act, although not mentioning natives,
applies to individual natives operating casinos on reservation); Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 593
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B. Tribal Regulatory Jurisdiction
Tribal authority to regulate in Indian country arises from the inher-
ent sovereign powers of the native nations. Domestic courts in the
nineteenth century generally recognized the separate sovereignty of
native nations, despite the frequent assertion of superior sovereignty
by the United States.36 The last vestige of congressional recognition of
native governments as truly independent sovereigns was excised in
1871 when Congress mandated an end to treatymaking with the native
nations.3 7 Nonetheless, Chief Justice Marshall's characterization of
native nations as "distinct, independent political communities"
remains a staple of judicial decisionmaking.38
Notwithstanding the domestic relegation to "dependent sovereign"
status, native nations remain independent governments with inherent
"attributes of sovereignty."39 Any judicial determination of the sover-
eign powers of a native nation begins with the doctrine that tribes
retain all inherent powers of national sovereignty that have not been
(10th Cir. 1972) (National Environmental Policy Act applies to Indian country); In re Sandmar
Corp., 12 Bankr. 910 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1981) (Bankruptcy Code applies to native tribes as
creditors). But see Brecher, Federal Regulatory Statutes and Indian Self-Determination: Some
Problems and Proposed Legislative Solutions, 19 ARIz. L. REV. 285 (1977) (advocating federal
legislation limiting the Tuscarora rule).
36. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559-60 (1832):
The very term "nation," so generally applied to them, means "a people distinct from
others." The [C]onstitution, by declaring treaties already made, as well as those to be made,
to be the supreme law of the land, has adopted and sanctioned the previous treaties with the
Indian nations, and consequently admits their rank among those powers who are capable of
making treaties. The words "treaty" and "nation" are words of our own language, selected
in our diplomatic and legislative proceedings, by ourselves, having each a definite and well
understood meaning. We have applied them to Indians, as we have applied them to the
other nations of the earth. They are applied to all in the same sense.
See also Exparte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 568 (1883) (noting that treaties were made to secure
to the native nations, "with whom the United States was contracting as a distinct political body,"
the basic right of self-government).
37. Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 566 (codified at 25 U.S.C.A. § 71 (West Supp.
1989)). Although the end of treaty making may have had more to do with the House of
Representative's pique at being excluded from a voice in federal Indian policy, the Act of 1871
generally is recognized as heralding the onset of the first serious push toward assimilation of
native tribes into white society. See Israel, The Reemergence of Tribal Nationalism and Its
Impact on Reservation Resource Development, 47 U. COLO. L. REv. 617, 620 n.13 (1976);
Newton, supra note 15, at 206.
38. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832); see New Mexico v. Mescalero
Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 332 (1983); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55 (1978);
United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975); see also United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S.
313 (1978) (no double jeopardy attaches to prosecutions by both tribe and federal or state
government because the prosecutions originate in separate sovereigns).
39. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 207 (1987) (quoting
Mazurie, 419 U.S. at 557).
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ceded by treaty, excised by federal legislation, or divested by the
courts as inconsistent with the federal government's assertion of supe-
rior sovereignty.4 ° The domestic test for the exercise of native govern-
mental powers thus is not whether a native nation has a sovereign
power, but whether the tribe has lost it. The initial existence of tribal
sovereign powers is presumed.
1. Inherent Tribal Authority
Tribal regulatory authority is preeminent over natives and native
lands.4 1 In particular, native governments possess the right to control
their internal and social affairs, "to make their own laws and be ruled
by them."4 2 Tribal jurisdiction over natives may be subject to intru-
40. "Indian tribes still possess those aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or statute,
or by implication as a necessary result of their dependent status." Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323.
Under this test of retained tribal authority, native nations may continue to assert sovereignty
only where the federal government-through Congress or the courts-has not usurped that
power to itself. Where a tribe has lost a sovereign power by statute, the arrogation belongs to
Congress under its asserted plenary power. See, e.g., Curtis Act of 1898, 30 Stat. 495 (abolishing
"all tribal courts in Indian Territory"); see also supra note 19 (discussion of the termination acts).
Where a tribe loses a power by "implicit divestiture," however, the arrogation of power belongs
to the courts despite the fact that plenary power is said to reside exclusively in the legislative
branch. See supra note 15.
For examples of judicial divestiture, see Johnson & Graham's Lessee v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8
Wheat.) 543, 587-88 (1823) ("discovery" and "conquest" vest absolute title in the discovering
nation; native peoples have only a right of occupancy); Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 559 (United
States "irresistible power" excludes native tribes from relations with any power other than the
discovering nation); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210 (1978) (tribes
divested of right to prosecute non-natives "[b]y submitting to the overriding sovereignty of the
United States"); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 563-65 (1981) (tribe cannot regulate
hunting and fishing by non-natives on non-native fee land because it is "beyond what is necessary
to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations" and thus "is inconsistent with
the dependent status of the tribes"); Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 726 (1983) ("tribes have long
ago been divested of any inherent self-government over liquor regulation .. .as a 'necessary
implication of their dependent status' " (quoting Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville
Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 152 (1980))).
Unlike powers lost by federal statute or "dependent status," sovereign authority divested by
treaty does not involve an arrogation of power by the United States, and thus does not implicate
a "lesser" status for native nations. Cession of some sovereign power, in exchange for reciprocal
concessions or other benefits, is not uncommon in international treaties. See, e.g., I D.
O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 352-61 (1965).
41. See, e.g., California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 205 (1987); New
Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 332 (1983).
42. New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 332 (1983); Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55-56 (1978); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959); Worcester v.
Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832).
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sions of federal regulatory authority,43 but generally is exclusive of
state jurisdiction.'
The territorial jurisdiction of native nations, like that of other sover-
eignties, customarily is limited to their land base.45 Concomitant with
this territorial circumscription, natives going off the reservation gener-
ally are subject to the full range of state and local jurisdiction.46 How-
ever, native nations retain a limited power of jurisdiction over their
members off the reservation: members engaged in the exercise of off-
reservation treaty usufructuary rights remain subject to tribal hunting
43. For example, under the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C.A. § 1302(1), (8) (West. Supp.
1989), native nations may not regulate in ways that would prohibit the free exercise of religion,
abridge freedom of speech or the press, or deprive any person of property without due process.
Beyond these and other regulatory proscriptions, Congress also has vested the Secretary of the
Interior with enormous intrusive control over native governments and peoples. See generally
Title 25 of the U.S. Code (1982 & Supp. V 1987) and Part 25 of the Code of Federal Regulations
(1988); see particularly, e.g., 25 U.S.C.A. § 476 (West Supp. 1989) (power to review and overrule
most actions of native governments, including constitutional amendments).
The exercise of this invasive federal power has not been limited to the regulatory area. See,
e.g., Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1153 (West Supp. 1989) (discussed supra note 14); see also
25 C.F.R. § 11.1(e) (1988) (granting Secretary of Interior approval power over tribal law and
order codes).
44. "When on-reservation conduct involving only Indians is at issue, state law is generally
inapplicable...." White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 144 (1980). Thus, it
is only "in exceptional circumstances [that] a State may assert jurisdiction over the on-
reservation activities of tribal members." New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324,
331-32 (1983); see also California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 214-15
(1987).
45. See, eg., NAvAjO TRIB. CODE tit. 7, § 254 (Supp. 1984-85):
The Territorial jurisdiction of the Navajo Nation shall extend to Navajo Indian Country,
defined as all land within the exterior boundaries of the Navajo Indian Reservation or of the
Eastern Navajo Agency, all land within the limits of dependent Navajo Indian communities,
all Navajo Indian allotments, and all other land held in trust for, owned in fee by, or leased
by the United States to the Navajo Tribe or any Band of Navajo Indians.
Unlike other sovereignties, however, many tribes that suffered the ravages of allotment or home-
steading of their tribal land base by non-natives do not have full regulatory control of their
territorial domain. The Supreme Court in Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 557-67
(1981), held that the Crow Tribe, as a general matter, could not regulate hunting and fishing on
lands that, while within the territorial confines of the reservation, were not owned by the tribe.
See also Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Washington Game Dep't, 433 U.S. 165, 173-77 (1977) (denying
exclusive tribal regulatory authority over on-reservation fishing where fewer than 22 acres of the
original 18,000 acres of the reservation remained in trust status); cf. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v.
Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977).
46. DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 427 n.2 (1975); Mescalero Apache
Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1973).
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and fishing laws.4 7 This off-reservation extension of personal jurisdic-
tion over members is exclusive of state jurisdiction.48
2. Tribal Authority Under Federal Delegation
Domestic law provides that, in addition to their inherent sovereign
authority, native nations may assume regulatory authority under dele-
gations of federal powers. Although Congress is limited in its ability
to delegate its legislative powers, the limitation is less stringent where
the delegation is to an entity possessing independent authority over the
subject area. 9 Where Congress delegates its federal authority to
native nations, the delegation is to governments possessing indepen-
dent powers, particularly over internal and social affairs.5"
In virtually all instances, inherent tribal sovereignty is sufficient to
support the tribal exercise of regulatory authority. Only in those rare
circumstances where tribal authority previously has been divested is
specific federal delegation necessary. 5' Nonetheless, nothing prevents
47. Settler v. Lameer, 507 F.2d 231, 237 (9th Cir. 1974); Lac Courte Oreilles Band v.
Wisconsin, 668 F. Supp. 1233, 1241 (W.D. Wis. 1987); United States v. Michigan, 471 F. Supp.
192, 273-74 (W.D. Mich. 1979); United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 340-42 (W.D.
Wash. 1974), aff'd, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1975), vacated on other
grounds, 443 U.S. 658 (1979). See generally Reynolds, Indian Hunting and Fishing Rights: The
Role of Tribal Sovereignty and Preemption, 62 N.C.L. REV. 743, 760 (1984); Note, Indian Law-
Tribal Off-Reservation Jurisdiction-Settler v. Lameer, 507 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1974), 1975 Wis.
L. REV. 1221. At least in the Pacific Northwest, this off-reservation authority is widely exercised
by native tribes. Wilkinson & Conner, The Law of the Pacific Salmon Fishery: Conservation and
Allocation of a Transboundary Common Property Resource, 32 U. KAN. L. REv. 17, 48 n.174
(1983).
48. To be exclusive, tribal laws must be effective and enforced. Washington, 384 F. Supp. at
340-41 (tribes meeting certain qualifications and conditions, including procedures for
enforcement, identification of members, and reporting, are "relieved of state regulation" of off-
reservation fishing); see also Lac Courte Oreilles, 668 F. Supp. at 1241-42; Michigan, 471 F.
Supp. at 274.
49. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 556-57 (1975).
50. Id. at 557:
[W]hen Congress delegated its authority to control the introduction of alcoholic beverages
into Indian country, it did so to entities which possess a certain degree of independent
authority over matters that affect the internal and social relations of tribal life .... [T]he
independent tribal authority is quite sufficient to protect Congress' decision to vest in tribal
councils this portion of its own authority "to regulate Commerce . . . with the Indian
tribes."
(citation omitted).
51. One area in which native tribes are forced to depend on federal delegation is the exercise
of criminal jurisdiction over non-natives. In the criminal area, the Supreme Court has ruled that
native nations are divested of any criminal jurisdiction over non-natives for crimes committed
within Indian country, because such jurisdiction would be "inconsistent with their status."
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978). Subsequent to this judicial
divestiture of inherent tribal criminal jurisdiction, id. at 212, the 99th Congress considered a bill
that would reinvest the Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community with criminal
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the federal government from granting, or native governments from
accepting, delegations of federal authority.
The primary difficulty with federal delegations is not legal but
perceptual. In every instance where tribes, with inherent powers to
act, act instead under a delegation of federal authority, the perception
of inherent tribal authority is diminished. A prime example may be
the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 ("IRA")52 which established
federal authorization for native tribes to organize as governmental
units and as corporate entities. Although native nations clearly had
the inherent, preexisting power to form governments, those tribes with
IRA governments often are perceived as governing themselves under a
"grant" of authority from the federal government.53
3. Non-Natives and Their Lands Within Indian Country
Native nations may assert regulatory authority over non-natives
both on native-owned land and on lands within Indian country pat-
ented in fee to non-natives. In the former instance-tribal authority
over non-natives on native land-tribal jurisdiction is exclusive of
state action, at least where strong state interests are not implicated.54
misdemeanor jurisdiction over non-natives. H.R. 4900, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); S. 2564,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986). The legislation was passed by the House of Representatives, but was
not reported out of the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs before the end of the session.
Cong. Index (CCH) 35,090, 21,051 (1985-86). Had the bill been enacted into law, it would have
represented a delegation of federal authority to the Salt River Community. Despite tribal and
widespread federal, state, and local support for the legislation, the bill has not been reintroduced.
52. 25 U.S.C. §§ 476-477 (1982).
53. Professors Deloria and Lytle point out that the IRA initially was welcomed by many
tribal members "because it ha[d] represented a step forward from the absolute prostration the
tribes suffered when the federAl bureaucracy preempted all social and political functions on the
reservations after the passage of the General Allotment Act." V. DELORIA, JR. & C. LYTLE,
THE NATIONS WITHIN: THE PAST AND FUTURE OF AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY 14
(1984). Deloria and Lytle contend also that the "inevitable product of the [IRA] experiment in
self-government" are uprisings such as that at Wounded Knee in 1973, which "represented the
first effort to establish the dignity of the tribe in a manner consonant with the people's memories
of their older way of life." Id.
Native nations, with the exception of those in Oklahoma, had the option of accepting the IRA.
Many of the largest tribes, such as the Navajo, Yakima, Klamath, and Crow, as well as the
eastern Iroquois confederacy of nations, chose not to do so. Other tribes, despite the superficial
institutionalization of IRA governments, in reality continue to operate largely with traditional
local-kinship political structures. See Champagne, American Indian Values and the
Institutionalization of IRA Governments, 6(2) AM. INDIAN POL'Y & CULTURAL VALUES 25
(1986) (detailing, in part, the workings of the Quechan, Florida Seminole, and Northern
Cheyenne tribal governments).
54. In New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 344 (1983), the Court held that
tribal jurisdiction to regulate non-native hunting and fishing on tribal lands was exclusive. In
finding state authority preempted, the Court relied in part on the fact that the resource use
implicated no state governmental services and created no spillover effect off the reservation. Id.
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In particular, where state regulation of the non-native conduct on
native lands would disrupt a tribal regulatory scheme, tribal jurisdic-
tion precludes additional state regulation."
In the second instance, where the non-native activities occur on
non-native land, the Supreme Court has established a general pre-
sumption that native nations do not have regulatory authority.56 This
"general proposition," however, is riddled with such significant excep-
tions that only in rare instances have tribes been barred from regulat-
ing the conduct of non-natives. In essence, the "general proposition"
becomes a rebuttable presumption that tribal jurisdiction is lacking. If
a tribe can show that the activities implicate one of the exceptions,
tribal authority over non-natives then may be exercised.
at 341-43. The Court noted that its decision two years earlier in Montana v. United States, 450
U.S. 544 (1981), which held that the state could regulate non-native hunting and fishing on non-
native fee lands within the reservation, offered no resolution to the issue in Mescalero:
Unlike this case, Montana concerned lands located within the reservation, but not owned by
the Tribe or its members.... But as to "land belonging to the Tribe or held by the United
States in trust for the Tribe," we "readily agree[d]" that a Tribe may "prohibit nonmembers
from hunting or fishing ... [or] condition their entry by charging a fee or establish bag and
creel limits."
Mescalero, 462 U.S. at 330-31 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 557) (emphasis in original).
55. Tribal authority over the reservation activities of non-natives would have a "rather hollow
ring" if a tribe's regulatory powers were co-opted by an equivalent or more restrictive state
regulatory scheme. Mescalero, 462 U.S. at 338.
It is important to emphasize that concurrent jurisdiction would effectively nullify the Tribe's
authority to control hunting and fishing on the reservation. Concurrent jurisdiction would
empower [the state] wholly to supplant tribal regulations. The State would be able to dictate
the terms on which nonmembers are permitted to utilize the reservation's resources. The
Tribe would thus exercise its authority over the reservation only at the sufferance of the
State.
Id. In Mescalero, a comprehensive system of tribal fish and game laws, licenses, and manage-
ment plans, coupled with extensive and lengthy cooperative efforts with federal fish and wildlife
specialists, preempted any concurrent state regulatory scheme that would "disturb and disar-
range" the integral tribal/federal efforts. Id. at 338-39. Moreover, here the tribe had "engaged
in a concerted and sustained [economic] undertaking," and the state threatened "Congress' over-
riding objective in encouraging tribal self-government and economic development" by asserting
concurrent jurisdiction. Id. at 341; accord United States v. Sohappy, 770 F.2d 816, 819 n.4 (9th
Cir. 1985); Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians v. North Carolina Wildlife Resources Comm'n,
588 F.2d 75, 77 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed, 446 U.S. 960 (1980). On the conflicts inherent
to concurrent tribal and state on-reservation regulation, see Woodbury, New Mexico v. Mes-
calero Apache Tribe: When Can a State Concurrently Regulate Hunting and Fishing by Non-
members on Reservation Lands?, 14 N.M.L. REV. 349 (1984); Comment, New Mexico v.
Mescalero Apache Tribe: Dueling Sovereigns-When State and Tribe Clash, 11 OHIO N.U.L.
REV. 439 (1984).
56. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981).
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Tribes may exercise regulatory jurisdiction over non-natives, even
on non-native fee land, in two broad instances.5 7 The first of these is
where the non-natives enter into consensual dealings with the tribe or
its members.5 8 The most common regulatory power that native
nations exercise over non-natives in such situations is the power to tax.
The Supreme Court repeatedly has recognized the inherent sovereign
power of tribes to impose taxes on nonmembers doing business on the
reservation. 59 The second instance of tribal authority over non-natives
is where the non-native activities impact the health and welfare of the
tribe, or its economic or political security." Under this broad recogni-
tion of tribal sovereign rights, lower courts have affirmed tribal rights
to subject non-natives on non-native fee land to tribal building, health,
and safety codes,6 1 tribal regulation of the exercise of riparian rights,6 2
and tribal sewer hook-up requirements. 63 In particular, courts consist-
ently have recognized tribal zoning powers over non-native lands
within Indian country.'
Only where state involvement in the regulated activity is particu-
larly strong, and the courts find that none of the exceptions is relevant,
57. Id. The Court found the tribal right to regulate in these instances to be exceptions to "the
general proposition that the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the
activities of nonmembers of the tribe."
58. Id. ("A tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of
nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through
commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements."); see also Merrion v. Jicarilla
Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 144, 147 (1982) (noting that a tribe's sovereign power to exclude
non-members "necessarily includes the lesser power to place conditions on entry, on continued
presence, or on reservation conduct, such as a tax on business activities conducted on the
reservation.... [The nonmember's presence and conduct on Indian lands are conditioned by the
limitations the tribe may choose to impose.").
59. Kerr-McGee v. Navajo Tribe, 471 U.S. 195 (1985); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455
U.S. 130 (1982); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S.
134 (1980).
60. Montana, 450 U.S. at 566. These exceptions are drawn to recognize the right of
indigenous peoples to protect their sovereign interests. As separate sovereigns, each native
nation has particular interests in such basic concerns of dominion as "the political integrity, the
economic security, or the health and welfare" of the nation. Where these sovereign interests are
present, non-natives may not escape tribal regulation simply because they are not citizens of the
tribal state.
61. Cardin v. De La Cruz, 671 F.2d 363, 367 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 967 (1982).
62. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation v. Namen, 665
F.2d 951 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 977 (1982).
63. Lummi Indian Tribe v. Hallauer, 9 Indian L. Rep. 3025 (W.D. Wash. 1982).
64. See, eg., Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation v. Whiteside, 828
F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. granted sub nomn. Brendale v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of
the Yakima Indian Nation, 108 S. Ct. 2843 (1988); Knight v. Shoshone & Arapaho Indian
Tribes, 670 F.2d 900 (10th Cir. 1982); Governing Council of Pinoleville Indian Community v.
Mendocino County, 684 F. Supp. 1042 (N.D. Cal. 1988); Colville Confederated Tribes v.
Cabenham Forest Indus., 14 Indian L. Rep. 6043 (Colv. Tr. Ct. 1987).
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will native nations be prohibited from regulating non-native activities
on non-native land in Indian country. For example, in a rare rejection
of tribal authority, the Supreme Court held that the Crow Tribe was
without jurisdiction to regulate hunting and fishing by non-natives on
non-native fee lands within the boundaries of the reservation.65 The
Court concluded that since non-native hunters and fishers on non-
native fee lands did not enter into dealings with the tribe and did not
"threaten the Tribe's political or economic security," tribal regulation
of the non-natives was barred.6 6 The Court offered no explanation for
its assertion that control of resources within the boundaries of the res-
ervation did not implicate tribal concerns.
C. State Regulatory Jurisdiction
State assertions of authority stem primarily from the refusal of the
states to perceive Indian country as extraterritorial to state borders.
In the early years of the Republic, when native sovereign status gener-
ally was acknowledged under domestic law, the Supreme Court ruled
that state laws had no force or effect in native territory.67 Beginning in
the late 1800's, however, the Court decided a long series of cases,
involving state authority over both natives and non-natives, that
eroded the inviolability of tribal dominions. 6' Although the "concep-
65. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981). The Court specified that approximately
28% of the reservation was owned in fee by non-natives, and that the state stocked the waters of
the reservation with fish and stocked some of the game on the reservation. Id. at 548. In
addition, the state traditionally had exercised "near exclusive" jurisdiction over non-native
hunting and fishing on fee lands, a situation to which the parties had accommodated themselves.
Id. at 564 n.13. Moreover, the tribal regulations prohibited all hunting and fishing within the
reservation by any person not a member of the tribe. Id. at 549.
66. Id. at 566. The Court has recognized, however, the sovereign interest in controlling the
same activities by non-natives on tribal lands. New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S.
324 (1983) (discussed supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text).
67. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832):
The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community occupying its own territory, with
boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and which
the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but with the assent of the Cherokees
themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with the acts of Congress. The whole
intercourse between the United States and this nation, is, by our Constitution and laws,
vested in the government of the United States.
68. Typical examples include United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1881) (states have
jurisdiction over crimes committed by one non-native against another non-native in Indian
country); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959) (state action may be permitted unless it
"infringe[s] on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them");
McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973) (pronouncing a "trend" away
from "platonic notions" of tribal sovereignty as a barrier to state jurisdiction, and an increasing
reliance on federal preemption to bar state incursions); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435
U.S. 191 (1978) (native tribes have no inherent criminal jurisdiction over non-native defendants);
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981) (discussed supra notes 56-58, 60, 65-66. and
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tual clarity" of the early absolute bar to state authority thus has been
abandoned,69 a presumption still runs against the application of state
laws within reservation borders.7"
1. The Infringement/Preemption Test
The initial articulations of the modem test for state regulatory juris-
diction appeared in the 1950's. In the landmark case of Williams v.
Lee, addressing civil court jurisdiction over native defendants involved
in an on-reservation transaction, the Supreme Court ruled that unless
Congress had decreed otherwise, state action was barred if it infringed
on the tribal right of self-government.71 By 1980, the Williams
infringement test had been relegated to one half the current analytical
test for the validity of state authority in Indian country. This modem
analysis, known as the "infringement/preemption" test, bars state
jurisdiction if it either infringes on tribal sovereignty or is preempted
accompanying text); Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713 (1983) (retail liquor establishments on
reservations, even when operated by tribal members, are subject to state liquor license
requirements); California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987) (applying the
infringement/preemption test from Williams and McClanahan to assertions of direct state
authority over native tribes); see also Comment, Evolution, Assimilation, and State Control of
Gambling in Indian Country: Is Cabazon v. California an Assimilationist Wolf in Preemption
Clothing?, 24 IDAHO L. REv. 317, 326-31 (1987-88).
Civil court jurisdiction appears to the be the only area of law that consistently has escaped
increasing intrusions by state governments. Disputes arising in Indian country and involving a
native defendant cannot be adjudicated in state court because state court jurisdiction would
interfere with tribal sovereignty. Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976); Williams v. Lee,
358 U.S. 217 (1959). The preclusion of state court jurisdiction only applies, however, to a state
without Public Law 280 or other specific congressional delegation of jurisdiction. Where a
reservation is subject fully to Public Law 280, state courts may adjudicate civil disputes arising in
Indian country. See infra note 98-99 and accompanying text.
69. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973). As the Court noted in 1959:
"Over the years this Court has modified these principles in cases where essential tribal relations
were not involved and where the rights of Indians would not be jeopardized, but the basic policy
of Worcester has remained." Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219 (1959).
70. See, eg., California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 215 (1987) (state
jurisdiction over natives is permissible only "in exceptional circumstances"); White Mountain
Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 144 (1980) ("[wlhen on-reservation conduct involving
only Indians is at issue, state law is generally inapplicable"). But see supra notes 56-66 and
accompanying text (discussion of Montana v. United States).
71. 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959) ("Essentially, absent governing Acts of Congress, the question
has always been whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make
their own laws and be ruled by them.").
The Court's test was considerably more deferential to asserted state jurisdiction than a
contemporaneous statement by the Interior Department, the federal agency charged with
administering domestic Indian policy and law. "State laws generally are not applicable to tribal
Indians on an Indian reservation except where Congress has expressly provided that State laws
shall apply." U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 845 (1958).
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by federal law.72 Even before the infringement/preemption test was
fully articulated in the regulatory cases, however, the Supreme Court
had begun positing a "shift in emphasis" or a "trend away from" the
infringement barrier and toward federal preemption.73 Today, in the
regulatory context, the infringement barrier has been all but
abandoned.74
To resolve conflicting sovereign assertions of regulatory jurisdiction
in Indian country, domestic courts now focus almost exclusively on
federal preemption, but a special type of federal preemption unique to
Indian law.75 The current preemption analysis76 begins with a deter-
72. In White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980), the Supreme Court
combined the separate threads of the Williams infringement test and the preemption test from
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973), to posit "two independent but
related barriers" to state jurisdiction:
First, the exercise of such [state] authority may be preempted by federal law. Second, it may
unlawfully infringe "on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled
by them." The two barriers are independent because either, standing alone, can be a
sufficient basis for holding state law inapplicable to activity undertaken on the reservation.
White Mountain Apache Tribe, 448 U.S. at 142-43 (quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220
(1959)).
73. The "trend" toward dominance of the preemption prong was premised in McClanahan v.
Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973); see also Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 718
(1983).
74. For example, in Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713 (1983), the Court engaged in a lengthy and
detailed preemption analysis, concluding that state licensing of on-reservation liquor vendors was
not preempted by federal law. As for the infringement barrier, which theoretically served also as
an independent bar to state jurisdiction, the Court stated summarily: "Regulation of sales to non-
Indians or nonmembers of the Pala Tribe simply does not 'contravene the principle of tribal self-
government'...." Id. at 720-21 n.7 (citation omitted). In the regulatory area no recent major
case has prohibited state jurisdiction exclusively on the ground that the state action would
infringe impermissibly on tribal sovereignty. For other criticisms that the "independent"
infringement test has been collapsed into the preemption test, and that the Court now engages
only in a balancing test of tribal, federal, and state interests, see Barsh, Is There Any Indian Law
Left? A Review of the Supreme Court's 1982 Term, 59 WASH. L. REV. 863, 866-67 (1984);
Feldman, Preemption and the Dormant Commerce Clause: Implications for Federal Indian Law,
64 OR. L. REv. 667, 678 (1986).
Interference with tribal sovereignty remains, however, the primary test for the exercise of state
court jurisdiction over civil disputes. See supra note 68; see also Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante,
480 U.S. 9, 15 (1987) ("If state-court jurisdiction over Indians or activities on Indian lands would
interfere with tribal sovereignty and self-government, the state courts are generally divested of
jurisdiction as a matter of federal law.").
75. In its usual sense, "federal preemption" refers to federal statutory preemption of state
law. In this federalism context, preemption is the exception and not the rule. The federal law
must expressly preempt state law or occupy the field so that no room remains for state law. See,
e.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963). In domestic
Indian law, the presumption runs not in favor of the state, as it does in the classic preemption
analysis, but in favor of federal preemption of state regulation.
Although a State will certainly be without jurisdiction if its authority is preempted under
familiar principles of preemption, . . . our cases have rejected a narrow focus on
congressional intent to preempt state law as the sole touchstone. They have also rejected the
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mination of the "backdrop" of tribal sovereignty.77 This backdrop
inquiry is focused on broad-based concepts of self-government, rather
than any particularized notion of specific tribal powers.7" In addition
to tribal sovereignty itself, the backdrop inquiry also now includes an
examination of federal policies promoting native self-government. 79
proposition that preemption requires "'an express congressional statement to that effect.'"
State jurisdiction is preempted by the operation of federal law if it interferes or is
incompatible with federal and tribal interests reflected in federal law, unless the state
interests at stake are sufficient to justify the assertion of state authority.
New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 333-34 (1983) (citations omitted).
76. The most recent articulation of the preemption test appears in California v. Cabazon
Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 216 (1987):
"State jurisdiction is pre-empted... if it interferes or is incompatible with federal and tribal
interests reflected in federal law, unless the state interests at stake are sufficient to justify the
assertion of state authority." The inquiry is to proceed in light of traditional notions of
Indian sovereignty and the congressional goal of Indian self-government, including its
"overriding goal" of encouraging tribal self-sufficiency and economic development.
(quoting New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 334 (1983)).
77. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 216.
78. In the penultimate statement of the preemption test, the Court employed, for the first
time, an extremely narrow vision of tribal sovereignty. Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713 (1983). The
issue in Rice was whether the state could impose its licensing requirements upon an on-
reservation retail liquor establishment. The Court held that state licensing was not preempted, in
part because "tradition simply has not recognized a sovereign immunity or inherent authority in
favor of liquor regulation by Indians." Id. at 722. Prior to the Rice decision, the Court's inquiry
into the "backdrop" of tribal sovereignty never had required the tribe to demonstrate such a
particularized exercise of tribal powers.
In Cabazon, however, despite the dissenting justices' note that the tribe "has no tradition or
special expertise in the operation of large bingo parlors," 480 U.S. at 226 (Stevens, J., dissenting),
the Court found that the general background of tribal sovereign interests in economic
development and self-sufficiency supported federal preemption. Id. at 221-22. The majority
dissociated itself from the Rice eccentricity, without needing to overrule that case or expressly to
limit it to its facts, by claiming that Rice was based on a traditional federal intent to involve
states in liquor regulation on reservations. Id. at 220. The Court's return to broad-based notions
of sovereignty is fortuitous since the casuistry of the Rice articulation is exposed by the dissent in
Cabazon, quoted above. Would a tradition of operating small bingo parlors not be sufficient?
What about a tradition of other types of gaming? The absurd minutiae of such a narrow inquiry
led the Court in Cabazon to jettison the Rice formulation before much damage could be done.
For criticism of the Rice test, see generally Mikkanen, Rice v. Rehner: A Limitation on the
Exercise of Tribal Governmental Powers Based on Historical Factors?, 9(2) AM. INDIAN J. 2
(1986).
79. In Rice, as well as in the cases preceding that decision, the "backdrop" consisted solely of
tribal sovereignty. 463 U.S. at 719-20; see also McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411
U.S. 164, 172 (1973). The Court in Cabazon, however, stated that its preemption inquiry "is to
proceed in light of traditional notions of Indian sovereignty and the congressional goal of Indian
self-government." 480 U.S. at 216 (emphasis added).
In 1980, tribal sovereignty was posited as an independent barrier to state regulation. White
Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142 (1980). By 1983, the judicial pretense that
tribal sovereignty provided more than a "backdrop" to the second barrier of federal preemption
was all but gone. Rice, 463 U.S. at 718-20. Now, tribal sovereignty has been reduced beyond
that, to only one aspect of the backdrop component. Even tribal self-government as a backdrop
is not permitted to stand alone. Moreover, the wedding of federal policies to concepts of native
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Against this backdrop, courts engage in balancing the federal, tribal,
and state interests implicated by the state regulatory effort.
Under this preemption test, state regulatory authority will be per-
mitted if it does not interfere with federal and tribal interests, as deter-
mined by federal law, or, even if state action does interfere, if the state
interests at stake are sufficient to justify the intrusion. 0 Where the
state seeks to regulate natives and native activities, a presumption of
interference with tribal sovereignty arises, and state interests may
overcome that presumption only in "exceptional circumstances."-8'
In the recent Supreme Court case, California v. Cabazon Band of
Mission Indians,8 2 the Band argued that the infringement/preemption
test was inapplicable to state assertions of authority over native activi-
ties.83 The Band posited that because the state regulations at issue
were imposed directly on the tribe, and because no express congres-
sional authorization of the state action could be found, the state regu-
lations should be barred "without more."84
Essentially, the Band's argument followed the jurisdictional lines for
state criminal and civil jurisdiction over natives. State civil and crimi-
nal jurisdiction over natives are barred absent a grant of jurisdiction
from Congress, such as that contained in Public Law 280.85 There
does not appear to be any satisfactory explanation why these types of
state jurisdiction are prohibited absent a congressional grant, while
state regulatory jurisdiction over natives may be permissible under the
self-government to determine the backdrop of tribal sovereignty necessarily pretends an
alignment of the two to the derogation of true tribal self-determination and sovereignty. See, e.g.,
Moapa Band of Paiute Indians v. Dep't of Interior, 747 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1984) (divergent tribal
and federal interests in reservation brothels as an economic development measure).
80. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 216; see also New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324,
334 (1983).
81. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 215 (quoting Mescalero Apache, 462 U.S. at 331-32).
Neither the exceptional circumstances test nor the infringement/preemption analysis is
applicable in the tax area. After 12 years of applying the infringement/preemption test to
assorted state taxes imposed on natives, and repeatedly holding those taxes preempted, the Court
in Cabazon declared in dicta "a per se rule" that state taxation "of Indian tribes and tribal
members" is barred unless expressly permitted by Congress. 480 U.S. at 215 n.17. Highlighting
that tax is a "special area" of domestic Indian law, however, the Court refused to carry this
reasoning over to other types of state regulatory jurisdiction.
82. 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
83. Id. at 215. The tribe's position was in accord with both the tax cases and the line of cases
upon which the Cabazon Court relied for its analytical structure distinguishing between criminal
and regulatory laws of the state, id. at 209-10, and that uniformly found state jurisdiction over
native tribes barred once the law was determined to be regulatory. See discussion infra notes 108
& 110.
84. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 215.
85. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588, as amended by the Indian Civil
Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 78; see infra Section I.C.3.
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infringement/preemption test. One possible reason-though by no
means a justification-is simply that Congress has acted with regard to
civil and criminal jurisdiction. With the passage of Public Law 280,
Congress provided a bright line dividing states entitled to exercise civil
and criminal jurisdiction and those barred from doing so. The relative
simplicity of determining state civil and criminal jurisdiction by refer-
ence to Public Law 280 is lost when courts are faced with assertions of
state regulatory jurisdiction. If state civil and criminal jurisdiction are
barred absent a grant of authority from Congress, however, no princi-
pled reason exists why the same is not true of regulatory jurisdiction.86
In Cabazon, the Band urged the Supreme Court to adopt a similar
approach and prohibit state regulatory jurisdiction over natives absent
express congressional consent.8 7 The Court disagreed in principle,
however, concluding instead that states may regulate the on-reserva-
tion activities of natives "in exceptional circumstances."88 The Court
did not integrate the exceptional circumstances test into the infringe-
ment/preemption analysis, but apparently the former standard dem-
onstrates that state interests in exerting regulatory authority over
natives or native activities will outweigh tribal and federal interests
only in exceptional circumstances. Although such "exceptional cir-
cumstances" have been found rarely89 the Court did native nations a
profound injustice in compelling the use of infringement/preemption
86. This simple proposition, obvious when the several types of jurisdiction are considered
together, was the approach advocated in the 1950's. See supra note 71. The demise of the earlier
straightforward, conceptually clear approach unquestionably has been deleterious for native
sovereign interests.
87. 480 U.S. at 215.
88. Id. (quoting New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 331-32 (1983)).
89. The only "exceptional circumstance" that was cited by the Court in Mescalero Apache
was state authority over on-reservation treaty rights to hunt, fish, and gather. 462 U.S. at 332
n.15. In that context, the state is entitled to enforce against natives on the reservation those state
laws that are reasonable and necessary for conservation of the species. Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v.
Washington Game Dep't. 433 U.S. 165, 176-77 (1977). State authority in this "exceptional
circumstance" is not absolute, however, because state regulations can be preempted by effective
tribal self-regulation. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
A further "exceptional circumstance" apparently is the licensing of liquor establishments. In
Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713 (1983), the Court concluded that state liquor license laws are
applicable to individually owned retail establishments, even those operated by tribe members,
located on a native reservation. The Ninth Circuit subsequently extended the rule of Rice to
permit the State of Washington to license retail liquor stores owned and operated by native tribes
themselves. Squaxin Island Tribe v. Washington, 781 F.2d 715 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Op.
Att'y Gen. Wis. 19-87 (April 17, 1987) (positing that tribal hotel and convention center is subject
to state liquor licensing). Nothing in these decisions permitting state licensure, of course,
detracts from a tribe's inherent or delegated powers to impose its own licensing scheme on liquor
establishments. See, e.g., id. (Oneida Nation had already issued a tribal liquor license to the
enterprise); 18 U.S.C. § 1161 (1982) (authorizing tribes to adopt liquor laws "in conformity
with" those of the state).
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analysis to determine the validity of future state assertions of direct
regulatory authority over native tribes and their citizens.
2. State Jurisdiction over Non-Natives and Non-Native Land
States assert more extensive regulatory authority over non-natives
and non-native lands within Indian country than over native persons
and property.90 In Montana v. United States,9" the Supreme Court
pronounced a "general proposition" in favor of state jurisdiction over
non-natives, but one sharply limited by broad areas of tribal sovereign
powers.9 2 Under the Montana test for regulatory jurisdiction over
non-natives within Indian country, tribal authority is exclusive when
non-natives have placed themselves within the tribal regulatory sphere
or where native sovereign interests are implicated.9 3 State jurisdiction
is exclusive either where it does not impact tribal sovereign interests or
where such tribal interests are not acknowledged by the courts.94
Although domestic courts are more likely to find no impact on tribal
interests where the non-native activities occur on non-native fee
lands,95 judicially recognized tribal regulatory powers over non-
natives within Indian country render instances of exclusive state juris-
diction infrequent. 96 On occasion state jurisdiction over non-natives
may be concurrent with tribal authority; joint regulation is the excep-
90. For example, while states generally now accept that they may not tax natives or native
interests within Indian country, see supra note 81, they continue to assert taxing power over non-
natives engaged in business activities on reservations. See, e.g., Cotton Petroleum v. New
Mexico, 109 S. Ct. 1698 (1989) (upholding state oil and gas taxes on non-native producer located
on native lands within reservation); Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 819 F.2d 895 (9th Cir.
1987) (invalidating state severance tax on coal belonging to tribe but mined by non-native lessee),
aff'd mem., 108 S. Ct. 685 (1988).
State assertions of special authority over non-natives are by no means limited to the taxing
power. See, e.g., 72 Op. Att'y Gen. Wis. 54 (1983) (state has authority to regulate groundwater
contamination on non-native fee lands within reservation, but not on native lands unless
spillovers onto non-native lands pose "an immediate danger to public health, safety or the
general welfare"). But see 1982-83 Op. Att'y Gen. Ore. 169 (1983) (Umatilla Tribes have
exclusive authority to apply land use code to all lands, native and non-native, within boundaries
of the "diminished reservation").
91. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
92. Id. at 565-66; see also supra notes 56-66 and accompanying text.
93. See supra Section I.B.3.
94. See generally Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981) (discussed supra notes 65-66
and accompanying text).
95. Compare Montana, 450 U.S. 544 (exclusive state jurisdiction over non-native hunting and
fishing on non-native fee land within reservation) with New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe.
462 U.S. 324 (1983) (exclusive tribal jurisdiction over non-native hunting and fishing on tribal
lands).
96. See supra Section I.B.3.
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tion, however, since it generally creates impermissible "mutual dislo-
cations" in both regulatory schemes. 97
3. The Effect of Public Law 280
In some instances, Congress has granted specific authority to the
states to exercise civil and criminal jurisdiction in Indian country. 98
The primary grant of such jurisdiction, and the paramount means by
which states currently may take civil or criminal jurisdiction, is Public
Law 280.99 Enacted in 1953, Public Law 280 required several states to
97. Concurrent jurisdiction is most likely in the area of taxation, particularly taxation of a
product produced off the reservation and brought into Indian country for resale. Compare
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980) (both
tribe and state may tax on-reservation cigarette purchases by non-natives) with Crow Tribe of
Indians v. Montana, 819 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1987), aff'd mem., 108 S. Ct. 685 (1988) (state
cannot impose severance tax on tribal coal mined by non-native lessee, in part because the coal is
a product generated on the reservation in which the tribe has a strong interest).
To a great extent, concurrent taxation of off-reservation products is tolerated because such
dual sovereign taxation-unlike dual regulatory schemes-does not create "mutual
dislocations." Mescalero Apache Tribe v. New Mexico, 630 F.2d 724, 730 (10th Cir. 1980)
(distinguishing dual taxation from dual regulation), vacated and remanded, 450 U.S. 1036
(1981), on remand, 677 F.2d 55 (10th Cir. 1982) (reaching same result), aff'd, 462 U.S. 324
(1983); see also Colville, 447 U.S. at 158 ("There is no direct conflict between the state and tribal
schemes, since each government is free to impose its taxes without ousting the other."). By
contrast, courts generally acknowledge that dual sovereign regulation may permit one
government to supplant the sovereign prerogatives of the other. See supra note 55.
98. The various tests for state jurisdiction within Indian country, particularly in their earlier
incarnations, generally find at least a presumption against state jurisdiction absent "governing
Acts of Congress." Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959). In the criminal and civil court
arenas, Public Law 280 is such a "governing act."
99. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588, as amended by the Indian Civil
Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 78. See generally Goldberg, Public Law 280:
The Limits of State Jurisdiction Over Reservation Indians, 22 UCLA L. REV. 535 (1975).
The civil provision of the Act is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1982), and grants to the affected
states "jurisdiction over civil causes of action between Indians or to which Indians are parties
which arise in the areas of Indian country .. " The criminal provision is codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1162 (1982), and grants to the affected states "jurisdiction over offenses committed by or
against Indians in the [enumerated] areas of Indian country." Both the civil and criminal grants
of jurisdiction contain express disclaimers that Public Law 280 does not confer on the states any
rights to alienate, encumber, or tax trust property or to regulate trust property inconsistent with
treaties or other federal laws. 28 U.S.C. § 1360(b) (1982); 18 U.S.C. § 1162(b) (1982).
Any state now wishing to assume civil or criminal jurisdiction over Indian country must
comply with Public Law 280 as amended by the Indian Civil Rights Act. 25 U.S.C.
§§ 1321-1322 (1982 & Supp. V 1987); Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423 (1971). Some
states, however, had taken jurisdiction over selected reservations pursuant to special
congressional grants of jurisdiction prior to the enactment of Pub. L. 280: New York, 25 U.S.C.
§§ 232-233 (criminal and civil jurisdiction over all reservations); Iowa, 62 Stat. 1161 (limited
criminal jurisdiction over Sac & Fox Reservation); Kansas, 18 U.S.C. § 3243 (limited criminal
jurisdiction); North Dakota, 60 Stat. 229 (criminal jurisdiction over Devil's Lake Reservation).
At least one state, North Carolina, asserts jurisdiction under a treaty. In re McCoy, 233 F. Supp.
409, 412 (E.D.N.C. 1964) ("since the treaty of New Echota of 1835, 7 Stat. 478, the State of
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take civil and criminal jurisdiction over all or most native reservations
within the states' borders, 00 and made provisions for other states to
assume the same jurisdiction at their option.' Native anger over the
lack of provision for tribal consent led to amendments in 1968 provid-
ing that state jurisdiction could no longer be assumed without tribal
consent.12 The same amendments permitted states with Public Law
280 jurisdiction to retrocede it to the federal government. 0 3
North Carolina has exercised jurisdiction over criminal offenses commited by Indiana [sic] on the
Cherokee Indian reservation" in that state). In addition, states may have "residuary
jurisdiction" that permits, for example, a native to bring suit against a non-native in state court.
Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'g, 467 U.S. 138, 148-50 (1984).
Most newly "recognized" tribes, and most tribes freshly "restored" to federal recognition from
the brutal exile of termination, are only accorded recognition subject to a state jurisdictional
scheme "as if" the state had assumed Public Law 280 jurisdiction over the tribe. See, e.g., Pub.
L. No. 100-89, §§ 105(f), 206(f), 101 Stat. 666, 671-72 (1987) (Texas jurisdiction over the newly
restored Ysleta del Sur Pueblo and Alabama and Coushatta Indian Tribes); 25 U.S.C. § 766(b)
(Supp. V 1987) (Utah jurisdiction over the recently restored Paiute Bands). Lastly, as a result of
land settlement claims, several states have been accorded criminal and civil court jurisdiction
over reservations resulting from the settlements. See, e.g., Wampanoag Indian Claims Settlement
Act, 25 U.S.C.A. § 1771 (West Supp. 1989) (mandating Massachusetts jurisdiction); Rhode
Island Indian Claims Settlement Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1701, 1708 (Supp. V 1987) (mandating state
jurisdiction over the Narragansett); Mashantucket Pequot Indian Land Claims Settlement, 25
U.S.C.A. § 1755 (West Supp. 1989) (mandating Connecticut jurisdiction).
100. The initial mandatory states were California, Minnesota (except the Red Lake
Reservation), Nebraska, Oregon (except the Warm Springs Reservation), and Wisconsin. 18
U.S.C. § 1162(a) (1982); 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a) (Supp. IV 1986). Alaska was added in 1958 by the
enactment of Pub. L. No. 85-615, 72 Stat. 545 (1958).
It is more accurate to speak of Public Law 280 reservations than Public Law 280 states,
because many states that exercise Public Law 280 jurisdiction do so only over selected
reservations. For the sake of brevity, however, this Article will refer to Public Law 280 states as
denoting those states that exercise some or all Public Law 280 jurisdiction over some or all
reservations within their borders.
101. States without disclaimer clauses in their constitutions were authorized to enact enabling
legislation to assume jurisdiction under Public Law 280. Pub. L. No. 83-280, § 7, 67 Stat. 590
(repealed 1968). States with disclaimer clauses were authorized to amend existing statutes and,
where necessary, their constitutions "to remove any legal impediment to the assumption of civil
or criminal jurisdiction." Id. at § 6 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1324 (1982)).
102. 25 U.S.C. § 1321 (1982) (criminal jurisdiction); id. § 1322 (civil jurisdiction). These
amendments were part of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1982).
103. 25 U.S.C. § 1323 (1982). Only states are authorized to retrocede Public Law 280
jurisdiction. Not only may tribes not initiate such action, there is not even a mechanism to take
account of tribal preferences. In fact, tribal consent to retrocession is not required.
Several states initially mandated to assume jurisdiction have since retroceded jurisdiction to
the federal government. See, e.g., 35 Fed. Reg. 16,598 (1970) (Nebraska's retrocession of
jurisdiction over the Omaha Reservation); 51 Fed. Reg. 24,234 (1986) (criminal jurisdiction over
the Winnebago Reservation); 46 Fed. Reg. 2195 (1981) (Oregon's retrocession of criminal
jurisdiction over the Umatilla Reservation); 41 Fed. Reg. 8516 (1976) (Wisconsin's retrocession
of jurisdiction over the Menominee Reservation). Some states that initially assumed the optional
jurisdiction also have retroceded their jurisdiction. See, e.g., Nevada's assumption of jurisdiction,
NEV. REV. STAT. § 328.350 (1987), and subsequent retrocession over all reservations within that
state, and Washington's retrocession of criminal jurisdiction over the Colville Reservation, 52
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In all, eleven states presently exercise some configuration of Public
Law 280 jurisdiction over at least some native reservations within their
borders."M The jurisdiction over Indian country assumed by Public
Law 280 states is coextensive with the jurisdiction those states exercise
elsewhere within their borders. Civil and criminal jurisdiction over
tribal members that formerly was exercised exclusively by the tribe
now is exercised concurrently by the state. 105 For those tribes affected
by Public Law 280, the Act accordingly operates as a partial abroga-
tion of tribal sovereignty.106
Public Law 280 affected only civil and criminal jurisdiction, how-
ever, and did not confer on the states any regulatory jurisdiction over
Fed. Reg. 8372 (1987). Finally, at least one state that assumed "as if" jurisdiction over a newly
recognized tribe, see supra note 99, retroceded its acquired jurisdiction. See 25 U.S.C. § 1300f(c)
(1982) (congressional grant of jurisdiction to Arizona over the Pascua Yaqui); 50 Fed. Reg.
34555-01 (1985) (Arizona's subsequent retrocession of jurisdiction). In addition to these state
retrocessions, in 1970 Congress restored to the Metlakatla Reserve in Alaska the right to
"exercise jurisdiction over offenses committed by Indians in the same manner in which such
jurisdiction may be exercised by Indian tribes" in non-Public Law 280 states. Act of Nov. 25,
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-520, 84 Stat. 1358.
104. In addition to the mandatory states, see supra note 100, these states include: Florida,
Idaho, Iowa, Montana, and Washington. Nevada, which early-on assumed Public Law 280
jurisdiction over the reservations in that state, no longer exercises any Public Law 280
jurisdiction following its recent retrocession of jurisdiction over the Ely Colony (Shoshone). 53
Fed. Reg. 5837 (1988).
The most recent Handbook of Federal Indian Law reports that ten non-mandatory states have
"acted to accept" jurisdiction, adding to the above states Arizona, North and South Dakota, and
Utah. F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 362-63 & n.125 (1982).
Notwithstanding the technical accuracy of the Handbook, there is a difference between a .paper"
assumption of Public Law 280 jurisdiction and actual enforcement. For example, while Arizona
insists upon asserting Public Law 280 jurisdiction over native lands under that state's air
pollution statutes, the federal Environmental Protection Agency officially has stated that this
assertion is illegal. See infra note 229. Both North Dakota and Utah require the consent of the
tribe to assume Public Law 280 jurisdiction, but to date, no tribe in either state has so consented.
See Malaterre v. Malaterre, 293 N.W.2d 139, 143 (N.D. 1980); United States v. Felter, 752 F.2d
1505, 1508 n.7 (10th Cir. 1985) (Utah). But see supra note 99 (Utah Public Law 280 "as if"
jurisdiction mandated for newly restored Paiute Bands). South Dakota's attempted assumption
of Public Law 280 civil jurisdiction has been held invalid. State v. Hero, 282 N.W.2d 70, 72
(S.D. 1979).
105. See, eg., Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation v. Beck, 6 Indian L.
Rep. F-8 (E.D. Wash. 1978) (concurrent tribal-state criminal jurisdiction); State v. Michael, Ill
Idaho 930, 729 P.2d 405, 408 n.1 (1986) (tribal court may have concurrent jurisdiction with
adjoining state on Public Law 280 reservation).
106. Public Law 280 is a prime example of federal plenary power at work. See supra Section
I.A. 1. By enacting Public Law 280, Congress not only endowed the states with jurisdiction over
native tribes and peoples, but in the process stripped native governments of formerly exclusive
sovereign powers. See, e.g., Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima Indian
Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 478 n.22 (1979) (spurning as "tendentious" the tribe's assertions that its
treaty-reserved right to self-government could not be abrogated by implication and was not
abrogated expressly by enactment of Public Law 280).
609
Washington Law Review Vol. 64:581, 1989
native reservations. 10 7 Accordingly, where a state asserts the right to
enforce its laws on a reservation that is subject to Public Law 280,
courts often must engage in an initial analysis to determine whether
the state laws at issue merely regulate conduct or instead prohibit it," 8
If the laws are found to be prohibitory, then the state may enforce
them in Indian country under its Public Law 280 criminal jurisdic-
tion. t° 9 If the laws are found to be regulatory, however, the courts
apply the infringement/preemption test outlined above to determine
whether the laws may be applied within reservation borders." 0 If a
107. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 378-79, 385 (1976) (Public Law 280 was not a
grant of the power to tax, but was intended to grant jurisdiction over private civil court causes of
action). This holding in Bryan recently was reaffirmed in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission
Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 208 (1987) (the civil provision of Public Law 280 has been interpreted "to
grant States jurisdiction over private civil litigation involving reservation Indians in state court,
but not to grant general civil regulatory authority").
Despite the fact that the holding in Bryan is clear, long-standing, and recently reaffirmed,
states persist in attempting to justify intrusions of regulatory authority by reference to their
Public Law 280 jurisdiction. See, e.g., Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian
Nation v. Whiteside, 828 F.2d 529, 532 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. granted sub noma. Brendale v.
Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 108 S. Ct. 2843 (1988), in which
the county maintained that Public Law 280 divested the Yakima of any regulatory jurisdiction
over non-natives on fee land. The court responded tersely. "This argument lacks merit ....
Because zoning is clearly regulatory, Public Law 280 does not affect Yakima Nation's authority
to zone." Id. Nonetheless, persevering to the end, one of the landowners in the petition for
certiorari presented the question whether fee ownership by a non-native, coupled with
Washington's assumption of Public Law 280 jurisdiction over all non-trust land in Indian
country, divested the Yakima Nation of exclusive zoning rights over non-native fee land.
Brendale v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 56 U.S.L.W. 3775
(1988).
108. This test was developed in and extensively used by the lower federal courts, primarily in
cases concerning gambling. See, e.g., Barona Group of the Capitan Grande Band of Mission
Indians v. Duffy, 694 F.2d 1185 (9th Cir. 1982) (bingo); Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
Butterworth, 658 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1981) (bingo). The prohibitory-regulatory distinction
recently was approved by the Supreme Court, which in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission
Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 209 (1987), adopted the lower courts' analysis.
[I]f the intent of a state law is generally to prohibit certain conduct, it falls within Pub. L.
280's grant of criminal jurisdiction, but if the state law generally permits the conduct at
issue, subject to regulation, it must be classified as civil/regulatory and Pub. L. 280 does not
authorize its enforcement on an Indian reservation. The shorthand test is whether the
conduct at issue violates the State's public policy.
Id. at 209. This preliminary prohibitory versus regulatory analysis is only necessary, of course, if
the state asserts that the particular laws are criminal in nature.
109. On a reservation fully subject to Public Law 280, the state has jurisdiction over all
crimes committed within reservation borders other than those federal crimes that are exclusive of
state jurisdiction. 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1982).
110. This development appears to have its genesis in the Cabazon decision, at least with
respect to state laws directly applicable to native people and their tribes. Prior lower court cases
using the prohibitory versus regulatory analysis did not engage in the infringement/preemption
test once a state law was determined to be regulatory. These cases noted, rather, that states have
no regulatory jurisdiction in Indian country absent a grant of authority from the federal
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law is regulatory, then the test for its application does not vary
between Public Law 280 and non-Public Law 280 reservations.
4. The Applicability of Local Laws
Federal courts commonly have held that local laws are not applica-
ble within the boundaries of native reservations."' The premier case
on local authority is Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings County, " 2 in
which the Ninth Circuit declared that assertions of local jurisdiction
infringe on tribal sovereignty and self-government." 3 A grant of civil
government. Because Public Law 280 did not grant such regulatory authority, the states were
without jurisdiction to impose their noncriminal laws on native nations. See, eg., Barona Group,
694 F.2d at 1188-90; Seminole Tribe, 658 F.2d at 312-15; Oneida Tribe of Indians of Wisconsin
v. State, 518 F. Supp. 712, 716, 719-20 (1981).
Il1. Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux v. City of Prior Lake, 771 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir. 1985);
United States v. Humboldt County, 615 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1980); Santa Rosa Band of Indians
v. Kings County, 532 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977).
At first blush, tribes have not fared as well in state decisions, particularly in Wisconsin. See
County of Vilas v. Chapman, 122 Wis. 2d 211, 361 N.W.2d 699 (1985) (affirming conviction of a
Lac du Flambeau member for violation of a county traffic ordinance); Op. Att'y Gen. Wis. 19-87
(April 17, 1987) (positing that an on-reservation tribal business was subject to local liquor
licensing). But see Zachary v. Wilk, 173 Cal. App. 3d 754, 219 Cal. Rptr. 122 (1985), holding
that a municipal rent control ordinance could not be applied to a mobile home park located on
native land. "[W]hen a local regulation is applied to Indian lands, it is the form (i.e., local
nature) of the regulation rather than its content which interferes with the Indians' sovereignty."
219 Cal. Rptr. at 127 (emphasis in original). Cf Thomsen v. King County, 39 Wash. App. 505,
694 P.2d 40 (applicability of county health regulations to non-natives on fee land does, not
interfere with tribal sovereignty where tribe has chosen to apply county standards and
specifically has sought joint tribal-county enforcement), review denied, 103 Wash. 2d 1030
(1985).
112. 532 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977).
113. Id. at 663 (holding that "extension of local jurisdiction is inconsistent with tribal self-
determination and autonomy").
[S]ubjecting the reservation to local jurisdiction would dilute if not altogether eliminate
Indian political control of the timing and scope of the development of reservation resources,
subjecting Indian economic development to the veto power of potentially hostile local non-
Indian majorities. Local communities may not share the usually poorer Indian's priorities,
or may in fact be in economic competition with the Indians and seek, under the guise of
general regulations, to channel development elsewhere in the community. And even when
local regulations are adopted in the best of faith, the differing economic situations of
reservation Indians and the general citizenry may give the ordinance of equal application a
vastly disproportionate impact.
Id. at 664. Five years after Santa Rosa, the Ninth Circuit expressly declined to overrule that case
when requested t6 do so. United States v. Humboldt County, 615 F.2d 1260, 1261-62 (9th Cir.
1980).
Recently, however, the Ninth Circuit appears to have retreated from the clarity of Santa Rosa.
In cases involving county zoning and rent control ordinances, the court of appeals did not
declare that the local laws were barred by the mere fact of their municipal nature. Rather, the
Ninth Circuit engaged in the standard infringement/preemption test for state jurisdiction. Con-
federated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation v. Whiteside, 828 F.2d 529 (9th Cir.
1987), cert. granted sub nom. Brendale v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima Indian
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or criminal jurisdiction to a state pursuant to Public Law 280, the
court held, does not confer jurisdiction on the state's subordinate units
of government." 4 The United States Supreme Court, although it has
not ruled directly on the issue, has voiced its doubt that Public Law
280 ever would authorize local jurisdiction over native reservations." 5
In any case, where state jurisdiction is barred, local authority likewise
is prohibited. 16
D. Summary of Regulatory Authority in Indian Country
The preceding section outlined the legal theories that undergird the
assertion of regulatory control in Indian country by the federal, tribal,
and state governments. Under domestic law, the federal government
can exercise whatever regulatory authority it pleases on the reserva-
tion, either under its arrogated plenary power to regulate natives
directly, or pursuant to the judicially created rule permitting general
federal legislation to be applied to tribes.
Native nations retain inherent sovereign powers of regulatory con-
trol over the territory and inhabitants of the reservation, except for
specific instances where native governmental powers have been ceded
by treaty or lost through congressional legislation or judicial divest-
ment. In addition, tribes may exercise powers delegated to them by
federal action. Tribal regulatory powers extend to non-natives in
Indian country, even on non-native fee lands, in all instances where
the non-natives enter into consensual dealings with tribal governments
or members, and where non-native activity may impact tribal health,
welfare, economic stability, or political integrity.
State regulatory powers in Indian country are quite limited. As a
general rule, states may regulate within native territory only when
state control is not preempted by federal law, as determined largely
through a balancing of tribal, federal, and state interests, or when state
Nation, 108 S. Ct. 2843 (1988); Segundo v. City of Rancho Mirage, 813 F.2d 1387 (9th Cir.
1987). Using that test, the court held that a county could not apply its rent control ordinance to
non-native lessees of native allotments, Segundo, 813 F.2d at 1392-93, or its zoning ordinance to
non-native fee land within a "closed" area of the Yakima Reservation, Whiteside, 828 F.2d at
535, but remanded for a balancing of county and tribal interests in zoning fee lands in an "open"
area, id. at 536. Despite generally favorable outcomes, the court's use of the infringement/pre-
emption analysis represents a significant regression from its original understanding, expressed in
Santa Rosa, that local authority in and of itself constitutes an infringement of tribal sovereignty.
114. Santa Rosa, 532 F.2d at 661; see also Goldberg, supra note 99, at 580-83.
115. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 212 n.ll (1987)
("language [of Public Law 280] seems clearly to exclude local laws").
116. Id. ("even if Pub. L. 280 does make local criminal/prohibitory laws applicable on Indian
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control does not infringe upon tribal sovereignty. Where state regula-
tions would be applied directly to native tribes, persons, or activities,
states may exert regulatory authority only where the state interests in
regulating constitute exceptional circumstances.
Against this background of general regulatory jurisdiction within
Indian country, the following sections will describe the framework of
state pollution control laws and explore the extent to which these state
environmental schemes apply within the territories of the native
nations. The next section will outline the various types of state pollu-
tion control schemes that tribes are likely to encounter.
II. STATE POLLUTION CONTROL LAWS
States generally assert the right to legislate over persons and activi-
ties within Indian country. With judicial removal of the absolute bar
to state regulatory jurisdiction, assertions of state power within contig-
uous native territories have increased in both frequency and intensity.
Court battles over state attempts to control liquor, gambling, land use,
taxation, and the like have become common. To a great extent, this
contest for regulatory primacy arises as a result of the ethnocentric
view of the states that native lands are not extraterritorial to the states
they abut. States generally are willing to perceive native nations, at
best, as more or less the equivalent of municipalities: geo-political sub-
divisions of the state entitled to some tribal form of home rule for
internal affairs, but otherwise subject to the authority of the state.
In the late 1960's, the United States awakened to a new ecological
consciousness. Congress and the state legislatures reacted to the
growth of public awareness of environmental issues with a spate of
legislation aimed at controlling the spread of pollution and rectifying
existing environmental damage. By the 1980's, as governmental famil-
iarity with pollution control schemes grew, both federal and state
agencies began to turn their attention to those narrower and more
select ecological issues that had escaped notice in the earlier years of
designing and implementing the general environmental programs.
Pollution in Indian country was one of those issues. Almost inevita-
bly, given the history of attempted state regulatory incursions into
native interests, many states proposed extending state pollution con-
trol authority over tribal territories.
This section will explore the framework of state pollution control
laws, discussing the various types of laws and regulations implemented
by the states within their borders. There are three primary sources of
state statutes and regulations governing pollution control: state pro-
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grams enacted "in lieu of" the federal programs established by the
federal statutes;"1 7 more stringent state standards and requirements
expressly permitted under the federal acts;.. 8 and additional state laws
enacted pursuant to state police powers, addressing areas of pollution
control not covered by the federal schemes." 9 Whether any of these
state enactments is applicable in Indian country is determined by the
three-tiered analysis developed in Section IV of this Article. The spe-
cific analysis applicable will vary with the source of the state law.
A. State "In Lieu Of" Programs
The federal pollution control acts generally establish federal stan-
dards and programs for controlling pollution either by regulating the
pollutant at the emission source or by regulating the quality of the
protected resource.' 20 Various provisions contained in these acts per-
mit, or sometimes require, the development of state programs within
the guidelines set out in the federal acts. State programs that meet
federal requirements then may be implemented "in lieu of" the federal
programs in the particular state. 12' The general purpose of these state
"in lieu of" schemes is to combine national uniformity in pollution
control standards with local program implementation.' 22 To ensure
implementation of national standards, the federal government typi-
117. See, e.g.. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6926-6991 (1982)
(authorizing state hazardous waste programs "in lieu of" the federal program). The "in lieu of"
language is found only in this Act. Nonetheless, because the term is a convenient way to refer to
federally delegated state programs. it will be used in this Article to designate all state programs
implemented under any of the federal pollution control acts.
118. See infra note 157 and accompanying text.
119. The federal pollution control acts, while generally comprehensive, cannot and do not
cover every possible aspect of pollution control. The states retain their ability to regulate
environmental matters under the police power. See infra notes 158-60 and accompanying text.
120. For example, the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982 & Supp. IV
1986), attempts to control pollution at the source by establishing standards for release of
pollutants at "point sources." By contrast, the Clean Air Act ("CAA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986), establishes air quality standards, and then works backward to control
air pollutants. See A. SANDERS & R. OTSEA, PROTECTING INDIAN NATURAL RESOURCES: A
MANUAL FOR LAWYERS REPRESENTING INDIAN TRIBES OR TRIBAL MEMBERS 80 (1982)
(published by Native American Rights Fund, 1506 Broadway, Boulder, Colorado 80302).
121. Even where state "in lieu of" programs are implemented, however, the federal presence
does not disappear altogether. The federal government generally remains responsible for
ensuring that state programs function effectively and in compliance with federal law. See infra
notes 145-47 and accompanying text.
122. The state point of view often is that the purpose of the scheme is to remove from the
states most choices concerning the substance of the program, while at the same time
externalizing to the states the costs and other burdens of implementation. See, e.g., U.S.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, Federal-State Environmental Programs-The State Perspective
(1980); Schnapf, State Hazardous Waste Programs Under the Federal Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act, 12 ENVT'L L. 679, 703-05, 734 (1982).
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cally retains primary authority where no approved state plan is in
effect.
The discussion in this Article focuses on the federally delegated
state programs established under seven of the major federal pollution
control acts: (1) the Clean Air Act ("CAA"),'23 under which the fed-
eral Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") is required to estab-
lish national air quality standards for a broad range of air
pollutants;124 (2) the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), 125 which calls for
developing "comprehensive programs for preventing, reducing, or
eliminating the pollution of the navigable waters and ground waters
and improving the sanitary condition of surface and underground
waters";126 (3) the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compen-
123. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982).
124. Id. § 7409. The EPA is required to promulgate national ambient air quality standards
for "each air pollutant for which air quality criteria have been issued." Id. § 7409(a)(1)(A).
The CAA establishes programs to address each of two types of air quality areas. In
nonattainment areas, those for which the air quality is in violation of the national standards for
any of the regulated pollutants, id. § 7501(2), the Act calls for the "expeditious attainment" of
the national air quality standards through measures such as emission limitations and permits for
the construction and operation of new sources of air pollutants. Id. § 7502. For "clean" or
attainment areas, CAA establishes a program for the prevention of significant deterioration
(PSD) of air quality. Attainment areas are divided into three classes: Class I protecting pristine
air quality, Class II permitting some air quality deterioration, and Class III tolerating even
greater deterioration, although in no case may air quality fall below the national standards. Id.
§ 7473. All "clean" areas initially are classified as Class II, id. at § 7472(b), except for a few
statutory designations at Class I: all international parks, and national wilderness areas, national
memorial parks, and national parks above a designated acreage. Id. at § 7472(a).
For a detailed discussion of CAA and its two major programs, see Lutz, Managing a
Boundless Resource: U.S. Approaches to Transboundary Air Quality Control, 11 ENVT'L L. 321,
323-55 (1981).
125. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). The CWA also is known as the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act ("FWPCA").
126. Id. § 1252(a). Under this sweeping charge, the Act establishes three main programs.
One is the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") program, under which
a permit must be obtained before any "point source" may discharge pollutants into navigable
waters. Id. § 1342(a). A "point source" is defined as "'any discernible, confined and discrete
conveyance," such as a pipe, ditch, conduit, well, container, or vessel "from which pollutants are
or may be discharged." Id. § 1362(14). The second program is the permit program for the
discharge into navigable waters of dredged or fill material, id. § 1344(g), known as the "§ 404"
permit program after the section of FWPCA that created it. Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 404, 86 Stat.
816 (1972). The 1987 amendments to CWA created a third program for "controlling pollution
added from nonpoint sources to the navigable waters." 33 U.S.C.A. § 1329(b)(1) (West Supp.
1989). Although a "nonpoint source" of water pollution is not defined expressly in the Act, the
term apparently includes any source other than one defined as a "point source." The
amendments also address the protection of groundwater quality through a program of grants.
Id. § 1329(i).
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sation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA"), 2 7 or the "Superfund Act,"
aimed primarily at cleaning up hazardous waste sites and spills;' 2 8 (4)
the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act
("FIFRA"), 12 9 which controls and regulates the use of pesticides;' 3 °
(5) the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"),13 1
enacted to reduce or eliminate the generation of hazardous waste, and
to treat and store existing hazardous waste in a manner that will mini-
mize the threat to human health and the environment;3 2 (6) the Safe
Drinking Water Act ("SDWA"), t33 which protects drinking water
supplies; 3 4 and (7) the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act
127. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675, as amended by the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986 ("SARA"), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1706 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 9626) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
128. To that end, CERCLA provides for notification procedures and federal remedial action
in case of the release of a hazardous substance, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9603, 9604; a "Superfund" to pay
the costs of responding to a release, id. § 9611; and standards for clean up of hazardous materials
releases, id. § 9621. The Act also establishes a national priorities list of sites most in need of
remedial action. Id. § 9605.
The national hazardous waste management policy is contained in the combination of
CERCLA and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"), discussed infra at notes
131-32 and accompanying text. According to one commenter, there are four major goals to the
national policy: (1) cleaning up hazardous waste sites and compensating victims; (2) bringing
existing facilities up to state of the art, or at least safer, practices; (3) encouraging new facilities to
use the most environmentally sound management practices; and (4) encouraging recycling
wherever possible. The first goal is addressed partially by CERCLA, and the last three are
addressed by RCRA. Tarlock, Anywhere But Here: An Introduction to State Control of
Hazardous-Waste Facility Location, 2 UCLA J. ENVT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 4-5 (1981).
129. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
130. The Act establishes procedures for registration of pesticides and pesticide producers, id.
§§ 136a, 136e, certification of pesticide applicators, id. § 136b, and regulation of the import,
export, transportation, and disposal of pesticides, id. §§ 136o, 136q. In general, FIFRA forbids
the distribution, sale, shipment, delivery, or receipt of any pesticide that is not registered with the
federal government. Id. § 136a(a). However, "to meet special local needs," states may register
federally registered pesticides for additional uses, so long as the federal government previously
has not denied that use of the pesticide. Id. § 136v(c).
131. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
132. Id. § 6902(b). The Act's ambitious purpose is to regulate and manage hazardous waste
from generation through final disposal, popularly referred to as "cradle to grave" management,
through measures such as identification of hazardous wastes and waste sites, standards for
generators, transporters, and owners and operators of treatment, storage, and disposal facilities,
and permits for the treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous waste. Id. §§ 6921-6939. The
RCRA also provides for development of federal guidelines for state solid waste management
plans. Id. § 6942.
133. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300f-300j-1 1 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
134. The Act establishes three major programs. The first is the public water systems
program, which sets drinking water quality standards. Id. §§ 300g-300g-l. The second program
is the underground injection control ("UIC") program, which regulates the injection of fluids
into the ground. Id. § 300h. The 1986 amendments to the Act established a third program for
the protection of wellhead areas, id. § 300h-7, defined as the surface and subsurface area
surrounding a water well or wellfield that supplies a public water system. Id. § 300h-7(e).
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("SMCRA")135 enacted upon congressional findings that surface coal
mining was contributing not only to the nation's energy needs, but
also to the nation's environmental problems.136
1. State Programs Under the Federal Acts
Each of these federal pollution control acts provides for state imple-
mentation and enforcement of the programs established in the stat-
utes. In most cases, state assumption of regulatory authority is
discretionary with the state. For the programs contained in
FIFRA, 137 RCRA, 138 and SMCRA, 139 and for selected programs of
CWA 4° and SDWA,14 1 a state may submit a plan to EPA for federal
approval. Once EPA approves the state's program, the state then
assumes primacy for the particular program "in lieu of" the federal
government. The Superfund Act also is discretionary, but with the
federal government rather than the states. The Act authorizes the
135. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Unlike the other federal pollution
control acts discussed in this article, SMCRA is administered by the Department of the Interior
rather than EPA.
136. Id. § 1201. The Act established two major surface mining programs: The abandoned
mine reclamation program, id. §§ 1231-1243, and a program to control the environmental effects
of surface coal mining through the issuance of permits for coal exploration and for the
development of new, previously mined, or abandoned mines, including environmental protection
performance standards and reclamation plans. Id. §§ 1251-1279.
137. States may assume primacy for the certification of pesticide applicators, 7 U.S.C. § 136b
(1982), and also are authorized to regulate the sale and use of federally registered pesticides, and
to register pesticides for additional uses, "to meet special local needs," so long as the state does
not permit uses prohibited by federal law. Id. § 136v(c). In addition, states are accorded
primary enforcement responsibility for pesticide use violations if they have either an approved
applicator certification plan that adequately addresses pesticide use, or a cooperative agreement
with the federal government, or if EPA determines that the state has adequate pesticide use laws,
regulations, and enforcement procedures. Id. § 136w-l(a), (b).
138. States may take primary responsibility to administer and enforce hazardous waste
programs. 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b) (1982 & Supp, IV 1986). See generally Schnapf, supra note 122,
at 694-97. Unique among the federal environmental acts discussed in this Article, RCRA
provides for interim authorization of state hazardous waste programs prior to final authorization.
42 U.S.C. § 6926(c) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). States also may develop and implement plans for
solid waste management. Id. §§ 6942-6943, 6946-6947.
139. States may take jurisdiction over the regulation of surface coal mining and reclamation
operations. 30 U.S.C. § 1253(a) (1982). Any state with an approved regulatory program also
may submit a plan to take jurisdiction over the abandoned mine reclamation program. Id.
§ 1235.
140. States may administer the NPDES and § 404 permit programs under CWA. 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1342(b), 1344(g) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Any state proposing to operate either permit
program must submit to EPA a statement certifying that its laws provide it with adequate
authority to carry out the proposed state program. Id.
141. The SDWA provides that states may assume primary responsibility for enforcement of
the public water systems program. 42 U.S.C. § 300g-2(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
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President, "in his [sic] discretion," to delegate response authority to
the states. '42
In three instances the statutes mandate state primacy. States are
required under these acts or programs to develop and submit state
plans for federal approval. 4 3 Under two of these mandatory state
plan provisions, EPA is obligated to prescribe a state plan if the state
fails to submit an adequate plan or if the submitted plan is
disapproved. 44
Typically, the federal government retains a residual enforcement
authority in states exercising discretionary or mandatory "in lieu of"
jurisdiction. Under most of the federal pollution control acts, the fed-
eral government reserves jurisdiction, upon notice to the state, to issue
compliance orders or commence civil actions against violators of the
state plan or program."' In addition, the federal government gener-
ally may withdraw its approval of a state plan where the state fails to
142. The CERCLA provides that states may apply for authority to carry out remedial and
response actions in connection with the release or substantial threat of release of any hazardous
substance into the environment. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1), (d)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). If the
President determines that the state has the capability to carry out the federal mandate, the
federal government, at the President's discretion, may enter into a contract or cooperative
agreement with the state. Id. § 9604(d)(1). The federal government, however, will not provide
any remedial action unless the affected state first enters into a contract or cooperative agreement
in which the state guarantees future maintenance of the remedial action, availability of a
federally approved hazardous waste disposal facility, and payment of a percentage of the cleanup
costs for any state operated facility. Id. § 9604(c)(3).
143. Under CAA and selected programs of CWA and SDWA, states are required to develop
and submit state plans for federal approval.
Under CAA, each state is required to submit a State Implementation Plan ("SIP") for the
"implementation, maintenance, and enforcement" of the federal air quality standards. 42 U.S.C.
§ 7410 (1982). In addition to the SIP's, states have the primary role under CAA for
redesignating air quality in attainment areas, including national lands, within their borders. Id.
§ 7474. Under the 1987 amendments to CWA, states are required to prepare and submit to EPA
management programs for controlling water pollution from nonpoint sources. 33 U.S.C.A.
§ 1329(b)(1) (West Supp. 1989). See generally Davidson, Thinking about Nonpoint Sources of
Water Pollution and South Dakota Agriculture, 34 S.D.L. REv. 20 (1989). Similarly, states are
required under the 1986 amendments to SDWA to submit for approval management programs
for the protection of wellhead areas. 42 U.S.C. § 300h-7(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). In addition.
the states also are required to submit a UIC program in each state where EPA determines that an
underground injection control program may be necessary to prevent endangering drinking water
sources. Id. § 300h-l(a), (b).
144. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c) (1982) (CAA); 42 U.S.C. § 300h-l(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (Safe
Drinking Water Act UIC program). In other instances where the state plans are mandatory,
EPA may compel a state that has submitted an inadequate plan to revise and resubmit the state
program within a statutorily specified period of time. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1329(d)(2) (West Supp.
1989) (CWA nonpoint source pollution program); 42 U.S.C. § 300h-7(c)(2) (1982 & Supp. IV
1986) (SDWA wellhead protection program).
145. See 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a) (1982) (CAA); 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a) (1982) (Clean Water Act
NPDES and § 404 programs); 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a) (1982) (RCRA hazardous waste program); 42
U.S.C. § 300g-3 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (SDWA public water system program); id. § 300h-2
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administer or enforce the state program according to the requirements
of the federal statutes. 146 In some instances the federal government
itself may enforce the state plan where the state fails to do so.147
2. Native Nations as States Under the Federal Acts
About half of the federal pollution control acts now contain provi-
sions mandating that tribes be treated as states for most purposes of
the statutory schemes. The SMCRA has contained such a provision
since 1977,148 and recent amendments added a "tribes-as-states" pro-
vision to CWA, 149 the Superfund Act,"' ° and SDWA.1 ' Generally,
(UIC program); see also 30 U.S.C. § 1271(a) (1982) (permitting the Secretary of the Interior,
upon notice to the state, to take actions to correct violations of SMCRA).
146. 7 U.S.C. § 136b(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (FIFRA certification of pesticide
applicators); id. § 136v(c)(4) (registration of pesticides for additional uses); 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)
(1982) (Clean Water Act NPDES program); id. § 1344(i) (§ 404 program); 42 U.S.C. § 6926(e)
(1982) (RCRA hazardous waste plans); 30 U.S.C. § 1235(d) (1982) (SMCRA abandoned mine
reclamation program).
147. If the federal agency finds that violations are so widespread as to constitute a failure on
the part of the state to enforce its implementation plan, the federal government may assume
enforcement responsibility. See, eg., 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a) (1982) (CAA); 30 U.S.C. §§ 1254(b),
1271(b) (1982) (SMCRA).
148. Pub. L. No. 95-87, § 405, 91 Stat. 459 (1977) (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 1235(k) (1982)).
The Act provides that tribes shall be considered as states under the abandoned mine reclamation
program. 30 U.S.C. § 1235(k) (1982). An anomaly appears to exist in the structure of the Act.
States may not receive federal approval of their abandoned mine reclamation programs unless
they have approved state regulatory programs. Id. § 1235(c). If this requirement applies equally
to tribes as to states, then tribes are in an impossible position. Tribes are not treated expressly as
states under the Act's provisions for regulating surface coal mining; hence, tribes cannot have
approved "state" regulatory programs. Thus, despite the express authorization of § 1235(k),
native nations ostensibly cannot obtain federal approval for abandoned mine reclamation
programs.
In addition, SMCRA provided for a study on "the question of the regulation of surface mining
on Indian lands." Id. § 1300(a). The report was submitted in 1979. COUNCIL OF ENERGY
RESOURCE TRIBES, THE CONTROL AND RECLAMATION OF SURFACE MINING ON INDIAN
LANDS (1979). The study advanced proposals for remedial legislation, but the Act has yet to be
amended with regard to the regulation of surface coal mining in Indian country.
149. Clean Water Act Amendments of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, § 506, 101 Stat. 77 (codified
at 33 U.S.C.A. § 1377 (West Supp. 1989)). The new section provides that EPA shall treat tribes
as states for most purposes and programs of the Act, including the NPDES and § 404 permit
programs and the nonpoint source management program, "to the degree necessary to carry out
the objectives of this section." Id. § 1377(e).
Until EPA promulgates regulations specifying how tribes are to be treated as states under
CWA, other measures are available to tribes. Recently, at the request of the Colville
Confederated Tribes, EPA proposed to adopt the Tribe's water quality standards as federal
standards for the Colville Reservation. 53 Fed. Reg. 26,968 (1988).
A native government that assumes responsibility for programs under CWA may exercise its
authority over water resources held by the tribe, by the United States in trust for the tribe or a
member, or "otherwise within the borders of an Indian reservation." 33 U.S.C.A. § 1377(e)(2)
(West Supp. 1989). The CWA also contains provision for federal settlement of disputes between
states and tribes sharing common bodies of water. Id. § 1377(e). The EPA is required to
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the statutory tribes-as-states treatment is limited by the language of
the acts: CWA, SDWA, and CERCLA place restrictions upon the
"provide a mechanism for the resolution of any unreasonable consequences that may arise as a
result of differing water quality standards that may be set by States and Indian tribes located on
common bodies of water." Id.
150. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 ("SARA"), Pub. L. No. 99-
499, § 207(e), 100 Stat. 1706 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9626 (Supp. IV 1986)). The new section
provides that a native government "shall be afforded substantially the same treatment as a State"
with respect to a number of the provisions of CERCLA, including notification of releases,
consultation on remedial actions, access to information, roles and responsibilities under the
national contingency plan, and submittal of priorities for remedial action. Id. § 9626(a). Tribes
specifically are authorized to enter into contracts or cooperative agreements with the federal
government to carry out removal or other remedial actions in case of releases of hazardous
substances, id. § 9604(d)(1)(A), and to assert claims against the Superfund for damages to tribal
natural resources and for the costs of restoring or replacing damaged resources. Id. § 961 l(b)(1),
(c).
Some express exceptions to the general tribes-as-states provision exist. Each state is entitled to
have one facility on the national list of priorities for remedial action. Id. § 9605(a)(8)(B). The
treatment of tribes as states, however, specifically excludes this entitlement. Id. § 9626(a).
Native nations also are exempt from certain assurances of future maintenance and cost-sharing
required of states in the case of federal remedial actions, id. § 9604(c)(3), and from certain time
limitations placed on state governments. Id. § 9626(d).
The CERCLA amendments also call for a study of hazardous waste sites on native lands,
including recommendations on tribal needs with an emphasis on maximum tribal participation in
the administration of CERCLA programs. Id. § 9626(c). The report was to be submitted to
Congress with the President's budget request for fiscal year 1988. The Council of Energy
Resources Tribes completed a survey of hazardous waste sites on 25 selected native reservations
in 1985, finding that nearly 1200 waste generators or sites existed within the participating
reservations, and that five reservations contained a total of six hazardous waste activities or sites
"requiring prompt investigation." COUNCIL OF ENERGY RESOURCE TRIBES, INVENTORY OF
HAZARDOUS WASTE GENERATORS AND SITES ON SELECTED INDIAN RESERVATIONS 21
(1985).
151. Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-339, § 302(a), 100 Stat.
665 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 300j-I l(a) (West Supp. 1988)). The amendments authorize EPA
"to treat Indian Tribes as States" under the Act, and specifically provide that native nations may
assume primary enforcement responsibility for both public water systems and UIC programs.
Id. Tribal primacy under the UIC program also is addressed at § 300h-l(e), which exempts
tribes from certain time limits placed upon states, and provides that EPA will prescribe a UIC
program where one does not exist for a native nation.
Where treatment of a tribe as a state is considered "inappropriate, administratively infeasible
or otherwise inconsistent with the purposes" of the Act, however, EPA is entitled to promulgate
"other means for administering such provision in a manner that will achieve the purpose of the
provision." Id. § 300j-ll(b)(2).
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native nations that may receive treatment as states, 152 and SMCRA is
limited to tribes with certain types of lands.'53
Two additional federal environmental statutes, although they do not
include special tribes-as-states provisions, specifically delegate to tribes
primary authority for certain programs. The CAA places with native
nations the exclusive authority to redesignate air quality for reserva-
tions;' 54 and FIFRA expressly permits EPA to enter into cooperative
agreements with tribes to enforce pesticide use violations and to train
152. For example, SDWA provides that treatment as a state is authorized only if:
(A) the Indian Tribe is recognized by the Secretary of the Interior and has a governing
body carrying out substantial governmental duties and powers;
(B) the functions to be exercised by the Indian Tribe are within the area of the Tribal
Government's jurisdiction; and
(C) the Indian Tribe is reasonably expected to be capable, in the Administrator's
judgment, of carrying out the functions to be exercised in a manner consistent with the
terms and purposes of this subchapter and of all applicable regulations.
42 U.S.C.A. § 300j-ll(b)(1) (West Supp. 1988); see also 53 Fed. Reg. 37,396, 37,398-402 (1988)
(final SDWA rules interpreting these requirements). The provisions of CWA are similar. See 33
U.S.C.A. § 1377(e) (West Supp. 1988).
The broadest statutory definition of tribes to be treated as states is found in SARA, the 1986
amendments to CERCLA:
The term "Indian tribe" means any Indian tribe, band, nation, or other organized group or
community, including any Alaska Native village but not including any Alaska Native
regional or village corporation, which is recognized as eligible for the special programs and
services provided by the United States to Indians because of their status as Indians.
42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(36) (West Supp. 1988). Federal authorization to enter into a contract or
cooperative agreement with a native tribe, however, is available only "[i]f the President deter-
mines that the ... Indian tribe has the capability to carry out any or all of such actions in
accordance with the criteria and priorities established [in the act] and to carry out related
enforcement actions." Id. § 9604(d)(1)(A). The requirements for approval of a state application
are identical. Id.
153. Treatment as states is available to tribes with "eligible lands" and lands "from which
coal is produced .. " 30 U.S.C. § 1235(k) (1982). Eligible lands are those "which were mined
for coal or which were affected by such mining, wastebanks, coal processing, or other coal
mining processes, and abandoned or left in an inadequate reclamation status prior to August 3,
1977, and for which there is no continuing reclamation responsibility under State or other
Federal laws." Id. § 1234.
154. The CAA provides that "[]ands within the exterior boundaries of reservations of
federally-recognized Indian tribes may be redesignated only by the appropriate Indian governing
body." 42 U.S.C. § 7474(c) (1982). The Spokane Tribe recently requested, and EPA proposed
for approval, a redesignation of the Spokane Reservation's air quality to Class I. 54 Fed. Reg.
1954 (1989).
In addition, the Act provides for federal resolution of disputes between native governments
and states where either government objects to redesignation by the other or to a permit for a new
emission source that would cause or contribute to air pollution in excess of that allowed by the
tribal or state government. 42 U.S.C. § 7474(e) (1982). Either government may request EPA to
enter into negotiations with the governments involved, and to make recommendations to resolve
the dispute. If the parties do not reach agreement, however, EPA "shall resolve the dispute,"
and the federal determination then becomes part of the governments' air quality plans. Id.
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and certify pesticides applicators.' 55 Only one of the seven federal
acts, RCRA, does not contain either a general tribes-as-states section
or express authorization for tribes to assume specific program
responsibilities. 5 6
B. Additional State Pollution Control Laws
State pollution control efforts are not confined to the "in lieu of"
programs developed under the auspices of the federal acts, but include
as well state pollution control laws additional or supplementary to the
delegated programs. These state laws take two forms. First, several of
the federal environmental statutes-CWA, RCRA, and SMCRA-
expressly permit states to enact more stringent standards, limitations,
and requirements than those promulgated as federal minimums.'"
Despite the generally comprehensive nature of the regulatory schemes
established by these federal pollution control acts, more stringent state
laws, by congressional fiat, are deemed not inconsistent with the fed-
eral acts.
In addition to stricter state regulations specifically permitted by fed-
eral law, states are entitled under their police power to regulate in
areas not covered by the federal pollution control acts.' 58 Although
155. 7 U.S.C. § 136u(a) (1982). By contrast, states may assume primary enforcement
responsibility for pesticide use violations not only by entering into a cooperative agreement with
EPA, but also if the state has a federally approved plan or if EPA determines that the state has
adequate laws, regulations, and enforcement procedures. Id. § 136w-l(a), (b).
156. Native governments are mentioned only once in RCRA-in the definition section. A
"person" for purposes of the Act includes a municipality, 42 U.S.C. § 6903(15) (1982), and the
definition of municipality in turn includes "an Indian tribe or authorized tribal organization or
Alaska Native village or organization." Id. § 6903(13). As "persons," native tribes are subject to
compliance actions under RCRA's citizen suit provision. Blue Legs v. U.S. Bureau of Indian
Affairs, 867 F.2d 1094, 1097 (8th Cir. 1989).
One other federal environmental act, SDWA, also defines "municipality" as including native
tribes, and "person" as including municipalities. 42 U.S.C. § 300f(10), (12) (1982). The EPA
has stated that tribes which do not meet the tribes-as-states criteria of SDWA, see supra note 152,
will be treated as municipalities. 53 Fed. Reg. 37,396, 37,397 (1988).
157. 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1982) (CWA); 42 U.S.C. § 6929 (1982) (RCRA); 30 U.S.C. § 1255
(1982) (SMCRA). The RCRA specifically preserves a state's right to impose more stringent site
selection requirements, 42 U.S.C. § 6929 (1982), and to carry out all state and local solid waste
planning and management activities that are not inconsistent with approved state solid waste
management plans. Id. § 6947(c). See Snyder, The EPA-North Carolina Dispute: The Right of
States to Pass Stricter Laws Under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 8 VA. J. NAT.
RESOURcEs L. 171 (1988).
158. State laws may be preempted by federal laws where a congressional intent to preempt is
express in the language of the statute or implicit in the statutory scheme. If the state regulation
would constitute an obstacle to the accomplishment of the federal purpose, then the state law is
barred. See generally infra notes 169-70 and accompanying text (discussion of federal
preemption). Where the federal pollution control schemes do not address a particular area of
environmental control, state regulation of that area is not likely to be an obstacle to
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the federal environmental schemes are becoming increasingly compre-
hensive, there remain still a few areas not addressed by the federal
statutes.1 5 9 In these areas states may control environmental pollution
through police power regulation.
160
III. APPLICABILITY OF STATE LAW
State programs established "in lieu of" federal programs under the
federal pollution control acts comprise the bulk of state control of pol-
lutants and pollution sources. Yet state extension of the "in lieu of"
programs over Indian country is preempted in virtually all aspects.'
In many cases the federal preemption does not depend upon an analy-
sis under the usual infringement/preemption test of federal Indian
law, but is found directly in the acts themselves. In other instances,
interpretations of the federal laws by EPA, and judicial review of those
accomplishment of the federal program. Those areas not covered by the federal statutory
schemes thus fall within the authority of the state under its police power.
On federal preemption of state law under the pollution control acts, see generally Light,
Federal Preemption, Federal Conscription Under the New Superfund Act, 38 MERCER L. REV.
643 (1987); Comment, Environmental Law: A Reevaluation of Federal Pre-emption and the
Commerce Clause, 7 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 649 (1979); Comment, Preemption Doctrine in the
Environmental Context: A Unified Method of Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 197 (1978).
159. For example, in a paper dated March 4, 1988, the Indian Affairs Working Group of the
National Association of Attorneys General identified the following as subjects not covered by the
federal pollution control acts: "[R]egulation and permitting of discharges to groundwater,
shoreline management, cleanup of pesticides or petroleum wastes not covered by CERCLA, and
regulation of non-point source pollution." NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL,
INDIAN AFFAIRS WORKING GROUP, EPA INDIAN LANDS POLICY: THE NEED FOR
REEVALUATION AND REVISION 5 (1988) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter NAAG PAPER]. The
year previous to the release of the NAAG Paper, however, amendments to CWA required states
to submit management plans for controlling nonpoint source pollution, and established grants to
states pursuant to such plans for the protection of groundwater quality. See supra notes 126 &
143.
160. See, eg., New York State Pesticide Coalition v. Jorling, No. 89-7143 (2d. Cir., 10 May
1989) (1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 6557) (state "right to know" laws requiring notification, posting of
signs, and newspaper notice of pesticide use not preempted by FIFRA); Roberts, Acid Rain
Regulation: Federal Failure and State Success, 8 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 1, 35-60 (1988)
(describing Minnesota state acid rain regulations).
161. Divestment of state regulatory jurisdiction is not the sum of the issue. Equally offensive
to many native peoples are the federal regulations themselves.
In the absence of clear congressional expression of applicability to Indian reservations, some
native governments and commenters have argued that the provisions of the EPA statutes should
not apply to native reservations at all. Additionally, some native nations have advanced the
argument that any placement by the federal government of environmental restrictions on
reservation lands or tribes would be inconsistent with the federal government's trust
responsibility to America's native nations. See, e-g., Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S.
286, 296 (1942); FINAL REPORT TO THE AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMM'N, TASK
FORCE FOUR: FEDERAL, STATE AND TRIBAL JURISDICTION 34 (1976); P. MAXFIELD, supra
note 3, at 47.
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interpretations, serve to block state extension of "in lieu of" programs
over Indian country. Where neither the language of the statute nor
EPA's interpretation of the statute bars state authority, the applicabil-
ity of the "in lieu of" programs is determined by the judicial infringe-
ment/preemption test for state regulatory authority within reservation
borders.
More stringent state laws permissible under the federal pollution
control acts also are preempted directly where the federal law treats
native governments as states. Where the federal statutes do not treat
tribes as states, more stringent state laws nonetheless may be prohib-
ited under EPA's interpretation of the federal pollution control
scheme. Alternatively, more stringent state laws, along with supple-
mental state regulations not barred by the federal statutes, are pre-
cluded by the infringement/preemption test for general state
regulatory authority.
A. Express Federal Preemption
In many cases, the federal pollution control laws directly preempt
states from extending their jurisdiction onto native reservations under
the "in lieu of" programs. As the federal pollution control acts come
before Congress for reauthorization, amendments generally include
language treating native tribes as states.
162
Under each of these laws, "states" are accorded jurisdiction to oper-
ate the applicable program within "state" borders. As a general prin-
ciple of sovereignty, of course, no state may regulate in the territory of
another. 163 Treating tribes as states, therefore, preempts any other
state from asserting jurisdiction in the tribal territory. For example, if
the Crow Tribe is a "state" for purposes of CWA programs, the State
of Montana can no more assert jurisdiction over the Crow Reservation
162. Recent amendments to CERCLA, CWA, and SDWA, as well as the 1977 SMCRA, all
include specific provisions that tribes may be treated as states for all or most purposes of the acts.
See supra notes 148-51 and accompanying text. The EPA has stated that one of its goals in
addressing pollution control in Indian country is to "[seek] amendments to environmental
statutes in order to clarify the role of tribal governments in this area." U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY, OFFICE OF FEDERAL ACTIVITIES, EPA ACTIVITIES ON INDIAN
RESERVATIONS: FY 87, 2 (1988) [hereinafter EPA ACTIVITIES FY 87].
163. As with most state jurisdictional footings, common law adopts a territorial basis as the
general precept of state regulatory jurisdiction. A state has the authority to regulate activities
within its territorial limits. Conversely, there can be no territorial jurisdiction where the
regulated conduct and its results occur outside a state's territory. See RESTATEMENT OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 425 (1934). The Supreme Court has recognized this principle specifically
in the context of pollution control. See International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 494
(1987) (under CWA, states may administer their permit systems only with regard to in-state
sources); see also infra note 173.
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than Montana can over its neighboring state of Wyoming. As "state
equivalents" under the federal acts, tribes may assume responsibility
for implementing and enforcing the pollution control programs within
reservation borders."6 The assumption of primary responsibility by
two governments-state and tribal-aside from the inherent inconsis-
tency, would frustrate federal intent and conflict with the plain lan-
guage of the acts that tribes are to be treated as states.
Not all the federal pollution control acts contain general statutory
provisions authorizing the federal implementing agency to treat tribes
as states. Some federal laws instead include specific language concern-
ing tribal participation in particular programs. The CAA, for exam-
ple, provides that only the governing body of a native nation may
redesignate an air quality attainment area within reservation borders,
and thus CAA expressly preempts any attempt by a state to redesig-
nate reservation lands.'65 The FIFRA provides that, like a state, a
tribe may enter into a cooperative agreement with EPA to enforce the
Act. 166
Preemption of state jurisdiction under these aspects of the federal
pollution control acts more closely resembles traditional principles of
federal preemption than the specialized preemption doctrine devel-
oped for domestic Indian law.167 Because of the presumption against
state jurisdiction within reservation borders, 68 express federal pre-
emption of the states is rare in native affairs. By equating tribes with
states, however, or otherwise placing sole authority with the tribes,
Congress overtly has preempted state jurisdiction in Indian country
under several of the state "in lieu of" programs.
Under traditional principles of preemption, state regulation is pre-
empted entirely by federal law where Congress " 'unmistakably' " has
164. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 300j-11(a) (West Supp. 1988) (SDWA, providing that EPA "is
authorized to treat Indian Tribes as States under this subchapter, [and] may delegate to such
Tribes primary enforcement responsibility for public water systems and for underground
injection control."). The EPA recently promulgated final rules for treating tribes as states and
for tribal primacy under these two programs. 53 Fed. Reg. 37,396 (1988).
165. See supra note 154.
166. 7 U.S.C. § 136u(a) (1982). Presumably the federal government would not enter into two
cooperative agreements-one with the state and another with an adjoining tribe-to enforce the
Act within a tribal territory. Such a system of dual agreements could result in potentially
conflicting regulatory schemes, and would appear to frustrate the intent of the law that native
nations may enter into cooperative agreements for tribal enforcement within their territories. On
the federal government's disfavor of dual tribal-state regulatory schemes, see supra notes 55 & 97
(general regulation), and infra note 235 (environmental regulation).
167. See supra note 75 (discussing the difference between standard preemption and
preemption in domestic Indian law).
168. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
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ordained federal control, whether congressional intent is explicit in the
language of the statute or implicit in the statutory structure and pur-
pose. 169 Moreover, even where federal law does not override state law
completely, state regulation still may be barred if compliance with
both is a physical impossibility or if the state law stands as an obstacle
to the accomplishment of the federal purpose.1 "0
In the case of the federal pollution control laws, congressional intent
that tribes, not states, carry out the federal mandate within Indian
country can be either express in the language of statutes, such as CAA
redesignation provisions, or implicit in the general tribes-as-states
scheme established in statutes such as CWA. While states are not pro-
hibited from regulating altogether, as they would be in traditional pre-
emption law, they are barred, whether explicitly or implicitly, from
regulating in native territory.
The preemption of state jurisdiction found in the tribes-as-states
statutes and similar provisions of other laws is not "express" preemp-
tion in the usual sense of that term, in that no language in the statutes
specifically and expressly provides that the state may not regulate in
Indian country. But neither does preemption under these federal laws
resemble Indian law preemption, which relies upon an examination of
the "backdrop" of tribal sovereignty and a balancing of the interests of
the federal, tribal, and state governments to determine whether state
authority is barred. t ' None of this analysis is necessary in the case of
the tribes-as-states laws, because the express language of the statutory
schemes bars any state jurisdiction in Indian country. The direct
nature of the preemption found in many of the pollution control acts
thus resembles standard preemption law to a degree unusual in federal
Indian law.
This preemptive effect of the tribes-as-states language in the pollu-
tion control acts is not diminished where a state's laws are more strin-
gent than the federal standards.' 7 2 The mere fact of stricter pollution
controls does not authorize a state to apply its "in lieu of" laws on a
reservation, any more than the state could apply those laws to an adja-
cent state. One state is not entitled to regulate in the territory of
another state under the federal acts merely because the first state's
laws offer greater protection, even if those states with more stringent
169. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) (quoting Florida Lime & Avocado
Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963)).
170. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 158 (1978); Rath Packing, 430 U.S. at 526.
171. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
172. See also infra notes 237-38 and accompanying text (addressing more stringent state laws
under the federal pollution control acts that do not treat tribes as states).
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standards are impacted adversely by neighboring jurisdictions that
adopt the federal minimums. 173 The statutory treatment of tribes as
states, or similar grants of exclusive authority to tribes, mandates the
same result with respect to Indian country. Thus, under the federal
statutes that treat tribes as states, more stringent standards or require-
ments enacted by a state cannot be enforced in Indian country.
In some instances, the federal grant of statutory program author-
ity 74 applies to any federally recognized native nation. 175 In other of
the federal acts, however, particularly those amended during
reauthorization to treat tribes as states, only those native nations meet-
ing certain statutory criteria may qualify as states.176 Generally, the
criteria include federally-recognized tribal governments exercising
substantial governmental functions, jurisdiction over the subject mat-
ter of the program, and the perceived capability to carry out the pro-
gram.' 77 The extent to which these statutory limitations will impact
native nations wishing to take advantage of the federal programs is not
yet known.
178
173. See, eg., Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 731 F.2d 403, 413 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1196 (1985) (under CWA, state has no right to impose more stringent regulations upon
sources in neighboring state); Connecticut v. EPA, 656 F.2d 902, 909 (2d Cir. 1981) (under
CAA, state is under no obligation to respect its neighbor's more stringent air quality standards).
174. In speaking of a federal "grant" of authority, it is not the authors' intention to imply in
any way that native nations are dependent upon a delegation of power from the federal
government in dealing with reservation environmental issues. In the case of the federal pollution
control laws, however, there is a "grant" of federal authority-that is, a delegation of authority
to carry out the programs established by federal law. It is a delegation to the tribes of federal
statutory authority and not an attempt to coAfer on the native nations that which is already
theirs. See generally supra Section I.B.2. (discussion of federal delegation to tribal governments).
175. Under CAA, area air quality redesignation of reservations rests exclusively with the
"Indian governing body" of "federally recognized Indian tribes." 42 U.S.C. § 7474(c) (1982).
And under SMCRA, the Department of the Interior may treat as a state an "Indian tribe," 30
U.S.C. § 1235(k) (1982), defined as "any Indian tribe, band, group, or community having a
governing body recognized by the Secretary." Id. § 1291(10). Consideration of tribes as states
under SMCRA, however, logically is limited to tribes having within their jurisdictions eligible or
coal producing lands to which SMCRA applies. See supra note 153.
176. See CWA, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1377(e) (West Supp. 1988); SDWA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 300j-11(b)
(West Supp. 1989); see also SARA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 9604(d)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1989).
177. See supra note 152.
178. The EPA recently estimated that within a 10-year period it expects approximately 36
tribes to be interested in acquiring delegation under one or more of the federal programs. U.S.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ADMINISTRATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS
ON INDIAN LANDS: EPA INDIAN WORK GROUP DISCUSSION PAPER 21 (1983) [hereinafter EPA
DISCUSSION PAPER].
The statutory program limitations may have an especially hard impact on nonrecognized
native communities in the country. The federal government recognizes only about 300 of the
estimated 400 tribes and bands in the United States today. I AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY
REVIEW COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT 461 (1977). Of the approximately 100 nonrecognized
native communities, about one quarter have land bases. Id. at 467, 474. For want of formal
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At the present time, therefore, direct federal preemption of state
pollution control authority in Indian country is not universal, either as
to programs or as to tribes. Some of the federal acts do not directly
prohibit states from regulating conduct in Indian country. 7 9 Those
statutes that do directly bar state incursions by treating tribes as states
do not necessarily reach all affected native nations. Where direct fed-
eral preemption is not clear, the applicability of a particular state "in
lieu of" program in Indian country will depend upon one of two fac-
tors. If EPA has developed and implemented a regulatory policy con-
cerning state authority over reservation lands under the particular
pollution control act, the agency's interpretation and judicial review of
that interpretation will determine state jurisdiction. If no EPA inter-
pretation exists, however, a state's imposition of "in lieu of" programs
in Indian country will be determined by the infringement/preemption
test for general state regulatory authority within reservation
borders. 8 0
B. Deference to Agency Statutory Interpretation
There are three basic situations where EPA's interpretation of the
federal pollution control laws affects the reach of state "in lieu of"
programs: (1) statutes such as CAA, FIFRA, and RCRA, that in
whole or in part do not treat tribes as states; (2) statutes such as CER-
CLA, CWA, SDWA, and SMCRA that do include specific provisions
that tribes be treated as states, but that exclude certain tribes which do
not meet the statutory criteria for assuming primacy; and (3) the latter
group of statutes, with regard to tribes that meet the statutory criteria,
but have not yet assumed primacy.' 8'
recogized status, however, these native homelands likely will be excluded from consideration for
federal grants of tribal environmental program authority.
Virtually all of the 100 nonrecognized communities, scattered across 30 states, and comprising
some 100,000 native members, actively are seeking federal recognition of their tribal status. See
generally THE NEWBERRY LIBRARY, CENTER FOR THE HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN,
OCCASIONAL PAPERS SERIES, No. 7, NONRECOGNIZED AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBES: AN
HISTORICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVE (F.W. Porter III, ed. 1983).
179. Specifically, RCRA and CAA do not contain express prohibitions. See supra notes 154 &
156 and accompanying text.
180. See supra Section I.C. 1.
181. In only one instance does a federal statute directly address authority on Indian lands in
these instances. The SDWA provides that until a native nation assumes primary enforcement
responsibility for the underground injection control program, the currently applicable UIC
program shall continue to apply. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300h-l(e) (West Supp. 1989). As noted earlier,
states may assume primacy over UIC programs within their borders. See supra note 151.
Nonetheless, SDWA regulations provide that EPA may promulgate an alternative UIC program
628
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The EPA has interpreted the federal pollution control acts in two
ways that fundamentally affect the operation of state programs within
reservation borders. First, EPA asserts that the federal acts do not
give the states any regulatory authority in Indian country, and that
any state that wishes to implement its "in lieu of" programs on native
lands must demonstrate independent authority to do so. Second, EPA
on occasion has determined that the federal acts authorize it to dele-
gate program authority to native nations, even though the federal law,
on its face, does not treat tribes as states. Each of these agency inter-
pretations effects a preemption of state authority within native
territory.
1. Federal Primacy in Indian Country
The general position of EPA is that where native nations cannot or
do not assume program management, EPA, and not the state, has pri-
mary enforcement responsibility within Indian country. 182 Based on
President Reagan's Indian policy of government-to-government rela-
tions,183 EPA posits that a state may take primacy within reservation
for Class II wells on Indian lands, 40 C.F.R. § 144.2 (1986), and that states may take UIC
primacy even though they are unable to regulate UIC activities on Indian lands. Id. § 145.21(f).
In practice, EPA generally administers the UIC program for all types of wells on native lands,
even where the state has assumed primary responisibility for the UIC program under the Act.
See, eg., 40 C.F.R. § 147.101(a) (1987) (Alaska); id. § 147.151(a) (Arizona); id. § 147.251(a)
(California); id. § 147.301(a) (Colorado); id. § 147.651(a) (Idaho); id. § 147.801(a) (Iowa); id.
§ 147.1151(a) (Michigan); id. § 147.1351(a) (Montana); id. § 147.1401(a) (Nebraska); id.
§ 147.1451(a) (Nevada); and id. § 147.2101(a) (South Dakota); see also 53 Fed. Reg. 43,084
(1988) (extending the federal UIC program to most native lands); id. at 43,080 (rejecting
Washington State's application to extend its state UIC program to Indian country).
182. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA POLICY FOR THE
ADMINISTRATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS ON INDIAN RESERVATIONS 2 (1984)
[hereinafter EPA INDIAN POLICY]; see also U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
INTERIM STRATEGY FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EPA INDIAN POLICY 2-3, 11 (1985)
[hereinafter EPA INTERIM STRATEGY]; EPA DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 178, at 17; U.S.
E.P.A. General Counsel Opinion No. 78-2 (Mar. 6 1978).
183. President Reagan announced his Indian policy on January 24, 1983. 19 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. DOCs. 98, 99 (1983) ("Our policy is to reaffirm dealing with Indian tribes on a
government-to-government basis and to pursue the policy of self-government for Indian tribes
without threatening termination."). The policy reiterates that tribes have the primary
responsibility for meeting the needs of their people and for developing and managing reservation
resources. Id. "This administration affirms the right of tribes to determine the best way to meet
the needs of their members and to establish and run programs which best meet those needs." Id.
For criticism of Reagan's Indian policy as little more than a means to reduce or eliminate federal
responsibilities to native tribes, see Jorgensen, Federal Policies, American Indian Polities and the
"New Federalism," 10 AM. INDIAN CULTURE & RES. J. 1 (1986); Williams, Reagan's Initiatives
Lead to More Questions than Answers, 250 INDIAN TRUTH 4 (Apr. 1983).
In response to the new federal affirmation of tribal governmental status, EPA announced its
Indian policy on November 8, 1984. EPA INDIAN POLICY, supra note 182, at 1; see also
NATIONAL CONGRESS OF AMERICAN INDIANS, REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE ON
Washington Law Review Vol. 64:581, 1989
borders under an "in lieu of" program only if the state can demon-
strate to EPA's satisfaction that the state is entitled to regulate in
Indian country under independent authority." 4 The federal pollution
control acts, in and of themselves, do not constitute a grant to the
states of any authority or jurisdiction over reservation lands. 85
The EPA's insistence on an independent basis for any assertion of
state authority finds its strongest expression in pronouncements on
RCRA, one of the federal pollution control acts that does not treat
tribes as states. In 1980 EPA announced that it would assume that a
state lacked authority to regulate hazardous wastes within Indian
country unless the state affirmatively asserted that it had jurisdiction,
and supported that assertion with a legal analysis from the state attor-
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN INDIAN COUNTRY 13 (1987) (sponsored by U.S. E.P.A.
Region V (Chicago) [hereinafter REGION V CONFERENCE]. In a document outlining
implementation strategies for its policy, EPA noted that "forcing tribal governments to act
through state governments that cannot exercise jurisdiction over them is not an effective way of
implementing programs overall, and certainly is in opposition to the federal policy of working
with tribal governments directly." EPA INTERIM STRATEGY, supra note 182, at 11. The EPA
was then, and remains still, the only federal agency to have developed its own policy
implementing the presidential statement. Cf U.S. Dep't of Interior, National Park Service,
Native American Relationships Management Policy, 52 Fed. Reg. 35,674 (1987) (establishing
policy of consultation with tribes and consideration of native interests and concerns).
While EPA policy professedly is grounded in Reagan's policy statement, EPA's position is
supported as well by the federal trust responsibility to the native nations. For a discussion of the
trust doctrine generally, see supra note 21, and for a discussion of the federal-native trust
obligation relative to environmental matters, see infra notes 268-69 and accompanying text.
184. See, e.g., Hazardous Waste Management System: General, 45 Fed. Reg. 33,066, 33,378
(1980) ("Because States will lack jurisdiction, in most instances, to control activities on Indian
lands . . . EPA will assume that a State lacks authority unless the State affirmatively asserts
authority and supports its assertion with an analysis from the State Attorney General."). The
basis of EPA's position is found in its Indian policy statement: "EPA recognizes Tribal
Governments as sovereign entities with primary authority and responsibility for the reservation
populace. Accordingly, EPA will work directly with Tribal Governments as the independent
authority for reservation affairs, and not as political subdivisions of States or other governmental
units." EPA INDIAN POLICY, supra note 182, at 2.
185. EPA DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 178, at 9 ("Although Congress can give authority
to state governments to regulate reservation affairs, it must do so specifically, in clear and express
terms. This, the environmental statutes do not do.").
The EPA presumption against state jurisdiction in Indian country absent clear congressional
approval has a long and strong grounding in case law. See California v. Cabazon Band of
Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 216 n.18 (1987) (state laws may reach into Indian country "if
Congress expressly has so provided"); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164,
170-71 (1973) ("[s]tate laws generally are not applicable to tribal Indians on an Indian
reservation except where Congress has expressly provided that State laws shall apply") (citation
omitted); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959) ("Congress has ... acted consistently upon
the assumption that the States have no power to regulate the affairs of Indians on a reservation");
see also WILKINSON, supra note 22, at 93-106.
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ney general."8 6 The State of Washington, traditionally hostile to
native interests," 7 claimed that upon federal authorization of its haz-
ardous waste management plan, the state would be entitled to imple-
ment its program on native reservations.188 The EPA rejected
Washington's contention that either RCRA itself or federal authoriza-
tion of the state plan conferred jurisdiction on the state, and instead
retained federal authority to implement RCRA programs on reserva-
tion lands.189 In subsequent final authorizations of state hazardous
186. Hazardous Waste Management System: General, 45 Fed. Reg. 33,066, 33,378 (1980); see
also 40 C.F.R. § 271.125(c) (1986) (requiring an analysis of the state's authority whenever a state
seeks to extend the state RCRA program to native lands).
The requirement that the state attorney general analyze the state's jurisdiction whenever the
state seeks to implement its "in lieu of" programs in Indian country has become a general one.
See 40 C.F.R. § 123.23(b) (1986) (Clean Water Act NPDES program); 233.23(b) (CWA § 404
permit program); id. § 145.24(b) (SDWA regulations).
187. See, ag., EPA DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 178, at 27 n.6; REGION V CONFERENCE,
supra note 183, at 36. Most recently, Washington Attorney General Ken Eikenberry, writing on
behalf of the Indian Affairs Working Group of the National Association of Attorneys General,
called on the Administrator of EPA to revise the EPA Indian policy to permit states to take an
active role in regulating reservation environments. NAAG PAPER, supra note 159.
The State of Washington's opposition to native interests traditionally has not been confined to
the environmental arena. See, eg., Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v. United States Dist. Court,
573 F.2d 1123, 1125 (9th Cir. 1978) (with the exception of the desegregation cases, the State of
Washington put forth "the most concerted official and private efforts to frustrate a decree of a
federal court witnessed in this century"). For a brief overview of the Washington political
context in which these treaty issues fester, see Ott, Indian Fishing Rights in the Pacific Northwest:
The Need for Federal Intervention, 14 B.C. ENVT'L AFFAIRS L. Rav. 313 (1987).
Despite Washington's national reputation to litigate every last detail on native issues in that
state, and its persistent unwillingness to cooperate with native nations, the state appears recently
to have reconsidered its previous recalcitrance. In January 1989, Washington issued a new
"State/Tribal Governmental Relations Policy," acknowledging the "fundamental principle and
integrity of the government-to-government relationship between the State and the Indian
Tribes." Washington Governor Gardner, in announcing the policy, noted that it presented "a
clear demarcation from old habits of confrontation to new habits of cooperation." See Friends
Committee on National Legislation, Puyallup Land Settlement: Cooperative Wave of the Future,
1-32 INDIAN REP. 8 (Spring 1989).
188. Washington; Phase I and Phase II, Components A and B, Interim Authorization of the
State Hazardous Waste Management Program, 48 Fed. Reg. 34,954, 34,956 (1983).
189. Id. at 34,957:
Contrary to the State's argument, EPA concludes that RCRA and the act of authorization
do not convey to the State any authority relative to Indian lands jurisdiction. States must
independently obtain such authority expressly from Congress or by treaty. The State has
not demonstrated such authority and to EPA's knowledge has not been granted such
authority. EPA, therefore, will retain jurisdiction for operating the Federal program on
Indian lands in the State of Washington.
Despite EPA's rejection of the state's hazardous waste authority in Indian country, and the
judicial affirmance of that rejection, see infra notes 191-200 and accompanying text, Washington
State subsequently claimed authority to extend its SDWA underground injection control pro-
gram over native lands. See 53 Fed. Reg. 43,080 (1988). The State raised the same arguments
that it had raised in its earlier RCRA application. The EPA denied the State's SDWA applica-
tion, finding the State's position "weaker than the same argument under RCRA" because the
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waste management plans, EPA consistently and expressly has retained
jurisdiction in Indian country on the ground that the states have no
federal authority to operate RCRA programs on reservation lands.' 90
Angry at EPA's rejection of the state's asserted jurisdiction, the
state of Washington sued. In Washington Department of Ecology v.
United States Environmental Protection Agency, 9' Washington
claimed that the language and management scheme of RCRA permit a
state to enforce its program "in lieu of" the entire federal program,
including that portion of the federal program applicable on native res-
ervations.' 92 The Ninth Circuit, relying primarily upon principles of
administrative law buttressed by tribal sovereignty, held that EPA's
refusal to allow Washington to regulate in Indian country was
proper. 193
The court noted that both RCRA itself and the statute's legislative
history are silent on the issue of state regulatory authority over reser-
vation lands."9 Under generally accepted principles of administrative
law, when a statute is silent or ambiguous, the courts must defer to the
1986 SDWA amendments reflected congressional intent to promote tribal regulation in Indian
country. Id. at 43,081.
190. See, e.g., 51 Fed. Reg. 3779, 3780 (1986) (Oregon); id. at 3782, 3782-83 (Washington);
id. at 3783, 3784 (Wisconsin); id. at 36,804, 36,805 (Michigan).
The EPA has taken the same stance with regard to approval of state air quality control plans
for the prevention of significant deterioration of air quality ("PSD"). The Agency uniformly has
retained authority for issuing PSD permits in Indian country. See 40 C.F.R. § 52.96(b) (1986)
(Alaska); id. § 52.144(b) (Arizona); id. § 52.683(b) (Idaho); id. § 52.884(a)(1) (Kansas); id.
§ 52.1382(b) (Montana); id. § 52.1436(a) (Nebraska); id. § 52.1829 (North Dakota); id.
§ 52.2346 (Utah); id. § 52.2630(b) (Wyoming). The EPA also has retained authority under
SDWA over the underground injection control program for all classes of wells on native lands.
See supra note 181.
While partial state programs are not permitted under RCRA final authorization, EPA has
ruled that the lack of state authority to regulate in Indian country does not affect final
authorization. "[I]nability of a State to regulate activities on Indian lands does not constitute a
partial program." 40 C.F.R. § 271.1(h) (1986). Similarly, partial state programs are not allowed
under CWA, for either the NPDES or the § 404 permit programs. The EPA has inserted in the
regulations governing these programs language identical to that found in the RCRA regulation.
40 C.F.R. § 123.1(h) (1986) (NPDES program); id. § 233.20(i) (§ 404 program). A similar
provision in the regulations for SDWA permits a state to assume primacy for underground
injection control programs even though the state has no authority to regulate UIC activities on
Indian lands. Id. § 145.21(f).
191. 752 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1985). The case has generated considerable attention in the
literature, both pro and con. See supra note 3.
192. Washington DOE, 752 F.2d at 1467. In support of its argument, the state cited RCRA's
preference for state administration of hazardous waste programs, the authorization of state
programs "in lieu of" the federal program, the statutory right of a state to adopt more stringent
requirements, and the failure of the statute expressly to preserve tribal regulatory powers in the
same way it specifically did preserve state regulatory powers.
193. Id. at 1467-68.
194. Id. at 1469.
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interpretation of the agency charged with administering the statute, so
long as the agency's interpretation is reasonable.195 Under this defer-
ential standard of review, the court ruled that EPA's interpretation
that RCRA does not grant the states any regulatory authority over
native nations was a reasonable construction of the statute. 196
In affirming the reasonableness of the EPA interpretation, however,
the court did not rely solely upon traditional principles of deference to
the agency, but held as well that both federal Indian law and federal
Indian policy supported EPA's stance.197 The Ninth Circuit
examined these federal policies and the "backdrop" of tribal sover-
eignty, the concept central to present-day judicial determinations of
state ability to regulate within reservation borders, 198 as they affected
EPA's interpretation of the hazardous waste statute. Specifically, the
court referred to: the general principle that states do not have jurisdic-
tion over natives and native land absent an express congressional
grant; the federal trust responsibility toward native nations; what it
called "[r]espect for the long tradition of tribal sovereignty and self-
195. Id. Traditionally, the construction of a statute by the agency charged with its
administration is entitled to substantial deference. Young v. Community Nutrition Inst., 476
U.S. 974, 981 (1986). A reviewing court must defer unless the agency interpretation is
inconsistent with the statute or would frustrate congressional policy. Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v.
NRDC, 470 U.S. 116, 125-26 (1985). Regardless whether it is the only or the better
interpretation, a reasonable interpretation by the administering agency must be upheld. Id. at
125. For an excellent precis on judicial "deference" to administrative interpretations of law, see
5 K.C. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 399-404 (1984).
Where native issues are involved, traditional canons of statutory construction dictate that
legislation impacting on natives should be construed liberally and the resolution of statutory
ambiguities is to be found in the tribes' favor. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 381 (1976);
United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R., 314 U.S. 339, 354 (1941); Alaska Pac. Fisheries v. United
States, 248 U.S. 78, 89 (1918). See generally De La Hunt, Canons of Indian Treaty and Statutory
Construction: A Proposal for Codification, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 681 (1984).
196. Washington DOE, 752 F.2d at 1469. The Ninth Circuit stated:
Applying this deferential standard of review, we hold that EPA reasonably has
interpreted RCRA not to grant state jurisdiction over the activities of Indians in Indian
country. The statutory language cited by Washington does not express Congressional intent
to extend state jurisdiction with sufficient clarity for us to conclude that the agency's
interpretation is wrong. Implementation of hazardous waste management programs on
Indian lands raises questions of Indian policy as well as environmental policy. It is
appropriate for us to defer to EPA's expertise and experience in reconciling these policies,
gained through administration of similar environmental statutes on Indian lands.
197. Id. at 1469-72. Using a similar combination of deference to agency interpretation and
reliance on principles of tribal sovereignty, the Ninth Circuit previously had upheld EPA's
delegation to the Northern Cheyenne Tribe of redesignation authority under CAA. Nance v.
EPA, 645 F.2d 701, 712-14 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Crow Tribe of Indians v. EPA, 454
U.S. 1081 (1981). The Northern Cheyenne issue arose prior to the 1977 amendments to CAA
that provided statutorily for tribes to take exclusive redesignation authority over reservation
lands. See 42 U.S.C. § 7474(c) (1982).
198. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
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government;" the current federal policy of promoting tribal self-gov-
ernment, both in general and specifically with regard to environmental
matters; EPA's commitment to the federal position, in theory and in
practice; and the strong tribal sovereign interest in managing the reser-
vation environment.'9 9 All of these factors, the court stated, sup-
ported EPA's interpretation of RCRA as not granting to the states
any authority to implement their "in lieu of" hazardous waste pro-
grams on reservation lands.2°0
One disgruntled commenter quickly pointed out that the case is lim-
ited both procedurally and substantively. First, the commenter noted
that the procedural posture of the case was on appeal from an agency
ruling. Therefore, the decisive factor in the court's decision was the
administrative law principle of deference to agency interpretation of
statutes.2° While this technically is correct, the court's strong reli-
ance on tribal sovereignty to support the reasonableness of EPA's
action suggests judicial recognition of tribal interests in environmental
matters beyond mere deference to EPA.20 2 The commenter's substan-
tive argument rests on the court's disclaimer that its decision would
determine only state authority over natives on reservations, and not
the possible reach of state hazardous waste jurisdiction over non-
natives in Indian country.20 3
During the Washington DOE litigation, the state raised the argu-
ment that it should at least have authority over non-natives, but it did
199. Washington DOE, 752 F.2d at 1469-72.
200. Id. at 1472.
201. Allen, supra note 3, at 69-70, 83. Allen, noting that the court did not address "the more
difficult question of whether a state may assert its own police power, independent of RCRA, to
regulate wastes on reservations," takes as her thesis the assertion that principles of Indian law
preemption support state regulation of hazardous waste in Indian country. Id. at 70. Whether
state police power regulation of pollutants in Indian country is permissible under the
infringement/preemption test is discussed infra, Section III.C.
202. See infra Section III.C. (discussion of preemption of state regulation).
203. Washington DOE, 752 F.2d at 1467-68:
We hold today that the EPA Regional Administrator properly refused to approve the
proposed state program because RCRA does not authorize the states to regulate Indians on
Indian lands. We do not decide the question whether Washington is empowered to create a
program reaching into Indian country when that reach is limited to non-Indians.
See Allen, supra note 3. at 97-103 (positing that courts should find that states have "jurisdiction
to regulate the hazardous waste activities of at least non-Native Americans on Native American
lands if the state presented its regulatory program as an exercise of the state's police powers").
But see Non-Indian Hazardous Waste Regulation, supra note 3, at 110-11 (arguing that tribal
governments are the proper regulatory authority for non-native hazardous waste within reserva-
tion borders).
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so too late for the circuit court to address the question.2 4 Subsequent
to the court's decision, Washington raised the issue again, this time in
its application to EPA for final authorization under RCRA of its state
hazardous waste management program.2 °5 The EPA asserted, as it
had continually, that absent independent state authority to regulate
within reservation borders, EPA would retain jurisdiction under
RCRA to regulate "on Indian lands. '2 6  The term "Indian lands,"
EPA explained, was synonymous with Indian country: that is, it
encompassed all lands, including fee lands, within reservation borders,
all dependent Indian communities, and all Indian allotments.2" 7 The
EPA had presented this definition of "Indian lands" to the court in
Washington DOE, and the court had accepted it as a reasonable
204. Allen, supra note 3, at 96 n.170.
Washington State is a foremost advocate of "checkerboard" jurisdiction-where the state
regulates non-natives within tribal territory-and has been adamant in its insistence that native
governments retain no control over non-native persons and non-native lands on tribal
reservations. On the checkerboard jurisdiction problem, see infra note 212.
205. Washington; Final Authorization of State Hazardous Waste Management Program, 51
Fed. Reg. 3782, 3783 (1986) ("Based on the Court's decision [in Washington DOE], the State
amended their [sic] application to focus their [sic] assertion on authority to cover non-Indian
hazardous waste management activities on Indian lands.").
206. Id. The EPA's use of the term "on Indian lands" had been consistent since the
promulgation of general rules for state hazardous waste management plans. See 45 Fed. Reg.
33,066, 33,378 (1980); see also 40 C.F.R. § 271.1(h) (1986).
207. 51 Fed. Reg. at 3783: "EPA view[s] 'Indian lands' to mean all lands (including fee
lands) within Indian reservations, dependent Indian communities, and Indian allotments to
which Indians hold title." The EPA's definition is a somewhat abbreviated version of the
statutory definition of "Indian country," which includes:
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United
States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-
way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities within the
borders of the United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory
thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments,
the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running
through the same.
18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1982). In other instances, EPA has defined "Indian lands" simply by incorpo-
rating the definition of "Indian country." See 40 C.F.R. § 144.3 (1986) (SDWA regulations)
("Indian lands means 'Indian country' as defined in 18 U.S.C. 1151"). Tribal leaders have sug-
gested, in fact, that EPA substitute the term "Indian country" for any other synonym in order to
avoid confusion and possible future conflict.
The tribal governments request that EPA use the term "Indian country" when referring to
Indian lands, rather than the term "Reservation" or other possible terms which could
exclude extensive Indian territory. "Indian country" is an understandable term of art in
law. Use of other terms could serve to create confusion in definitions and jurisdiction, and
possibly could lead to law suits or legislative clarification which could be avoided by the use
of the standardized "Indian country" term.
REGION V CONFERENCE, supra note 183, at 9 (tribal recommendation no. 11).
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demarcation of state authority.2"8 Thus, based on its interpretation of
the limits of state authority, buttressed by judicial acceptance, EPA
denied Washington's assertion of hazardous waste authority over non-
natives on native lands.2 °9
Because the state cannot assert RCRA jurisdiction over non-native
persons in Indian country without also asserting jurisdiction over the
land on which the activities occur, EPA's interpretation of the statute
bars any attempt by the state to implement its RCRA program within
Indian country. In large part, EPA's interpretation of "Indian lands"
already has been found reasonable by the courts.210
Further judicial review should result in an identical conclusion.
Deference to the implementing agency requires that the court affirm
the agency's interpretation so long as it is reasonable. The reasonable-
ness of EPA's definition of "Indian lands" is apparent in a number of
factors: federal encouragement and promotion of tribal self-govern-
ance; the current state of the law concerning tribal jurisdiction over
non-natives within reservation boundaries, 1 particularly important
where EPA merely is administering a federal pollution control pro-
gram until authority is assumed by the tribe; a recognition of strong
tribal interests in sovereignty over the entirety of the tribal territory;
and an understanding that checkerboard environmental authority
within reservation boundaries would result in multiple practical diffi-
culties.21 2 The "backdrop" of tribal sovereignty and the practical real-
208. "We accept this definition as a reasonable marker of the geographic boundary between
state authority and federal authority." Washington DOE, 752 F.2d at 1467 n.1. The court's
position appears inconsistent with its subsequent insistence that it was not determining state
power "to create a program reaching into Indian country when that reach is limited to non-
Indians." Id. at 1468. If the Ninth Circuit accepts EPA's retained jurisdiction over "Indian
lands" as reasonable, and also accepts as reasonable EPA's definition of "Indian lands" as
including fee lands, then it is difficult to perceive which non-natives could be regulated by the
state in any event. If EPA retains program jurisdiction over all the lands, then the fact that the
state might have authority over persons on those lands would seem irrelevant. The state could
not implement its authority over the person without impinging upon EPA's authority over the
land.
209. 51 Fed. Reg. at 3783.
210. Washington DOE, 752 F.2d at 1467 n.1.
211. See supra Section I.B.3.
212. See EPA DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 178, at 91, noting that checkerboard
jurisdiction "must be weighed by EPA in terms of the practical difficulties of regulating the
environment with two different sets of rules based on racial lines-Indians and non-Indians." In
determining that federal primacy extends to all "Indian lands," EPA has weighed this factor and
determined that checkerboard jurisdiction is inappropriate.
The Supreme Court has addressed the identical problems with checkerboard enforcement in
the context of criminal jurisdiction over reservation lands:
[E]nforcement officers operating in the area will find it necessary to search tract books in
order to determine whether criminal jurisdiction over each particular offense, even though
636
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ities of program administration support EPA's interpretation of
RCRA that the federal agency, and not the states, has primacy over
non-natives in Indian country.
Thus far, conflict and litigation over the state's environmental regu-
latory role in Indian country have occurred primarily in the context of
RCRA. But EPA's position that states have no "in lieu of" program
authority on reservations without a separate grant of jurisdiction from
Congress, is not limited to hazardous waste authority. In regulations
implementing many of the federal environmental programs, EPA
asserts that states may only assume primacy in Indian country if they
can demonstrate independent regulatory jurisdiction over reservation
lands.213 Absent that demonstration, EPA consistently has maintained
the primacy of federal program authority within reservation bor-
ders.214 No reason exists or has been advanced for courts to treat
EPA's interpretation of other federal pollution control laws differently
than the Ninth Circuit treated the agency's interpretation of
RCRA.21 5 Thus, judicial deference to agency interpretation of the
committed within the reservation, is in the State or Federal Government. Such an
impractical pattern of checkerboard jurisdiction [is] contrary to the intent embodied in the
existing federal statutory law of Indian jurisdiction.
Seymour v. Superintendent of Wash. State Penitentiary, 368 U.S. 351, 358 (1962) (footnotes
omitted). But see Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 501-02 (1979) (upholding
Washington's assumption of checkerboard Public Law 280 jurisdiction over fee lands within the
reservation as not antithetical to law enforcement).
213. In addition to RCRA, EPA specifically has asserted this position with regard to CWA,
40 C.F.R. §§ 123.23(b), 233.23(b) (1986); FIFRA, 40 C.F.R. § 171.10(b), (d) (1986); and
SDWA, 40 C.F.R. § 145.24(b) (1986) and 52 Fed. Reg. 17,684 (1987). Under SMCRA, states
cannot assert regulatory authority in Indian country without the express permission of the tribes.
See 30 C.F.R. § 229.105 (1988) ("In the case of a State seeking a delegation of authority for
Indian lands... the State petition to the Secretary [of the Interior] must be supported by an
appropriate resolution or resolutions of tribal councils joining the State in petitioning for
delegation .... "). Tribal consent may be withdrawn at any time:
If at any time an Indian tribe... determines that it wishes to withdraw from the State
delegation of authority in relation to its lands, it may do so by sending a petition of
withdrawal to the State. Once the petition has been received, the State shall within 30 days
cease all activities being carried out under the delegation of authority.
Id. § 229.106.
214. In addition to its authority under RCRA, EPA retains federal primacy under CAA for
prevention of significant deterioration permit authority on Indian lands, see supra note 190;
under CWA for NPDES and § 404 permit programs, 40 C.F.R. §§ 123.1(h), 233.20(i) (1986);
and under SDWA for underground injection control programs, 40 C.F.R. § 145.21(f) (1986).
Similarly, the Secretary of the Interior retains "responsibility for the administration of the
Federal program on Indian lands" under SMCRA. 30 C.F.R. § 701.4(h) (1988).
215. Washington DOE, 752 F.2d at 1469. In fact, prior EPA actions with regard to
environmental programs in Indian country have been affirmed by the court under similar
combined principles of administrative law and domestic Indian law. See Nance v. EPA, 645
F.2d 701 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Crow Tribe of Indians v. EPA, 454 U.S. 1081 (1981)
(upholding as reasonable EPA's delegation to tribe of redesignation authority under CAA).
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federal pollution control acts, bolstered by the "backdrop" of strong
tribal sovereign interests in regulating the entirety of the reservation
environment, should lead to affirmance of EPA's stance as reasonable
agency action.
2. Delegation of Program Authority to Native Governments
The overall policy of EPA is to treat tribes as states, and to delegate
program responsibilities to native nations wherever possible. 1 6 The
EPA has not limited this aspect of its policy to those programs that
statutorily treat tribes as states, but has interpreted the federal pollu-
tion control acts broadly in light of President Reagan's government-
to-government federal Indian policy.217 Thus, where federal statutes
are silent regarding treatment of tribes as states, EPA may choose to
interpret the laws as permitting it to delegate program authority to
native governments.
This issue was addressed specifically in Nance v. Environmental Pro-
tection Agency,2 18 in which a number of energy companies challenged
Similarly, the power of the Secretary of the Interior to interpret SMCRA with respect to Indian
lands has been affirmed. In re Surface Mining Regulation Litig., 627 F.2d 1346, 1363-65 (D.C.
Cir. 1980).
216. EPA INDIAN POLICY, supra note 182, at 2:
EPA recognizes Tribal Governments as sovereigns with primary authority and
responsibility for the reservation populace. Accordingly, EPA will work directly with Tribal
Governments as the independent authority for reservation affairs, and not as political
subdivisions of States or other governmental units.
The Agency will encourage Tribes to assume delegable responsibilities, (i.e. responsibilities
which the Agency has traditionally delegated to State Governments for non-reservation
lands) under terms similar to those governing delegations to States.
217. EPA DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 178, at 35-36:
The Agency will endeavor where appropriate to give tribal governments the primary role in
environmental program management and decision-making relating to EPA's delegable
programs on reservation lands.
The President has stated his support of Indian self-determination and the proposition that
tribal governments should play the primary role in Indian affairs. Except where other
factors particular to the case are such as to render tribal management unreasonable or
inappropriate, tribal governments should be the first choice for the primary management
role in reservation programs, to the extent that individual tribal governments elect to
assume that role.
See also REGION V CONFERENCE, supra note 183, at 16 ("The Agency will recognize tribal
governments as the primary parties for setting standards, making environmental policy decisions
and managing programs for reservations, consistent with Agency standards and regulations.").
One of the examples given in the Region V Conference proceedings is a pilot project for solid and
hazardous waste management on the Menominee Reservation. Id. Solid and hazardous waste
programs fall under RCRA, one of the federal pollution control laws that does not treat tribes
expressly as states. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
218. 645 F.2d 701 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub noma. Crow Tribe of Indians v. EPA, 454 U.S.
1081 (1981).
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EPA's delegation of authority under CAA to the Northern Cheyenne
Tribe.2 1 9 The dispute in Nance arose prior to the 1977 amendments to
CAA that expressly delegated to native governments the sole author-
ity to redesignate reservation air quality. 20 Under the original act, no
statutory language permitted tribal redesignation, but EPA had
promulgated regulations under which a tribe could redesignate the res-
ervation air quality. 2 ' The Ninth Circuit, considering EPA's action
against the backdrop of tribal sovereignty,2  deferred to the agency's
interpretation of the statute as reasonable.22 3
Currently, EPA is conducting a number of pilot projects that dele-
gate to native nations the authority to implement federally mandated
pollution control programs within reservation boundaries.22 4 Several
of these projects fall under federal statutes that do not treat tribes as
states. For example, the Menominee Nation is developing a hazardous
waste management program for its reservation, 2 5 the Navajo Nation
is working on a tribal implementation plan for air quality,2 6 and the
219. This same issue specifically was reserved in Washington DOE, 752 F.2d at 1472:
EPA, having retained regulatory authority over Indian lands in Washington under the
interpretation of RCRA that we approve today, can promote the ability of the tribes to
govern themselves by allowing them to participate in hazardous waste management. To do
so, it need not delegate its full authority to the tribes. We therefore need not decide, and do
not decide, the extent to which program authority under Section 3006 of RCRA is delegable
to Indian governments.
220. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
221. Nance, 645 F.2d at 704 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(c) (1975)).
222. Nance, 645 F.2d at 713-14.
223. Id. at 714:
The effect of the regulations was to grant the Indian tribes the same degree of autonomy to
determine the quality of their air as was granted to the states. We cannot find compelling
indications that the EPA's interpretation of the Clean Air Act was wrong. Nor can we say
that the Clean Air Act constitutes a clear expression of Congressional intent to subordinate
the tribes to state decisionmaking.
224. See generally EPA ACTIvITIEs FY 87, supra note 162.
225. The Menominee pilot project is discussed in REGION V CONFERENCE, supra note 183, at
35-45.
The particular pilot that is being developed at Menominee is one for the control of
hazardous wastes.... The Tribe is the party with the authority, with the sovereignty, and
the Tribe says this is what we want to see, these are the rules that should govern hazardous
wastes. And the Tribe promulgates a tribal code which would ultimately be enforced by the
Tribe and not by the State. What the State has to offer in this kind ofsetting is that the State
has capabilities [such as laboratories and technical ability] . . . . This approach, with a
division of labor, can be structured into a program which would take over from EPA what
would otherwise be EPA's responsibility, in a program for the management of hazardous
waste on a reservation.
Id. at 35-36.
226. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, OFFICE OF FEDERAL ACTIVITIES, EPA
ACTIVITIES ON INDIAN RESERVATIONS: FY 86 4 (1987) [hereinafter EPA ACTIVITIES FY 86]
("The Navajo Nation Air Quality pilot project in Region IX is working on the development of an
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Fort Berthold Tribes have entered into a cooperative agreement for
enforcing pesticides use,227 even though none of the federal statutes
involved-RCRA, CAA, or FIFRA-expressly treats tribes as states
for purposes of these programs.228
If program delegations such as these are challenged in court,229 they
should be affirmed under the reasoning of Nance and Washington
DOE as reasonable exercises of agency authority. Nothing in these
federal statutes grants to the states any authority over reservation
lands or activities, and nothing expressly prohibits native nations from
assuming program responsibility. Presidential policy charges the exec-
utive branch to deal with native nations on a government-to-govern-
ment basis, and promotes tribal responsibility for and control over
approvable Tribal Implementation Plan (TIP) which will include visibility standards."); see also
id. at 9 (air quality monitoring project on the White Earth Reservation); REGION V
CONFERENCE, supra note 183, at 32-33; Cooperative Agreement Regarding Implementation of
the Northern Cheyenne Air Quality Program (State of Montana agrees to provide technical
assistance for tribal development and implementation of a reservation air quality program) (copy
on file with Washington Law Review) [hereinafter Cooperative Agreement].
227. EPA ACTIVITIES FY 87, supra note 162, at 5. The Fort Berthold cooperative agreement
is the first pesticides delegation to a native government. In addition, three tribes-the Cheyenne
River Sioux, the Lower Brule Sioux, and the Rosebud Sioux-have submitted to EPA draft
pesticides applicator certification plans under FIFRA. Id.
228. See supra notes 154 (CAA) & 155 (FIFRA) and accompanying text; see also 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6901-6991i (1982) (RCRA).
229. The challenge does not appear likely to come from a state affected by existing pilot
projects. See, e.g., REGION V CONFERENCE, supra note 183, at 33, 35-36 (praising the states of
Minnesota and Wisconsin for their willingness to work with the White Earth Band of Chippewa
and the Menominee Nation, respectively, on a government-to-government basis); see also EPA
DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 178, at 27 n.6 (noting the generally cooperative attitude of
Arizona, and contrasting it to the expansive jurisdictional claims of the State of Washington).
Notwithstanding its collaboration, Arizona purports to take jurisdiction pursuant to Public
Law 280, discussed supra section I.C.3, "with respect to criminal offenses and civil causes of
action arising from the enforcement of laws relating to air pollution control on all Indian tribal
lands, reservations and allotments." ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49-561 (1987). The EPA has
called Arizona's attempted assumption of jurisdiction "illegal."
Arizona has no legal power to enforce her [sic] pollution control laws on Indians in Indian
country nor has she [sic] the power to try Indians for causes of actions arising from
pollution in Indian country. Apparently, until rebuked by the U.S. Supreme Court, Arizona
will continue to claim jurisdiction to which she [sic] is not entitled.
U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (REGION IX), APPLICABILITY OF STATE POLLU-
TION CONTROL LAW TO INDIAN RESERVATIONS 1, quoted in Smith & Guenther, Environmental
Law: Protecting Clean Air: The Authority of Indian Governments to Regulate Reservation Air-
sheds, 9 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 83, 99-100 (1981). Aside from the illegality of Arizona's pur-
ported assumption of jurisdiction, the authority arrogated to the state by its statute should not
survive the prohibitory versus regulatory test approved by the Supreme Court in California v.
Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 210 (1987). See supra notes 108-10 and accom-
panying text. Since air pollution control manifestly is regulatory rather than criminal in nature,
Arizona would not be entitled to enforce the criminal or civil court provisions of its air pollution
laws even if the state had Public Law 280 jurisdiction.
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reservation resources.230 The concept of inherent tribal sovereignty
demands recognition of native dominion over the residents and the
territory of the reservation.231 In particular, the sovereign interests of
the native nations have been recognized judicially in situations where,
as is true with pollution control programs, the health and welfare of
the tribe may be affected.232
Against this "backdrop" of tribal sovereign interests, EPA has
interpreted the statutes it administers in light of the President's gov-
ernment-to-government policy, and has concluded that the federal
laws permit delegation of environmental programs to native govern-
ments. Under traditional principles of judicial deference to agency
interpretation, and existing precedent, EPA's view of its statutory
authority to delegate to native tribes is reasonable.
Program delegation to tribal governments necessarily preempts
state authority over the same program,233 much as statutory treatment
of tribes as states prohibits state jurisdiction under those acts.234 The
230. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 41-42.
232. See discussion supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
233. Such delegations only prohibit unilateral assertions of state authority; they do not
prevent cooperative tribal-state agreements concerning implementation of pollution control
programs in Indian country. In some instances, in fact, state-tribal agreements specifically are
authorized by federal law. See, eg., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1377(d) (West Supp. 1988)
(tribes and states may enter into agreements "subject to the review and approval of the
Administrator, to jointly plan and administer the requirements of this Act").
Cooperative agreements, whether bilateral or trilateral, abound. For example, the Turtle
Mountain Band of Chippewa and EPA have concluded a Memorandum of Understanding to
develop "a model environmental planning system for the Turtle Mountain Reservation."
Memorandum of Understanding between Turtle Mountain Band of the Chippewa Indians, U.S.
EPA Region VIII, and U.S. EPA Regulatory Integration Division (copy on file with Washington
Law Review). On a somewhat smaller scale, EPA's hazardous waste pilot project on the
Menominee Reservation involves a cooperative agreement between the Menominee Nation and
the State of Wisconsin. REGION V CONFERENCE, supra note 183, at 35-45. In the area of air
quality, the White Earth Band of Chippewa and the State of Minnesota cooperate in an air
quality monitoring program on the reservation, funded through an EPA grant. Id. at 32-33.
The State of Montana and the Northern Cheyenne Tribe in 1984 concluded their Cooperative
Agreement Regarding Implementation of the Northern Cheyenne Air Quality Program.
Cooperative Agreement, supra note 226. As a general rule, the state role in these agreements is
one of providing technical assistance and skills, with the tribes retaining sovereign authority over
development, implementation, and enforcement.
The use of cooperative agreements-as well as other similar measures such as circuit riders
(technical staff who "ride circuit" among a number of reservations)-consistently has been
encouraged by EPA. See EPA DiscussioN PAPER, supra note 178, at 29-30, 33-34, 38-39; EPA
INDIAN POLICY, supra note 182, at 3; EPA INTERIM STRATEGY, supra note 182, at 10. Native
nations appear willing to accept state assistance in technical areas where the states, in turn, are
willing to recognize and accept tribal sovereign authority over the reservation environment. See
REGION V CONFERENCE, supra note 183, at 35.
234. See supra notes 162-64 and accompanying text.
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EPA has rejected any notion of concurrent tribal-state regulatory
authority or checkerboard jurisdiction within reservation borders as
inconsistent with existing case law and unworkable from a practical
standpoint.2 3 5 Thus, to the extent EPA delegates to tribes the author-
ity to implement federal pollution control programs in Indian country,
state jurisdiction to extend the "in lieu of" programs over the same
territory is barred.
Moreover, deference to EPA's two-pronged interpretation of federal
environmental statutes should serve to prohibit the application in
Indian country of those more stringent state laws permitted under the
federal schemes. 3 6 The federal pollution control acts generally permit
only those more stringent state laws that are not inconsistent with the
federal statutes.2 3 7 But state assertion of regulatory authority in
Indian country in the areas governed by the federal statutes is incon-
sistent with those laws. Under EPA's interpretation, to the extent that
tribes are not treated as states, the federal statutory and regulatory
schemes provide for federal primacy in native territory with program
delegation to the tribal governments. Concurrent but more stringent
state regulation in the same territory, therefore, by definition would be
235. EPA DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 178, at 90-91:
[D]ual and possibly inconsistent environmental regulation is not a compatible area for
concurrent jurisdiction .....
[T]he present weight of existing authority in Indian jurisdiction law supports tribal
regulatory authority over pollution sources within the borders of the reservation ...
[A]rguments for concurrent or checkerboard state authority within reservation boundaries
will probably fail in the courts. . . . Finally, residual arguments for checkerboard
jurisdiction or for state jurisdiction over non-Indians must be weighed by EPA in terms of
the practical difficulties of regulating the environment with two different sets of rules based
on racial lines-Indians and non-Indians.
See also New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 338-39 (1983) (rejecting concur-
rent tribal-state regulation of non-Indian hunting and fishing on tribal land because concurrent
jurisdiction "would effectively nullify the Tribe's authority" and "would completely 'disturb and
disarrange' " the federal interests).
236. See also supra note 157 and accompanying text (addressing more stringent state laws
under the federal acts that treat tribes as states).
237. One commenter argues that more stringent state laws under RCRA are exercises of valid
state police power, completely apart from and not prohibited by the federal pollution control
acts, and thus their applicability to native territory is determined by the judicial "infringement/
preemption" analysis, discussed supra section I.C. 1. Allen, supra note 3, at 84-87. As noted in
the text, however, more stringent state laws are not separate from, but rather expressly are
permitted by, the federal statutory schemes. See supra note 157 and accompanying text. The
applicability of state environmental laws under the infringement/preemption test is discussed
infra at Section III.C.
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inconsistent with the federal-tribal scheme established by the pollution
control laws.238
Judicial deference to these agency interpretations, and judicial
affirmance of the reasonableness of the agency's views, should serve to
proscribe state pollution control authority on native lands under most
circumstances where the state is not barred already by statutory provi-
sions. Nonetheless, there may be instances where neither statutory
tribes-as-states language nor deference to agency statutory interpreta-
tion is applicable to a particular state assertion of environmental
authority. In such instances, whether the state can impose its regula-
tions in Indian country is determined by the "infringement/preemp-
tion" test applicable generally to assertions of state regulatory
authority over native lands.
C. The Infringement/Preemption Test
As a general rule, whether and when a state can regulate on the
reservation is a function of the judicially contrived infringement/pre-
emption analysis.2 39 The applicability of this analysis to state asser-
tions of regulatory authority in the environmental arena, however, is
largely mooted by the language of the federal pollution control stat-
utes and EPA's interpretation of its statutory mandate. In virtually
every instance, state attempts to regulate in Indian country, under
either state "in lieu of" programs or more stringent state laws permis-
sible under the federal statutes are barred by one of the two doctrines
discussed above.
Nonetheless, the infringement/preemption test of domestic Indian
law is too pervasive in determining state regulatory authority for
courts or commenters to abandon it altogether in the environmental
context. While even commenters adverse to tribal interests agree
that state regulatory schemes enacted pursuant to the federal laws are
238. Further, a state regulatory program more restrictive than the tribal scheme for the same
reservation effectively would supplant tribal pollution control regulation, infringing upon the
tribal government's inherent right to control its own territory. See infra Section III.C.2.
239. The parameters of the test are described supra at Section I.C.1.
There are, of course, prohibitions on state regulation that arise from analyses other than the
infringement/preemption test. Two of those are described in the preceding sections: direct
federal preemption of state authority, and "preemption" via judicial deference to agency
interpretation of statutes. Since these two situations rarely arise outside the environmental arena,
however, most modern state assertions of regulatory authority in Indian country have been
adjudged under the two-pronged infringement/preemption test.
240. But see Du Bey, Tano & Parker, supra note 3, at 468-69 (arguing that the balance of
interests is not appropriate to a RCRA analysis because of the need for a single management
scheme, EPA's interpretation of RCRA, and the federal Indian policy preempting state
hazardous waste jurisdiction).
Washington Law Review Vol. 64:581, 1989
preempted under the doctrines discussed above,24 1 there is disagree-
ment whether the infringement/preemption test is applicable to more
stringent state laws provided for in the federal acts, 242 or to state regu-
lation of non-native persons and activities within native territory.243
Given the Supreme Court's penchant for using the infringement/
preemption analysis, 244 however, that test likely will be employed by
the courts to determine the applicability of any supplemental or addi-
tional state pollution control laws enacted under the state police
power. Courts already have employed a part of that test-the "back-
drop" of tribal sovereignty that informs the domestic Indian law pre-
emption analysis-to inform and bolster their administrative law
decisions upholding EPA's interpretation of the federal pollution con-
trol laws. 245 Thus, despite its limited applicability in the environmen-
tal context, courts likely will continue to use the infringement/
preemption analysis for determining at least certain aspects of state
pollution control authority in Indian country.
1. Federal Indian Law Preemption
a. Backdrop of Tribal Sovereignty
The first component of the domestic Indian law preemption analysis
is the "backdrop" of tribal sovereignty against which the interests of
the various governments are weighed. In its most current articulation
241. Allen, supra note 3, at 84-85.
242. See supra note 237. As discussed supra Sections III.A and III.B, statutory treatment of
tribes as states, other express preemptive language in the federal statutes, and EPA's policy of
federal primacy with program delegation to native governments, all serve to preempt or prohibit
state implementation of more stringent laws under theories other than the Indian law
infringement/preemption analysis.
243. Two of the commenters who thus far specifically have addressed the issue of state
regulation of non-native pollution both assume that the infringement/preemption test is the
appropriate analysis, although they disagree about the outcome of applying that analysis. See
Allen, supra note 3, at 87-114 (arguing that states are empowered to regulate in Indian country
at least as to non-natives); Non-Indian Hazardous Waste Regulation, supra note 3, at 1110-11
(positing that tribes are the proper regulating authority over natives and non-natives alike inside
reservation borders).
Both commenters appear to ignore the fact that EPA has asserted federal primacy "on Indian
lands," which includes non-Indian fee lands within reservation borders. See supra notes 206-07
and accompanying text. For the most part, then, state assertions of regulatory authority over
non-natives in Indian country will be barred by judicial deference to agency statutory
interpretation, as exemplified in Washington Dep't of Ecology v. EPA, 752 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir.
1985) (discussed supra notes 191-200 and accompanying text).
244. See, e.g., California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 215-21 (1987);
see also supra notes 76-88 and accompanying text (discussion of Cabazon).
245. Washington Dep't of Ecology v. EPA, 752 F.2d 1465, 1469-72 (9th Cir. 1985); Nance v.
EPA, 645 F.2d 701, 713-14 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Crow Tribe of Indians v. EPA, 454
U.S. 1081 (1981).
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of the preemption test, the Supreme Court stated that this backdrop
encompasses "traditional notions" of native sovereignty,246 and indi-
cated as well that the backdrop should include federal promotion and
encouragement of native self-government, self-sufficiency, and eco-
nomic development.247
The fundamental "traditional notions" of tribal sovereignty relevant
to the pollution control area are dominion over the territory of the
reservation,248 sovereignty over citizens of the native nation,249 the
right to make and enforce laws and set domestic policy,25° and control
of tribal natural resources, including the reservation environment.251
Additional sovereign powers vital to control of pollution include the
protection and maintenance of citizen health and welfare,252 and con-
246. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 216. The Court properly refocused the backdrop inquiry on broad-
based concepts of tribal sovereignty, rather than the limited, particularized notion of sovereign
interests articulated in Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 722 (1983). See discussion supra note 78
and accompanying text.
247. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 216 ("The inquiry is to proceed in light of traditional notions of
Indian sovereignty and the congressional goal of Indian self-government, including its
'overriding goal' of encouraging tribal self-sufficiency and economic development."); see supra
note 78 (discussing the expansion of the backdrop component inherent in this formulation).
248. See supra notes 41 & 45 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
250. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
25 1. Most treaties, statutes, or executive orders reserving or establishing native reservations
are silent or, at best, ambiguous as to retained tribal property interests beyond surface use.
Rather than draw the inference that no resources were included in the reservation, however,
courts overwhelmingly have construed these documents as reserving to the tribe all beneficial
interests in the reservation. United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. 111, 113 (1938) (mineral
and timber rights impliedly reserved when treaty "set apart [lands] for the absolute and
undisturbed use and occupation of the Shoshone"); United States v. Kiamath and Moadoc
Tribes, 304 U.S. 119, 123 (1938) (tribes' rights in land extend to all elements that make land
valuable). Subsequent cases have enumerated these beneficial interests to include all wildlife,
timber, minerals, and fugacious minerals (oil and gas) on tribal lands. As the Supreme Court
noted in New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 337 (1983):
It is beyond doubt that the Mescalero Apache Tribe lawfully exercises substantial control
over the lands and resources of its reservation, including its wildlife.... [T]he sovereignty
retained by the Tribe under the Treaty of 1852 includes its right to regulate the use of its
resources by members as well as non-members. In Montana v. United States [450 U.S. 544
(1981)], we specifically recognized that tribes in general retain this authority.
252. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981) (acknowledging inherent
sovereign powers of native governments over conduct affecting "the health or welfare of the
tribe"); Cardin v. De La Cruz, 671 F.2d 363, 364, 366 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 967
(1982) (holding that "dangerous and unsanitary conditions" of non-native business on fee land
wer within tribe's power to regulate, in part because of effect on tribal health and welfare);
Colville Confederated Tribes v. Cavenham Forest Indus., 14 Ind. L. Rep. 6043 (Coly. Tr. Ct.
1987) (enjoining non-native corporation on fee land from using part of its property as a dump site
for waste from wood products, in part because of impact on tribal health and welfare, unless
corporation complies with tribal land use procedures); see also Non-Indian Hazardous Waste
Regulation, supra note 3, at 1111; Comment, The Developing Test for State Regulatory
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trol over land use and economic development patterns.253 To the
extent that the backdrop of native sovereignty still includes a "tradi-
tion of self-government" in the particular field under consideration,254
the existence of tribal environmental agencies and programs, pollution
control laws, cooperative agreements, and other trappings of native
legislative sovereignty may be important in any particular factual situ-
ation. Although such a particularized inquiry into the manifestations
of a tribe's sovereign powers ostensibly has been disavowed, 255 the
existence of particular indicia of tribal pollution control authority can
Jurisdiction in Indian Country: Application in the Context of Environmental Law, 61 OR. L. REV.
561, 581 (1982) [hereinafter The Developing Test].
253. See, e.g., Segundo v. City of Rancho Mirage, 813 F.2d 1387, 1393 (9th Cir. 1987) ("It is
beyond question that land use regulation is within the Tribe's legitimate sovereign authority over
its lands."); Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation v. Namen, 665
F.2d 951, 964 (9th Cir. 1981) (affirming inherent tribal powers to regulate non-native riparian
rights to build and maintain docks, breakwater, and storage shed on tribally-owned lake), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 977 (1982); Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 650 F.2d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir.
1981) (noting "the ability of a tribe to exercise traditional governmental functions such as
zoning"), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 916 (1982); see also supra note 64 and accompanying text (zoning
cases discussed).
254. The penultimate Supreme Court formulation of the test for state regulatory jurisdiction
in Indian country determined the backdrop of tribal sovereignty by seeking a tribal tradition of
self-governing activity in the particular area in question. Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 722
(1983). Although the Court more recently appears to have retreated to its earlier stance that
general rather than specific traditions of sovereignty should comprise the analytical backdrop, see
California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 216-18 (1987), the Supreme Court
is not known for consistency in its Indian law opinions. Thus, the future importance of
particularized traditions of self-government remains speculative. See generally supra note 78
(discussion of this aspect of Rice and Cabazon).
255. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 216-17 (1987) (the
preemption analysis "is to proceed in light of traditional notions of Indian sovereignty"); see also
id. at 220 (distinguishing Rice); id. at 226 (Stevens J., dissenting) (arguing for state authority
because the tribe "has no tradition or special expertise in the operation of large bingo parlors").
The absurdity and irony of requiring, as Rice did, a tribal tradition of sovereignty in a
particularized area are especially evident in the pollution control arena. Few tribes have
implemented environmental statutes and programs. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, SURVEY OF AMERICAN INDIAN ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION NEEDS ON
RESERVATION LANDS: 1986, 5 (1986) ("Twenty-eight tribes are currently implementing their
own environmental protection programs."). Moreover, since many polluting activities are
""'relatively recent phenomen[a], there is, of course, no history or tribal tradition of sovereignty
in this area.' " Id. at 106 (quoting the Amicus Brief of the State of California in Washington
Dep't of Ecology v. EPA, 752 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1985)). Because pollution control is a
relatively recent activity, and because many reservations are located far from major population
centers and have relatively pristine environments, it is logical that few native nations have
developed elaborate laws and programs to address the issue. Under the Rice analysis, however,
the very fact that much of Indian country historically has been pollution-free, and thus that
many tribes have no pollution control mechanisms in place, would be a reason to permit state
encroachment. Those tribes with cleaner environments thus could be penalized for that fact.
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serve only to strengthen the judiciary's perception of the backdrop of
tribal sovereignty. 6
Federal policy promoting native self-determination is the second
component of the backdrop of tribal sovereignty.257 In the area of
environmental protection, this federal policy is particularly forceful.
The "congressional goal of Indian self-government 258 is manifested
generally in enactments furthering native self-determination and eco-
nomic development,15  and specifically in legislation promoting tribal
primacy in pollution control activities.26 ° Executive branch policy
echoes the congressional. Former President Reagan's Indian policy
256. Courts at times purport to find no necessity for a native nation to have acted in order to
preserve tribal sovereign powers. See, eg., Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 148
(1982) ("[t]o presume that a sovereign forever waives the right to exercise one of its sovereign
powers unless it expressly reserves the right to exercise that power turns the concept of
sovereignty on its head"); Segundo v. City of Rancho Mirage, 813 F.2d 1387, 1393 (9th Cir.
1987) ("failure of the Tribe to legislate does not constitute a relinquishment of its authority to do
so"). But compare State v. Webster, 114 Wis. 2d 418, 338 N.W.2d 474 (1983) (no state traffic
jurisdiction over natives on Menominee Reservation, in part because Menominee Nation had
traffic code, police department, court system, and jail) with County of Vilas v. Chapman, 122
Wis. 2d 211, 361 N.W.2d 699 (1985) (state had at least interim traffic jurisdiction over natives on
Lac du Flambeau Reservation because tribe had no motor vehicle code and no tribal court).
One consequence of this judicial inconsistency is that native governments cannot rely upon the
judiciary to uphold tribal sovereign power if that power is not evidenced in legal codifications,
court systems, or other manifestations familiar to domestic courts. Native nations essentially are
forced to practice "legal auto-genocide." Williams, The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The
Hard Trail of Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man's Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 Wis.
L. REv. 219, 274. Only by subordinating their sovereignty through the adoption of the laws and
legal mechanisms of the majority culture can native nations assure that the domestic court
system will consider tribal "sovereign" interests.
257. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
258. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 216 (1987).
259. See, ag., Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. § 450a(b)
(1982) ("Congress declares its commitment to... the establishment of a meaningful Indian self-
determination policy"); Indian Financing Act of 1974, id. § 1451 (congressional policy is to
provide capital "to help develop and utilize Indian resources, both physical and human, to a
point where the Indians will fully exercise responsibility for the utilization and management of
their own resources"); Indian Tribal Governmental Tax Status Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7871 (1982)
(treating tribes as state equivalents for purposes of certain tax exemptions).
260. The federal pollution control laws that treat tribes as states, see supra Section III.A,
manifest a clear congressional intent that native governments exercise self-governing powers with
respect to environmental protection. Beyond the "tribes as states" statutory language, the
legislative intent for tribal autonomy in reservation environmental matters is manifested also in
the CongressionalRecord. For example, in debates on the House floor concerning the 1977 Clean
Air Act Amendments, the manager of the House bill noted:
The concept of Indian sovereignty over reservations is a critical one, not only to native
Americans, but to the Government of the United States. A fundamental incident of that
sovereignty is control over the uses of their resources. Some statutes, I imagine, have
encroached upon Indian sovereignty, eroding treaty rights negotiated at an earlier time.
This is not such a bill.
123 CONG. REc. H8665 (1977) (statement of Rep. Rogers (Fla.)).
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stated his administration's position of dealing with native nations on a
government-to-government basis, pursuing a policy of self-determina-
tion, and increasing tribal primary responsibility for such areas as
developing and managing reservation resources.26' In line with this
presidential policy, EPA has adopted its own, more specific policy of
government-to-government relationships with the native nations, 262
including the express recognition that filtering tribal pollution control
programs through the states is contrary to the spirit and function of
intergovernmental federal-tribal relations.263 In consequence, EPA's
policy dictates federal primacy and program delegation to tribal gov-
ernments in those instances where the federal statutes do not expressly
authorize the treatment of tribes as states.264
The backdrop of tribal sovereignty and the federal policy advancing
native self-government, both generally and more particularly in the
pollution control area, thus strongly support tribal primacy over envi-
ronmental protection matters in Indian country. Against this back-
drop, the courts engage in the second stage of the Indian law
preemption analysis: balancing the interests of the three governments
involved. As a rule, given the overriding federal policy of promoting
native self-government, the federal and tribal interests are weighed on
the one hand against the state interests on the other.265
261. 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Docs. 98, 99 (Jan. 24, 1983). While Reagan's policy was the
first specifically to recognize the governmental status of tribes, presidential policy promoting
native self-determination began with President Johnson's administration. Johnson called for an
end to the "old debate about 'termination' " and a new "policy of maximum choice for the
American Indian: a policy expressed in programs of self-help, self-development, and self-
determination." "The Forgotten American". The President's Message to the Congress on Goals
and Programs for the American Indians, PuB. PAPERS 335 (1968-69). Nonetheless, the shift in
presidential policy to full promotion of native "self-determination" generally is credited to
President Nixon. Special Message to the Congress on Indian Affairs, PUB. PAPERS 564 (1970).
See generally J.D. FORBES, NATIVE AMERICANS AND NIXON: PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS AND
MINORITY SELF-DETERMINATION, 1969-72 (1981) (critiquing the Nixon policy formulation and
its rhetoric of self-determination); Israel, supra note 37, at 629-30 (discussing the impact of the
Nixon policy).
President Bush has released no formal Indian policy. A presidential staff release states that the
new chief executive "believes in American Indian self-government" and will emphasize the
"individual rights and economic well-being of Native Americans on or off the reservation." Bush
Plans New Indian Policy, San Francisco Chron., Jan. 31, 1989, at 12. A Bush administration
emphasis on individual native rights and freedoms, especially those vis-a-vis tribal governments,
coupled with continued severe budget proposals for native programs, unquestionably will
undermine any rhetorical reaffirmation of support for tribal self-government.
262. EPA INDIAN POLICY, supra note 182.
263. Id. at 2; EPA INTERIM STRATEGY, supra note 182, at 11.
264. See supra Section III.B.
265. Recently, this analytical balancing has come under attack from western state attorneys
general, led by Ken Eikenberry of Washington State. At its 1987 conference, the Conference of
Western Attorneys General approved Resolution No. 87-10, proposed by Washington, that calls
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b. The Balance of Federal, Tribal, and State Interests
Federal interests in the area of pollution control in Indian country
include those federal policies described above: the general policy of
promoting tribal sovereignty and self-sufficiency and the more specific
policies encouraging tribal control over reservation resources and tri-
bal primacy over environmental protection activities. 66 In addition,
the federal government has a general interest in implementing and
enforcing pollution control programs, and a more particular interest in
assuring that at least the federal minimum standards are met on native
lands.2 67 Federal responsibilities toward native peoples imposed by
the trust relationship create additional federal interests in serving as a
buffer between native governments and the states, 68 and in ensuring
that native lands do not become dumping grounds for state pollution
on the federal Department of Justice "to review its litigation policies involving federally-
recognized Indian tribes and to insure that all competing federal interests, especially those which
are consistent with .the interests of the several states and their non-Indian citizens, are properly
and fairly considered and represented." See also Letter from Ken Eikenberry, Attorney General
of Washington, to Edwin Meese, United States Attorney General, at 5 (Dec. 9, 1987) [hereinafter
Eikenberry Letter].
266. One commenter posits that the federal government has no particular interests in the area
of hazardous waste regulation on native lands, and that the general federal interest in tribal self-
government-the only federal interest recognized by the commenter-is insufficient to overcome
state interests. Allen, supra note 3, at 107-09. There are significant problems with this assertion.
First, Allen's analysis is focused narrowly on hazardous waste regulation in particular, and not
pollution control regulation in general. Second, Allen ignores all federal interests other than the
general federal policy of promoting tribal sovereignty. See infra notes 267-70 and accompanying
text. And finally, in that section of her analysis, Allen neglects not only other federal interests,
but all tribal interests as well. See infra notes 271-79 and accompanying text.
267. Allen argues that this federal interest is weak because of EPA's poor track record of
environmental regulation on native lands. Allen, supra note 3, at 74, 111. Indications are,
however, that EPA is increasing enforcement of environmental protection programs on native
lands through a variety of mechanisms, including direct federal enforcement, cooperative
agreements between tribes and states, and pilot projects on selected reservations. See supra notes
224-27 & 233 and accompanying text.
268. Protecting native governments against encroachments by the states was a primary
rationale for the development of the trust doctrine. See, e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S.
375, 383-384 (1886):
These Indian Tribes are the wards of the Nation .... They owe no allegiance to the States,
and receive from them no protection. Because of the local ill feeling, the people of the States
where they are found are often their deadliest enemies. From their very weakness and
helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the Federal Government with them
and the treaties in which it has been promised, there arises the duty of protection, and with
it the power.
(emphasis in original). For a brief discussion of the trust doctrine, see supra note 21. The impor-
tance of this aspect of the federal responsibility is manifest particularly in the protection of native
treaty fishing rights. See, e.g., supra note 187 (federal court's admonition of Washington State's
entrenched obstructionist posture in the Pacific Northwest treaty rights cases).
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problems.2 6 9 Additional federal interests, identified by EPA, include
avoiding dual regulatory schemes for pollution control and avoiding
checkerboard jurisdiction over reservation lands.27 °
The interests of native governments in the pollution control field
include the general sovereign interests, discussed above, of self-govern-
ment and territorial integrity. Of particular importance are the right
to control the level of allowable pollution on native lands,2 ' the right
to exercise control over the pace and the degree of development of the
reservation and the reservation resource base,27 2 the right to control
land use within native territory, 27 3 and the right to control issues of
269. Federal responsibilities specifically with regard to native lands and environments
frequently have been noted. See Non-Indian Hazardous Waste Regulation, supra note 3, at 1110;
Wilkinson, Cross-Jurisdictional Conflicts: An Analysis of Legitimate State Interests on Federal and
Indian Lands, 2 UCLA J. ENVT'L L. & POL'Y 145, 161 (1982). The federal trust responsibility
for native land bases manifestly would be implicated by state use of Indian country as a
repository for pollutants and polluting activities not wanted elsewhere in the state. Cf
Washington Dep't of Ecology v. EPA, 752 F.2d 1465, 1470 (9th Cir. 1985) ("the United States in
its role as primary guarantor of Indian interests legitimately may decide that such tribal concerns
[as becoming a dumping ground] can best be addressed by maintaining federal control over
Indian lands").
270. See supra notes 212 & 235 and accompanying text.
271. "Since the land base of most tribes is severely limited, environmental externalities [i.e.,
environmental damage as a cost external to industrial development] may pose an unusually
serious threat." Barsh & Henderson, Tribal Administration of Natural Resource Development, 52
NORTH DAKOTA L. REV. 307, 333 (1975); see, e.g., Governing Council of Pinoleville Indian
Community v. Mendocino County, 684 F. Supp. 1042 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (preliminarily enjoining
operation of non-native asphalt and cement plants on non-native land within reservation, because
"operation of the plants threatens injury to the land, water, and air, as well as the health and
welfare of the Indians").
272. The economic development authority of native governments is widely recognized. See,
e.g., Indian Financing Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1451 (1982); Ramah Navajo School Bd. v. Bureau of
Revenue, 458 U.S. 832, 838 (1982) (noting "the traditional notions of tribal sovereignty, and the
recognition and encouragement of this sovereignty in congressional Acts promoting tribal
independence and economic development"); Governing Council of Pinoleville Indian
Community v. Mendocino County, 684 F. Supp. 1042, 1045 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (noting tribe's
"substantial interests in controlling industrial development"); The Developing Test, supra note
252, at 581. So also is tribal authority over reservation resources. See supra note 251. As one
commenter notes, native title to native lands includes title to the resources, and therefore tribal
actions with regard to resources are taken in both a proprietary and a governmental capacity.
"Thus, where tribal resources are involved, tribal authority should be regarded as plenary,
subject only to specific federal prohibition." Israel, supra note 37, at 634; see also Barsh &
Henderson, supra note 271, at 333 (positing tribal control of reservation resources as the
optimum means of minimizing environmental damage from resource development): Du Bey.
Tano & Parker, supra note 3, at 471 (advocating tribal environmental protection programs as a
way to encourage economic development consistent with tribal environmental goals).
273. Domestic courts repeatedly have acknowledged tribal control over zoning and land use
planning within reservation borders. See supra notes 64 & 253 and accompanying text. And, as
one commenter notes, "[e]nvironmental regulation is certainly very akin to land use regulation."
Will, supra note 3, at 491. Since environmental protection is so closely tied to land use, the cases
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health and welfare affecting the reservation population.274 Additional
native governmental interests include the capacity to comprehend and
respond to tribal needs and priorities,275 to safeguard tribal environ-
mental programs against spillovers from polluting activities located
outside tribal jurisdiction,276 and to prevent native lands from becom-
upholding tribal governmental powers over land use decisions reinforce the arguments in favor of
tribal authority over pollution control in Indian country.
Even Allen admits that tribal rights to zone and control land use "demonstrate the tribal
interest in protecting the reservation environment." Allen, supra note 3, at 103. She goes on,
however, to assert that hazardous waste regulation is distinguishable because RCRA provides
little or no role for tribes in hazardous waste management. Id. This argument is specious. First,
a lack of express delegation to tribes in the federal statute does not impinge upon the inherent
sovereign right of native nations to control land use within tribal territory. Second, hazardous
waste regulation seems peculiarly tied to the land. Finally, tribes increasingly are assuming
hazardous waste regulatory authority in Indian country. See supra note 225.
274. See supra note 252 and accompanying text.
275. As one commenter notes in the context of state governments:
The protection of public health, safety, and welfare is a traditional function of state and
local governments; state governments are closer to the problem and often have greater
knowledge of local environmental, economic, and political conditions.
It has also been suggested that state agencies may be more responsive to citizens, act faster,
and be more flexible, pragmatic, and creative in their solution of hazardous waste problems
than EPA.
Allen, supra note 3, at 112 & n.253. These factors, which Allen cites as supporting state jurisdic-
tion in Indian country, carry much more weight as reasons why tribal jurisdiction should be
paramount. Health and welfare is a traditional tribal governmental function; tribal governments
clearly are closer to the problems in Indian country and more aware of local needs and condi-
tions. Tribal governments unquestionably are likely to be more responsive to their citizens than
are state or adjacent municipal entities.
276. "Spillovers spill over both ways." Barsh, supra note 74, at 875. This obvious truth, so
aptly stated, apparently needs to be reiterated at every turn. In virtually every instance where
state interests are discussed, spillover-the effect in one jurisdiction of actions taken in another-
is listed as a legitimate state concern. See, e.g., Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 724 (1983)
(upholding state licensure requirement for on-reservation general store where "distribution of
liquor [for off-premises consumption] has a significant impact beyond the limits of the . . .
Reservation"); New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 336 (1983) ("A State's
regulatory interest will be particularly substantial if the State can point to off-reservation effects
that necessitate state intervention."); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian
Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 155 (1980) ("principles of federal Indian law ... [do not] authorize
Indian tribes thus to market an exemption from state taxation to persons who would normally do
their business [off-reservation]"). And yet virtually never is spillover listed as a valid tribal
concern. See Kramer, supra note 22, at 1032 (noting the Supreme Court's failure to balance
tribal interests in spillover situations). It is too obvious to merit discussion, however, that
pollutants which can travel off a reservation can as easily migrate onto a reservation.
The issue of spillovers would become especially important in the unlikely event that a court
would permit checkerboard pollution control authority in Indian country, with EPA and/or the
tribe regulating native sources and the state regulating non-native sources. See supra notes 212 &
235. The irony in that case, of course, is that a native nation would have essentially no
protection against spillovers occurring within its own territory, but outside its jurisdiction.
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ing dumping grounds for pollutants generated off-reservation.277
Tribes also legitimately fear a lack of state enforcement on native
lands278 and mistrust state sensitivity to tribal needs.279
State interests in pollution control regulation within native territory
include the desirability of uniform laws and uniform enforcement of
pollution control programs within state borders,28° the potential for
frustration of state environmental programs through spillovers from
on-reservation pollution sources,281 the perceived lack of enforcement
277. Washington Dep't of Ecology v. EPA, 752 F.2d 1465, 1470 (9th Cir. 1985); EPA
DiscussION PAPER, supra note 178, at 83; Non-Indian Hazardous Waste Regulation, supra note
3, at 1111. Included in this concern is the related fear of "midnight dumping" on reservation
lands. See REGION V CONFERENCE, supra note 183, at 20.
278. One commenter argues that "[i]f a state is aggressive enough to seek control over
hazardous waste on Native American lands, it is likely to be particularly conscientious in
regulating these wastes." Allen, supra note 3, at 112 n.251.
279. The same commenter posits that states have an interest in considering tribal sovereignty
because "[s]tate encouragement of tribal participation and explicit acknowledgement of tribal
concerns would undoubtedly further Washington's regulatory efforts on the reservations."
Allen, supra note 3, at 106. The naivet6 of this statement is startling, particularly since it was
made about the State of Washington, which has been reprimanded by the federal courts for its
recalcitrance in dealing with native governments. See supra note 187.
280. Washington Dep't of Ecology v. EPA, 752 F.2d 1465, 1472 (9th Cir. 1985) ("We
recognize the vital interest of the State of Washington in effective hazardous waste management
throughout the state, including on Indian lands."). See also Allen, supra note 3, at 97-99; Non-
Indian Hazardous Waste Regulation, supra note 3, at 1111.
Allen argues also that states have an interest in avoiding federal-state checkerboard
jurisdiction within the borders of the state. Allen, supra note 3, at 99-100. And yet Allen
essentially recognizes native authority over native activity, and proposes state jurisdiction only
over non-native activity in Indian country. Id. at 115. Thus, even under Allen's proposal, there
would be a patchwork of state and tribal authority on native lands. Furthermore, where the
federal or tribal government exercises pollution control authority over the entirety of native
territory, the boundaries between governmental jurisdictions are well marked: the state has
jurisdiction outside Indian country, and the federal or tribal government has jurisdiction within
that country. Such a straightforward demarcation of jurisdictional lines is not confusing. Under
Allen's formulation, by contrast, which government was entitled to regulate a particular parcel of
land, or the activity occurring on that land, would be fact specific and difficult to determine. The
uniformity and certainty that Allen advocates would be sacrificed by the author's own proposed
solution.
281. Allen, supra note 3, at 98-99; Non-Indian Hazardous Waste Regulation, supra note 3, at
1111; The Developing Test, supra note 252, at 582.
The specter of spillover effects is the interest most often asserted by states. See supra note 276.
The attorney general of Alaska, for example, asserted that although in general state jurisdiction
over air pollution sources on the Metlakatla Reservation is not "legally certain," the state would
have such authority where on-reservation air pollution had off-reservation impacts. 1983 Op.
Att'y Gen. Alaska No. 101; see also 1965 Rep. Att'y Gen. N.M. 44 (positing state air pollution
jurisdiction over non-native lessees, in part because the effect of the pollution occurs outside the
reservation). As the Ninth Circuit noted in Washington DOE, however, "EPA remains
responsible for ensuring that the federal standards are met on the reservation. Those standards
are designed to protect human health and the environment. The state and its citizens will not be
without protection." 752 F.2d at 1472 (citation omitted).
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of federal programs on native lands,28 2 the lack of tribal expertise and
technical competence in managing environmental programs, 283 and
the potential for a competitive tribal economic advantage because of
lesser environmental controls on industry.284 In addition, states assert
a greater interest over non-native persons, activities, and lands simply
because of their non-native status.285
The courts must balance these sovereign interests of the three gov-
ernments in light of the backdrop of tribal sovereignty and the federal
policies of promoting tribal self-sufficiency and self-government.
Native sovereignty extends over Indian country, including the natural
resources and environment and any development activities, and over
282. Allen, supra note 3, at 74:
In general, EPA does not have an outstanding record in regulating environmental problems
on [native) lands. Historically, EPA has hesitated to impose economically burdensome
environmental regulations on Native American tribes. In addition, it has not taken a strong
enforcement role on Native American lands until a serious problem has arisen.
(footnotes omitted). The problem is exacerbated where the state standards are more stringent
than the federal minimums. Id. at 74, 97-98. To some degree, enforcement problems now are
being addressed through tribal assumption of environmental program responsibility and through
cooperative agreements among EPA, the native nations, and the states. See supra notes 224-27
& 233 and accompanying text.
283. See REGION V CONFERENCE, supra note 183, at 8, 14. A variety of solutions to the
problem has been proposed by tribal leaders and EPA administrators, including increased
funding by EPA for training, staff, and technology, the circuit-rider approach, regional tribal
organizations, and cooperative agreements with neighboring states and with the federal agency.
Id. at 8, 72.
284. Allen, supra note 3, at 73; The Developing Test, supra note 252, at 582; see also
Eikenberry Letter, supra note 265, at 2-3 (asserting that tribes and businesses both seek to have
industry locate in Indian country to avoid state regulation, particularly state environmental
regulation). But see id. at 4 (positing that a lack of state environmental regulation is detrimental
to reservation economic development because "industry ends up in an uncertain regulatory
environment").
Like the spillover issue, see supra note 276, inequitable competitive climates for industry is a
fact faced by many adjacent jurisdictions-tribal/state, state/state, and nation/nation. For
example, any time one state adopts the federal minimum pollution control requirements, a
neighboring state with stricter laws can claim a competitive disadvantage in attracting and
keeping industry. Like spillovers, that fact never has justified interstate regulation.
285. Allen, supra note 3, at 100; Non-Indian Hazardous Waste Regulation, supra note 3, at
1111; see also The Developing Test, supra note 252, at 582 ("the tribal interest is the least in the
situation of non-Indians on fee land").
Several state attorneys general have posited that their states have environmental regulatory
jurisdiction over non-natives or non-native fee land within Indian country. See, e.g., 1965 Rep.
Att'y Gen. N.M. 44 (state has jurisdiction over a non-native lessee of reservation land where
lessee's air pollution affects non-native land off the reservation); 1970 Rep. Att'y Gen. N.M. 8
(state may apply its air and water quality regulations to privately-owned industries located on-
reservation); 72 Op. Att'y Gen. Wis. 54 (1983) (state may regulate mining on non-native fee land
in order to protect groundwater); see also 1983 Op. Att'y Gen. Alaska No. 101 (suggesting that
courts "might more easily find civil environmental regulatory jurisdiction over non-Indian
individuals or businesses operating on Indian reservations").
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the health and welfare of residents of the tribal territory. Federal
executive and congressional policies strongly encourage tribal self-
determination, self-government, and self-sufficiency, both generally
and specifically in the areas of environmental protection and pollution
control. Together, these factors create a backdrop to the balancing
test that clearly supports tribal and federal primacy in Indian country.
When viewed in light of this backdrop, the balancing test necessar-
ily tips in favor of the tribal and allied federal interests. Many of the
legitimate state interests-uniform laws, spillover concerns, and
enforcement issues-are being addressed through increased attention
by EPA to pollution control in Indian country, the growth of tribal
programs to address specific and overall environmental concerns, and
cooperative agreements between tribes and states.286 In any case,
many of these state interests are no greater in the state-tribal context
than they are with regard to neighboring states. Spillovers and
problems with lack of uniform laws potentially plague any situation
involving contiguous jurisdictions.7
Moreover, the asserted state interests become only minimally
stronger where non-natives are involved. Although in certain situa-
tions domestic law accords states a greater degree of regulatory juris-
diction over non-natives than over natives, 2 8  tribal regulatory
286. See supra notes 225-26. See generally EPA ACTIVITIEs FY 87, supra note 162; EPA
AcTIVITIEs FY 86, supra note 226.
287. One commenter attempts to distinguish tribal-state border problems from state-state
issues.
The problems between neighboring states and between states and reservations within their
borders, however, are different in an important matter of degree. While there are states
whose borders are blurred by urban development, for the most part the developed areas of
neighboring states do not overlap. Often neighboring states are divided by geographic
features, such as rivers or mountains. The problem raised by lower regulatory standards on
reservations is different than the equivalent problem between sister states because of the
close overlap between reservation land and non-reservation land. Thus, the degree to which
a reservation will have an adverse effect on a state's regulatory program is correspondingly
greater than between sister states.
Allen, supra note 3, at 98 n.177. Allen's distinctions are chimerical. The only "close overlap"
between tribal and state lands is that they abut, as do lands of most states with lands of neighbor-
ing states. The fact that some states are separated at a border by a natural boundary hardly
prevents spillover pollution problems, and in fact may aggravate them. See, e.g., International
Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987) (Vermont alleged water pollution by New York
source of border lake between the states); Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 731 F.2d 403 (7th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1196 (1985) (Illinois alleged pollution of Lake Michigan resulting
from sewage dumped by Wisconsin city).
288. See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981) (state can regulate non-native
hunting and fishing on non-native fee land in Indian country); Washington v. Confederated
Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980) (state can tax non-natives
purchasing cigarettes from native retailers on the reservation).
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authority over non-natives nonetheless is extensive. Native govern-
ments are entitled to regulate non-natives where those non-natives
enter into consensual business dealings with the tribe or its mem-
bers.289 In addition, native governments are entitled to regulate non-
natives, even on non-native fee land, when non-native conduct impacts
or may impact tribal health and welfare, economic security, or polit-
ical integrity.29 ° At the very least, non-native sources of pollution or
potential pollution may threaten or directly affect the health and wel-
fare of tribal members residing in or owning interests in land located
within tribal territory.291
There is little doubt, then, that native governments may regulate
non-native sources of pollution anywhere within the reservation.
Sources on all lands in Indian country may be regulated because of the
effect on tribal health and welfare. Pollution sources on native lands
also may be regulated because of tribal authority over non-natives
engaged in dealings with the tribe or its members.
The remaining question is the exclusivity of tribal regulation. The
Supreme Court has stated that tribal authority to regulate will pre-
empt state jurisdiction where concurrent jurisdiction "would effec-
tively nullify" native authority or would enable the state "wholly to
supplant" the tribal regulatory scheme.2 9 Concurrent pollution con-
289. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565. See discussion supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
Non-native lessees of tribal lands or non-native businesses that operate on native lands are
examples of non-natives who enter into consensual business dealings. Hence a pollution source
resulting from such non-native activity on tribal lands will be within the exclusive regulatory
jurisdiction of the tribe.
Tribal regulatory control over non-native lessees of tribal lands may be particularly important,
since "[w]hen the leased land reverts to the tribe, the tribe will be saddled with the environmental
effects of the lessee's activities." The Developing Test, supra note 252, at 584; see also Non-Indian
Hazardous Waste Regulation, supra note 3, at 1114 n.212 (noting that state interests in regulating
non-Indians who do not own land in fee are particularly weak).
290. Montana, 450 U.S. at 566; see discussion supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
Under the Montana test, non-native conduct need not have a present effect on tribal interests, but
only "threatenfl" such an effect. Montana, 450 U.S. at 566.
The Montana test concerns tribal authority over non-natives on non-native fee lands within
Indian country. Where tribal regulation of non-natives would be permissible on such fee lands, it
clearly is permissible also on native lands.
291. For example, the Puyallup Reservation encompasses much of the city of Tacoma,
Washington, including most of the city's port and industrial area. NAAG PAPER, supra note
159, at 2-3; Eikenberry Letter, supra note 265, at 3. Within the Puyallup Reservation, the state
has issued more than 70 NPDES (water pollution discharge) permits. NAAG PAPER at 3;
Eikenberry Letter at 3. Over 70 sources of waste discharge within a reservation inevitably may
impact tribal health and welfare. See also cases cited supra note 252 (noting effects of non-native
activities on tribal health and welfare).
292. New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 338 (1983). See discussion supra
note 235 ("mutual dislocations" presented by concurrent tribal/state regulatory jurisdiction).
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trol regulations would negate tribal regulatory efforts. A tribal gov-
ernmental scheme for pollution control, tailored to the needs,
resources, and priorities of the reservation, easily could be nullified or
supplanted by the imposition of a possibly conflicting state scheme.
Concurrent state jurisdiction also would interfere with the federal
scheme providing that EPA and the tribes, not the states, have regula-
tory primacy over all "Indian lands." '2 9 3 The EPA asserts that it and
the tribes have authority, to the exclusion of the states, over all
"Indian lands," a term that EPA equates with Indian country.294 The
federal management scheme for pollution control thus contemplates
only federal and tribal authority within Indian country. Manifestly,
concurrent state jurisdiction would "disturb and disarrange" this fed-
eral plan.29 5
Finally, concurrent state jurisdiction over non-natives would result
in checkerboard jurisdiction and interfere with the federal objective of
tribal primary responsibility over native territory.29 6 Tribal control of
the reservation environment is meaningful only if the native govern-
ment can in fact control the whole of the reservation environment.
Piecemeal or checkerboard jurisdiction by the state adversely may
affect the tribal pollution control scheme, particularly where tribal
laws and regulations are stricter than those of the state or where the
native government has legislated supplemental laws not matched by
the state. Spillover problems could be exacerbated if alternate parcels
of land were subject to alternate environmental schemes. Moreover,
state regulation of non-native inholdings would grant the state a
degree of control over industrial development within the tribe's terri-
tory by granting or withholding permit authority at the discretion of
the state, rather than the tribe. Thus, to avoid these problems, tribal
pollution control authority in Indian country necessarily must be
exclusive of the state for all persons, lands, and activities.
Despite some legitimate state interests in regulating all activities
within state boundaries, tribal and federal interests in native self-gov-
ernment and control of reservation resources, development, and envi-
ronmental and health issues outweigh state concerns. The backdrop
of tribal sovereignty and federal promotion of native self-government,
the fact that tribal and federal interests outweigh state interests in reg-
293. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. at 338 (state concurrent regulation is barred if it
would " 'disturb and disarrange'" a comprehensive federal management scheme (quoting
Warren Trading Post v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685, 691 (1985)).
294. See supra notes 206-07 and accompanying text.
295. See supra note 293.
296. See supra notes 212, 235, 280 and accompanying text.
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ulating on native lands, and the clear federal scheme encouraging tri-
bal primacy in pollution control activities, all point to preemption of
state pollution control laws and regulations in Indian country, over
non-natives as well as over natives.
2. Tribal Sovereignty
The second and ostensibly independent barrier to state jurisdiction
within Indian country is tribal sovereignty. Where the exercise of
state jurisdiction would infringe on the sovereign rights of the native
nation, state authority in native territory is barred.297 The relevant
sovereign powers of tribes in the area of pollution control have been
noted above: dominion and sovereignty over territory and persons, the
rights to control land use, natural resources, environment, and eco-
nomic development, and the right and duty to care for the health and
welfare of tribal members.298 These powers-central to any sover-
eign-are sufficient not only to inform the preemption analysis, but to
serve as an independent barrier to state jurisdiction within Indian
country.
The impacts of state pollution control laws on the tribal exercise of
these sovereign powers would be severe and detrimental. Politically,
the application of state laws would place control over reservation envi-
ronments in the hands of frequently hostile state governments. Tribal
lands-often remote and sparsely populated-might become dumping
grounds for state environmental problems. Reservation territories also
might be the last areas of the state to receive attention or implementa-
tion of pollution control programs, not only because of location and
population, but also because of the relatively insignificant political
clout of native nations within the state structure. Under state regula-
tion, states would be permitted to control pollution sources on and
near reservations to the extent the state deemed acceptable, subject to
federal minimum requirements. Native nations would lose even the
ability to control pollution effects within their own territories.
Moreover, under state pollution control schemes, states could be
vested with a significant degree of control over the development of the
reservation and tribal resources. State standards more stringent than
the federal minimums conceivably could block reservation develop-
ment believed necessary by the tribe for economic security and the
general welfare. Conversely, where a tribe wished greater protection
of its environment through the imposition of more stringent standards,
297. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
298. See supra notes 248-53 and accompanying text.
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state programs employing federal minimum requirements or state
standards less strict than the tribe's might permit on-reservation devel-
opment where the tribe would choose to block it. In either case, tribal
control over the existence and pace of reservation development would
be restricted.
Territorial integrity and control over natural resources are recog-
nized generally as vital sovereign prerogatives. 99 As a result of these
sovereign rights, one state cannot regulate pollution sources in another
state, 30 0 and one nation is subject to supranational pollution control
mechanisms only through treaty or agreement. 31' The right of sover-
eigns to develop their own laws and domestic policy, and to be gov-
erned by internal decisionmaking, 302 thus is particularly strong in the
environmental protection field. Native American sovereigns-the
tribes, bands, and nations of indigenous peoples-must be accorded
299. Present practice in international law inextricably binds sovereignty and territory: the
exercise of legal authority over a particular territory is central to modern conceptions of
sovereign competence. D. O'CONNELL, supra note 40, at 463 ("the exercise of sovereignty is
predicated upon territory [and] this latter is perhaps the fundamental concept of international
law").
The United States' pretension to exclusive mastery within its geographic boundaries was
articulated early-on by Justice Marshall:
The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute.
It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving
validity from an external source, would imply a diminution of its sovereignty to the extent of
the restriction, and an investment of that sovereignty to the same extent in that power that
could impose such restriction.
All exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete power of a nation within its own
territories, must be traced up to the consent of the nation itself. They can flow from no
other legitimate source.
The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, II U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812). On analogous tribal
sovereign rights, see supra notes 41-42 & 272-74 and accompanying text.
300. International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987); see also supra notes 163 & 173
and accompanying text.
In the international arena, and beyond the narrow context of environmental law, no
international state may exert jurisdiction over questions arising within another's boundaries.
"Now the first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a State is that-failing
the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary-it may not exercise its power in any form in
the territory of another State. In this sense jurisdiction is certainly territorial .... The Case of
the S.S. "Lotus," 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18; see also G. DAVIS, ELEMENTS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 35 (4th ed. 1916).
301. Any nation may place voluntary limitations on its complete freedom of action, by
treaties, contracts, leases, and municipal constitutions and laws, and is limited in its complete
freedom by customary international law and legal principles adhered to by most nations (jus
cogens). I. DELUPIS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE INDEPENDENT STATE 29-140 (1974).
While treaty or contractual arrangements do not serve to confer title or to effect changes in
sovereignty, they may grant jurisdiction to the foreign state. See, e.g., Canal Zone v. Coulson.
109 U.S. 397 (1929) (Constitution does not apply in Canal Zone because United States is not
owner in fee, but has use, occupancy, and control in perpetuity under treaty).
302. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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the same rights of self-government and self-determination over the
natural resources and the environment of their territory as those
enjoyed by other sovereigns.
Implementing state pollution control schemes within reservation
borders would lead necessarily to a diminishment of native sover-
eignty, with deleterious impacts on native governance, economic
development, and resources. This unequivocal infringement on native
sovereignty bars state environmental authority in Indian country.
IV. CONCLUSION
State pollution control laws and regulations are prohibited in Indian
country. Under the three-tiered analysis proposed in this Article, state
assertions of authority over native environmental concerns are pre-
empted by federal law and the inherent sovereignty of the native
nations. Virtually all state pollution control laws will be preempted
either by the plain language of the federal pollution control acts, or by
EPA's policy and statutory interpretation scheme implementing the
federal acts.
States also may enact, pursuant to their general police powers, addi-
tional and supplemental pollution control laws in areas not covered by
the federal acts. Under the infringement/preemption analysis, how-
ever, tribal and federal interests in retaining pollution control author-
ity in the tribal and federal governments outweigh competing state
interests in regulating environmental matters within reservation bor-
ders. State pollution control laws thus are preempted by the federal
environmental management scheme for Indian country. Moreover,
and more fundamentally, the application of state police power regula-
tions severely would prejudice native governmental interests, and thus
is barred also as an infringement upon native sovereignty.
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